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 Introduction 
1. Corporate Social Responsibility and its organizational outcomes 
Growing numbers of firms are engaging with Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR), that is, they are extending their decision-making beyond short-term max-
imization of profits to address the social and environmental costs of doing busi-
ness. Human rights violations, environmental pollution, misinformation of cus-
tomers, financial scandals and other irresponsible firm behavior have put CSR 
high on the public agenda and led to criticism of firm practices (Bartley & Child, 
2014). A recent defining moment was the Rana Plaza accident in April 2013, 
when more than 1,100 garment workers died in the collapse of a factory building 
near Dhaka in Bangladesh. Factory owners ignored safety warnings after cracks 
appeared the day before the accident and ordered garment workers to return the 
following day. The building then collapsed during the morning rush hour. The 
factories in the building produced apparel for such Western brands as Benetton, 
Bonmarché, El Corte Inglés, Mango, Primark, and Walmart, which had out-
sourced manufacturing to Bangladesh, the country with the lowest wages in the 
world (Young & Makhija, 2014). 
The global financial crisis of 2008 has also been blamed on imprudent 
business practices, opening an era of scrutiny of values of modern capitalism. 
Observers often target short-termism (Slawinski, Pinkse, Busch, & Banerjee, 
2017) as a source of counterproductive decision-making that damages firm in-
ternal ethical climates, leading to excessive risk-taking (as illustrated by the bank 
failures that originated the crisis), reduced value-creation activities (such as 
preference for financial over productive investments), or compliance avoidance 
(as seen in the Volkswagen emission scandal). Although some of these issues 
could be addressed through regulation and law enforcement, which rest on the 
shoulders of governments, firms are also asked “to operate with longer horizons 
and to more generously share the fruits of their corporate success with their 
workers, customers and other stakeholders” (Summers, 2015). 
Moreover, finding a balance between economic development and preserva-
tion of ecosystems has become increasingly difficult (Whiteman, Walker, & 
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Perego, 2013). Population growth and climate change are becoming major chal-
lenges for the future of modern societies. Firms play a critical role in the move 
toward a more sustainable economy. Apart from reducing pollution and other 
emissions, firms are expected to contribute to sustainability through voluntary 
efforts, such as the development of ecofriendly innovations, the modification of 
manufacturing processes, or the introduction of environmental management sys-
tems (Nidumolu, Prahalad, & Rangaswami, 2009). 
Some firms respond to CSR with political action to oppose regulations and 
defend the traditional logic of shareholder value creation (Dhalla & Oliver, 2013; 
Hoffman, 1999). Other firms seem ready to accept, at least ceremonially, their 
new responsibilities. A McKinsey (2014) survey of CEOs’ opinions revealed that 
36% of the respondents put sustainability amongst their top three strategic prior-
ities, and another 13% considered it their most important priority in absolute. 
Multi-stakeholder CSR programs are becoming popular: more than 8,000 firms 
in 145 countries are currently participating in the UN Global Compact, the 
world’s largest corporate citizenship initiative, and more than 6,800 publish sus-
tainability reports in accordance with the Global Reporting Initiative, the leader 
in sustainability reporting standardization (Accenture & UNGC, 2013). CSR and 
related fields are also penetrating executive education. Reports show that 15% of 
graduating MBA students are interested in pursuing a career in the non-profit 
sector and that 60% of Harvard Business School students enrol in social enter-
prise electives (Simons, 2013). 110 out of 247 MBA students at Said Business 
School (Oxford) applied for Skoll scholarships in 2011-2012 (awarded to students 
with entrepreneurial ability in the social field); they were only 41 out of 220 in 
2005-2006 (Boyde, 2013). 
It is possible to trace worries about the proper ways of conducting a busi-
ness to the first origins of commerce: the Code of Hammurabi (1800 B.C.) might 
be the oldest written evidence of concerns with the ethics of merchants (Werhane, 
2000). Plato’s Republic required that “husbandmen” and “craftsmen” – who 
were responsible for the production of material wealth – worked harmoniously 
with government to serve the public good (Cragg, 2012). Aristotle saw the desire 
for taking more than one’s share of material goods (pleonexia) as potentially dis-
ruptive to political relations and civic harmony (Balot, 2001). Aquinas’s notion of 
‘just price’ in his Summa Theologiae and Christine de Pizan’s depiction of how 
decent Christians could undertake trade honorably are probably the earliest ef-
forts by Christian thought to ponder the ethical risks of business and find roads 
for salvation. With the first Industrial Revolution, Bernard Mandeville and Adam 
Smith were responsible for spreading the view that it is the self-interested action 
by economic players in free markets that creates well-being. Smith famously 
wrote, “I have never known much good done by those who affect to trade for the 
public good” (quoted in Moon, 2014: 1), which might be read as criticism of CSR 
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before its time. However, it is well known that Smith’s opus left ample room for 
amicable cooperation among agents and for such social passions as altruism and 
compassion (Werhane, 2000). 
Modern CSR literature dates to Bowen’s (1953) publication of the book So-
cial Responsibilities of the Businessman, in which he argued that firms were 
powerful social actors, which influenced the lives of people in many ways, such 
that managers had a duty to address the external consequences of their decisions. 
Subsequent research has explored a variety of aspects of CSR from different per-
spectives, leading to a proliferation of theories and terminologies (Garriga & 
Melé, 2004). This literature has never converged on a standard definition of CSR. 
However, there is a consensus that firm responsibilities depend on societal ex-
pectations of appropriate business behaviour (Wood, 1991); it is also usually ac-
cepted that satisfaction of these expectations requires managers to look beyond 
immediate maximization of profits or shareholder value (Carroll, 1999). Here I 
will stick to Davis (1973), who defined CSR as “the firm’s consideration of, and 
response to, issues beyond the narrow economic, technical, and legal require-
ments of the firm to accomplish social benefits along with the traditional eco-
nomic gains which the firm seeks” (312). 
Modern CSR research is intertwined with stakeholder theory (Freeman, 
1984), because economic gains and social benefits may coincide with the inter-
ests of, respectively, shareholders and other stakeholders (such as employees, 
customers, or communities). Stakeholder theory proposes that firms must aban-
don their traditional focus on shareholders (Friedman, 1970) and adopt a wider 
consideration of all stakeholders, that is, everyone who is substantially affected 
by, or is in the position to affect, the firm’s activities. Stakeholder theory assigns 
managers the responsibility of building positive and reciprocally satisfying long-
term relationships with stakeholders. This responsibility involves integrating so-
cial and environmental issues in the firm strategies and improving the joint firm 
outcomes for all the interested constituencies. 
CSR is also grounded in business ethics. The idea of ‘responsibility’ implies 
an interaction in which one party has a power over another. Being responsible 
means that the party accept norms and principles that respect the interests or the 
values of the other party, instead of using this power selfishly. Responsibility re-
flects a liability logic, which derives “from legal reasoning to find guilt or fault for 
a harm” (Young, 2008: 144). 
At the same time, research emphasizes that CSR has the potential to yield 
positive organizational outcomes for the adopting firms, such as heightened ef-
fort by employees, improved reputation in the marketplace, or efficiency gains 
from reduced emissions (Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). These outcomes 
have led many scholars to advance a business case for CSR, arguing that a firm 
can ‘do well by doing good’, that is, it can outperform financially those firms that 
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do not attend to their responsibilities toward society (Kurucz, Colbert, & Wheeler, 
2008).  
In this thesis I want to contribute to research on organizational outcomes 
of CSR, and in particular on factors at the firm level that make more or less 
probable that these outcomes are produced, or that moderate their intensity. A 
central premise of this thesis is that organizational outcomes depend on how 
stakeholders react to CSR activities. As I will show, much work has still to be 
done to understand how CSR activities stimulate stakeholder responses. Among 
the organizational outcomes of CSR, I will focus on stakeholder trust, which is a 
fundamental ingredient of business transactions and a precondition of all other 
organizational outcomes of CSR. 
Donaldson & Preston (1995) introduced a well-known distinction between 
three approaches: descriptive/empirical, in which the firm is analysed as a con-
stellation of stakeholder interests, without direct prescriptions about how these 
interests should be met; instrumental, in which firms that satisfy stakeholders in 
proper ways are predicted to be successful in terms of profitability, growth or 
other conventional measures of performance; and normative, in which the inter-
ests of all stakeholders have intrinsic value and deserve consideration for their 
own sake, irrespective of their ability to help firms achieve these conventional 
measures of performance. The approach that I adopt in this thesis is descriptive. 
I intend to examine the conditions under which firms can obtain positive organi-
zational outcomes from their CSR activities. However, organizational outcomes 
have been mainly studied as elements of the instrumental approach; so, it is im-
portant to examine what are the main tenets and limitations of this approach, as 
I do in the next section. In particular, the limitations will make clear that there 
are several gaps to be filled in our understanding of organizational outcomes. 
2. The instrumental view of CSR and its limitations 
The first clear statement of the instrumental view of CSR is probably Friedman 
(1970), who famously wrote “the only one responsibility of business towards so-
ciety is the maximization of profits to the shareholders within the legal frame-
work and the ethical custom of the country”. This article presented CSR as a mis-
conceived attempt by managers to use the money of the firm for general interests, 
breaking their fiduciary duties to shareholders and illicitly levying a tax on them. 
However, Friedman noted that sometimes the self-declared good intentions of 
managers were only a screen for interested aims, such as attracting talented em-
ployees, exploiting the tax deductibility of charitable contributions, or generating 
goodwill that mitigated opposition to ‘soulless corporations’. 
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Subsequent instrumental CSR literature has rarely endorsed Friedman’s 
radical position and has usually sidestepped the normative assumption that 
shareholders are the only legitimate beneficiaries of a firm’s activities (Sundaram 
& Inkpen, 2004). However, such literature has built on Friedman’s empirical 
claim that CSR can be profitable to advance a broader ‘enlightened value maxi-
mization’ concept, in which nurturing a positive relationship with society is nec-
essary for a firm’s long-term profitability (Jensen, 2000; Jones, 1995). 
By avoiding a trade-off between the interests of shareholders and stake-
holders, the instrumental view is potentially liberating for managers who want to 
address social and environmental issues. Banerjee (2008) recalls that in 1919 
Henry Ford was taken to court by shareholders because he decided to forego the 
payment of dividends to finance Ford Motor Company’s employee welfare 
program. He argued in front of the court that the program was necessary “to 
spread the benefits of this individual system to the greatest possible number”. 
The court ruled in favour of shareholders because “A business organization is 
organized and carried on primarily for the profit of the stockholders. Directors 
cannot shape and conduct the affairs of a corporation for the mere incidental 
benefit of shareholders and for the primary purpose of benefiting others” (59). 
Today, Henry Ford could restate his position in the language of the instrumental 
view, focusing on the long-term productivity benefits of a satisfied workforce. 
Some scholars and consultants have seen the instrumental approach as an 
effective way of calling the attention of managers on CSR. In the instrumental 
approach, CSR might gather support from firms because social and environmen-
tal issues are not presented as externally imposed but as profit opportunities. 
This idea has gained some traction in practice, as proven by the popularity of 
Porter and Kramer’s (2011) ‘Creating Shared Value’ model (CSV), which aban-
dons the responsibility logic and identifies policies that enhance a firm’s compet-
itiveness while helping the communities in which the firm operates. Such multi-
national corporations (MNCs) as Nestlé or Enel have endorsed the CSV model, 
demonstrating its appeal. However, many accused this model to water CSR down 
to a voluntary affair, in which a firm is entitled to avoid any action when the ben-
efits do not cover the costs, such that addressing critical social and environmen-
tal issues becomes optional (Crane, Palazzo, Spence, & Matten, 2014). 
The instrumental view is especially useful in supporting CSR amongst 
firms listed in stock markets, because of constant pressure by investors to gener-
ate immediate financial results. For these firms, CSR is at risk of being seen as 
driven by managerial utility considerations, e.g. as an entrenchment strategy by 
directors who want to gather personal support from stakeholders (Galaskiewicz, 
1997). Profit-enhancing justifications for CSR can increase the managerial dis-
cretion (Hambrick & Finkelstein, 1987) of firm decision-makers. In general, high 
discretion allows managers a wider range of options and mitigates constraints 
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that arise when managers try to act outside the zone of acceptance of powerful 
parties. The instrumental view gives managers more freedom to adopt the long-
term view that is intrinsic to CSR, sacrificing short-term profits when necessary 
(Phillips, Berman, Elms, & Johnson-Cramer, 2010). Even rhetorical connections 
between CSR and profits can facilitate endorsement of CSR activities: Flammer 
(2015) evidenced that shareholder proposals in support of CSR were more prob-
able to be approved when they contained arguments linking CSR to performance. 
The instrumental view tends to direct managers towards policies that are 
related to the firm’s core business, as opposed to peripheral initiatives that do 
not affect a firm’s value chain (Garriga & Melé, 2004). Even philanthropic ex-
penses should be dedicated to social causes that can lead to increased industry 
profitability (Porter & Kramer, 2002). This connection between CSR and the 
business of a firm marks the difference with the so-called ‘philanthrocapitalism’, 
which consists in philanthropic organizations that are set up by the likes of Bill 
Gates, George Soros, or Mark Zuckerberg to pursue their own causes. These 
causes, such as fighting malaria or financing civil-rights movements, are unrelat-
ed to the business of the firms that produced the wealth of these philanthropists. 
This characteristic makes philanthrocapitalism closer to the normative approach, 
even though it is debatable whether philanthrocapitalism on a large scale is com-
patible with fundamental values of democracy (Cassidy, 2015). 
In the instrumental view, free-market solutions are to be preferred wherev-
er possible, as in the ‘bottom of the pyramid’ strategies, in which firms are en-
couraged to introduce products tailored for more than one billion people living 
on less than $2 per day; such initiatives can improve the daily life of the poor and, 
at the same time, allow firms to profit from an enormous and value-demanding 
market (Prahalad & Hammond, 2002). In all these instrumental endeavors, prof-
its are interpreted as a crucial stimulus: in the words of Porter & Kramer (2006: 
92), “When a well-run business applies its vast resources, expertise, and man-
agement talent to problems that it understands and in which it has a stake, it can 
have a greater impact on social good than any other institution or philanthropic 
organization”. 
However, the instrumental approach may fall short when it comes to eval-
uate practically whether a firm decision is desirable or not. Consider the decision 
by General Motors (GM) at the beginning of 2015 to give its 48,000 union work-
ers a bonus larger than what their contract called for (Vlasic, 2015). Each worker 
received $9,000 in profit sharing, even though the contract with the United Auto 
Workers called for GM to pay $1,000 for each $ 1 billion in pre-tax earnings in 
North America. The pre-tax earnings were $6.6 billion; thus, the payment should 
have been $6,600 (or $2,400 smaller). This decision was taken because the prof-
its would have been $9 billion if GM had not incurred extraordinary costs in 
2014 to recall several batches of cars for safety problems. While no safeguard for 
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extraordinary costs was included in the contract with the unions, GM decided 
that the workers should not be penalized for safety issues. This was also an im-
plicit admission that management caused them, not workers on the line. Compa-
ny sources reported that the CEO, Mary T. Barra, ultimately took the decision 
(which conforms to research that shows that women are more likely to contribute 
to feelings of belongingness and to enhance ties within organizations; see for ex-
ample Kacmar, Bachrach, Harris, & Zivnuska, 2011).  
Was GM’s decision instrumentally sound? By paying the extra bonus, the 
firm incurred a significant cost without any guarantee that the workers would 
reciprocate. Potential firm benefits, such as improved employee loyalty or morale, 
are difficult to calculate. Once one discounts their uncertainty and long-term na-
ture, the decision could easily fail financial criteria, such as the Net Present Value 
(NPV) test. According to some, this failure would identify the decision as truly 
socially responsible, precisely because it is not obviously profitable: “To qualify 
as socially responsible corporate action, a business expenditure or activity must 
be one for which the marginal returns to the corporation are less than the returns 
available from some alternative expenditure” (Manne & Wallich, 1972, as quoted 
in Carroll, 1999: 273). But in the instrumental approach, GM’s extra bonus could 
be seen as inappropriate or at least contentious. 
Many other arguments have been raised against the instrumental view. In 
the remaining part of this section, I classify them as ‘ethical’, ‘political’, and ‘em-
pirical’. The purpose is not to refute the instrumental view, or to evaluate the 
strength of these arguments, but to draw the attention on the shortcomings of 
this view of the relationship between firms and society. These arguments also 
provide a background for the descriptive approach that I adopt with regard to 
organizational outcomes and the research question that I address in this thesis. 
Ethical arguments against the instrumental view 
The instrumental view is opposed by those who favour normative interpretations 
of CSR and believe that stakeholders must be valued in themselves, or by those 
who, without taking a normative perspective, challenge the intrinsic impover-
ishment of existence that occurs when instrumental rationality becomes the pri-
mary motivation for action (Painter-Morland & ten Bos, 2016). Gond, Palazzo, & 
Basu (2009) present a particularly harsh criticism of the instrumental view, sug-
gesting that a focus on the financial outcomes of CSR might contribute to deviant 
behaviour and to the “transformation of a legal business entity into a Mafia-type 
organization” (73). A parallel between instrumental CSR and Mafia can be found 
in the ‘license-to-operate’ concept, which is a typical legitimation benefit that 
firms can obtain through mutually advantageous relationships with key stake-
holders (Howard-Grenville, Nash, & Coglianese, 2008); according to Gond et al. 
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(2009), instrumentally oriented CSR practices can turn this concept into the 
same exercise of controlling stakeholder behaviour, forging alliances with local 
powers, and obtaining community endorsement of questionable behaviour in 
which the Sicilian Mafia excels. 
A more basic normative concern is that the instrumental view says nothing 
about the responsibilities of firms when contributing to society does not bring 
profits (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007). For example, a firm could face a serious cost 
disadvantage if it asked suppliers in low-wage countries to ensure workers a de-
cent pay and basic safety (Crane et al., 2014). This point is usually acknowledged 
by supporters of the instrumental view and accepted as a limitation of their ap-
proach. Porter & Kramer (2014) wrote that “business cannot cure all of society’s 
ills—and as Mr. Crane points out, not all businesses are good for society nor 
would the pursuit of shared value eliminate all injustice” (153). This response 
implies that the social and environmental issues that cannot be profitably ad-
dressed are proper areas for intervention by governments, not business. 
Another criticism is that instrumental CSR practices can be used to create 
appearances of social responsibility that distract the attention of society from 
negative impacts of business activity. For example, tobacco firms have recently 
launched many CSR initiatives, such as improved disclosure of toxic substances 
in cigarettes, responsible farming techniques, and charitable projects, which 
helped them repair the awful reputation that they had gained through past at-
tempts at hiding the harmful effects of smoking (Schneider & Pintilii, 2013). 
These initiatives may deliver value to stakeholders but, to the extent that they 
improve the image of tobacco firms, they increase acceptance of a product that is 
inherently bad for the health of consumers (Crane et al., 2014). 
Political arguments against the instrumental view 
The instrumental view is accused of being an ideological discourse that aims at 
legitimating the excessive power of modern firms and hiding fundamental issues 
with their role in society (Banerjee, 2008). By turning responsibilities into profit 
opportunities, the instrumental view tries to alter the substance of CSR, replac-
ing society’s values and expectations with what can find ready acceptance by 
business (Shamir, 2004). In this perspective, the instrumental view is not an en-
lightened way to push business to collaborate with society, but a deliberate pro-
ject to protect the former from the latter, allowing firms to maintain a self-
referential logic, in which they grant themselves the right to turn down any ex-
ternal request that does not contribute to their business success. 
A related criticism targets more specifically large MNCs. The instrumental 
view assumes a separation of business and political domains (Scherer & Palazzo, 
2011). This is very clear in Friedman (1970), who presents CSR as an attempt by 
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managers to usurp governmental functions; according to Friedman, this attempt 
is illegitimate because any intervention on society should respect representative 
democracy and be filtered through the checks and balances that separate the 
constitutional powers of the state; as private organizations that lack representa-
tive mechanisms, firms are not in the position to decide which social problems 
should be addressed and what solutions should be adopted. This separation be-
tween business and politics is also stressed in Friedman’s proviso that firms 
should maximize profits “within the legal framework and the ethical custom of 
the country”, that is, they should play by the rules established by institutions. 
Today such separation may seem naïve in face of the reduced role of the nation-
state and the ‘loss of polity’ produced by a fragmented society and new interna-
tional governance institutions (Wissenburg, 2013). Current political circum-
stances emphasize the capacity of large MNCs to operate in a variety of geopoliti-
cal contexts. These firms can arbitrage the institutional environments in which 
they locate their operations, identifying favourable contexts with low regulation, 
negotiating their own rules of the games with local governments eager to attract 
foreign investment, or lobbying domestic governments that are afraid of offshor-
ing and loss of national jobs (Shamir, 2004). The instrumental view presupposes 
an intact system of regulation that is simply not there for large MNCs; therefore, 
compliance of these firms with legal and moral standards should not be taken for 
granted (Crane et al., 2014). 
Political approaches to CSR ask firms to use their capacities at the service 
of society, attending to the principle that power begets responsibility. For exam-
ple, the extended interpretation of Corporate Citizenship (Garriga & Melé, 2004) 
invite firms to fill institutional voids, especially in developing countries, by 
providing such public goods as infrastructure or education (Matten & Crane, 
2005). Scherer & Palazzo (2011) propose to evolve our democracies from the ex-
isting representative model to a new ‘deliberative’ model, in response to repeated 
global failures to address systemic problems of injustice, inequality, or corrup-
tion; in this new democratically organized multi-stakeholder model, firms should 
participate to politics on a par with other civil society constituencies, playing an 
active role in controlling market transactions and contributing to self-regulation. 
Empirical arguments against the instrumental view 
The central tenet of the instrumental view is that the organizational outcomes of 
CSR are substantial enough to move firms to address social and environmental 
issues more than ceremonially (Vogel, 2005). This idea needs empirical testing 
and, in fact, CSR research has provided plenty of it between the Nineties and the 
beginning of the new century. Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh’s (2007) meta-
analysis counted 167 published studies that investigated the link between corpo-
10   |   CSR, Stakeholder Trust, and Organizational Outcomes  
 
rate social performance (CSP) and corporate financial performance (CFP) in the 
1972-2007 period.  
The meta-analysis suggested that the link was positive but statistically 
small. Moreover, these studies had important limitations (Margolis et al., 2007). 
First, the decision by a firm to adopt CSR could be endogenous to unobserved 
firm characteristics, such as superior managerial or other human resources. Re-
latedly, mere correlation cannot exclude that it is CFP that drives CSP, as sug-
gested by the slack resource theory, according to which firms with extra-
resources are more likely than others to spend on social or environmental issues 
(McGuire, Sundgren, & Schneeweis, 1988). Some research tries to address en-
dogeneity and reverse-causality issues through longitudinal studies, in which the 
variables are observed over a period of time (18 years in Eccles et al., 2014), to 
verify that CSP predates CFP. But even in longitudinal studies a causal interpre-
tation is not certain, because it is still possible that managers adopt CSR in antic-
ipation of strong future financial performance, for example because they want to 
signal to investors that the firm can afford the luxury of wasting resources on so-
cial and environmental issues (Lys, Naughton, & Wang, 2015). 
Second, the measures of CSP typically used in these studies might not ex-
press real efforts, and reflect instead impression management or even green-
washing (Delmas & Burbano, 2011). Most research has relied on the Kinder, 
Lydenberg, and Domini (KLD) ratings, which have demonstrated weaknesses in 
predicting subsequent CSP; for example, Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel (2009) 
found inadequate evidence that KLD ratings predict future firm environmental 
performance, as measured through emissions or regulatory violations. Chatterji 
et al. (2016) also identified a lack of convergence across social ratings of KLD and 
other five well-established raters, suggesting that all these ratings lack external 
validity. Measures of financial performance are also questionable, because ac-
counting profits or stock market performance (which are commonly used in 
these studies) are not perfect mirrors of real economic value creation, especially 
when part of this value is incorporated in relationships with stakeholders. Such 
concerns may reduce the practical value of the CSP-CFP studies, to the extent 
that they want to imply that instrumental considerations may improve alignment 
between firms and society. 
Third, publication bias could inflate the average statistical significance of 
the CSP-CFP link, because academic journals might be unreceptive to studies 
that find null results, or to negative relationships that disconfirm the value of 
CSR. Published studies may therefore contain false positives or inflated findings, 
reflecting scientific apophenia and not real relationships (Goldfarb & King, 2016). 
Finally, most studies test a direct relationship between CSR and CFP, 
which amounts to treating a firm as a black box. In such direct models (see the 
first frame in Figure 1), the organizational outcomes that drive the link are not 
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observed. This means that it is not possible to understand which organizational 
outcomes are responsible for the improvement of CFP. This is a problem because 
the organizational outcomes of CSR are varied and presumably governed by very 
different mechanisms. For example, Kurucz et al. (2008) present four general 
types of outcomes. 
- Cost and risk reduction: the benefit of avoiding costs and damages pro-
duced by unsatisfied stakeholders, such as consumer boycotts, staff 
turnover, higher cost of capital, regulatory penalties, liability suits, etc. 
- Competitive advantage: better product differentiation or lower produc-
tion costs, achieved by redirecting resources toward stakeholder de-
mands and introducing new products, technological innovation, or pro-
cess efficiencies based on rational uses of natural resources. 
- Reputation and legitimacy: improved public perception of the firm and 
increased acceptance of its operations, facilitating the firm in attracting 
valuable resources (such as talented employees), overcoming barriers 
(such as obtaining public permissions), and reducing external monitor-
ing. 
- Synergistic value creation: new opportunities and knowledge generated 
by activating societal learning through better connection with stake-
holder interests. 
The obvious alternative to a direct model is to measure organizational out-
comes and test whether they result from CSP and, in turn, translate into im-
proved CFP. This two-stage relationship corresponds to a mediation model (sec-
ond frame of Figure 1). If measures of organizational outcomes are not available, 
studies can use moderating conditions that are theoretically expected to affect 
the CSP-CFP link if a given unobservable organizational outcome is present. For 
example, when CFP is driven by improved customer perceptions of socially re-
sponsible firms, the type of product or service sold by the firm could be a moder-
ating condition, because CFP is more likely to improve for consumer goods (the 
value of which depend heavily on perceptions) than for industrial goods or con-
sumer durables (in which demand focuses on functionality and price). This is an 
interaction model (third frame of Figure 1). 
Mediation and interaction models are relatively rare in CSP-CFP literature, 
which limits generalizability of most studies, because even when the direct effect 
is statistically robust and the technique used supports a causal interpretation, the 
effect can be due to unspecified contingencies that do not repeat themselves in 
circumstances that are different than those studied. 
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FIGURE 1. Alternative models for the CSP-CFP relationship 
 
The role of organizational outcomes 
Research has traditionally linked the organizational outcomes of CSR to their 
role in supporting the instrumental view of CSR. As I showed in this section, the 
instrumental view is problematic in many respects, which could lead opponents 
of this view to discount the importance of organizational outcomes. However, 
studying the conditions under which CSR produces positive organizational out-
comes is central to an understanding of how firms may relate to social and envi-
ronmental issues, regardless of what approach is adopted. Organizational out-
comes are essential even for a normative approach to CSR, because it remains 
that firms have a constitutive profit orientation, compete in markets, and are 
subject to incentives to be efficient and innovative. Firms cannot incorporate eth-
ics in their strategies without an understanding of how it might affect their fi-
nancial objectives. Therefore, the organizational outcomes of CSR activities par-
ticipate in defining whether these activities are feasible. Excessive costs that are 
not balanced by credible organizational outcomes can always be invoked by a 
firm to desist from ethically-inspired behaviour that could be financially ruinous 
and ultimately harm all the stakeholders who depend on the welfare of the firm. 
A general premise of this thesis is that organizational outcomes of CSR, 
and the mechanisms that govern their production, are critical to evaluate the 
conditions under which organizations with profit objectives and that engage in 
market action can address environmental and social issues. To clarify the role of 
these outcomes, it might be useful to unpack two aspects of the instrumental 
view that are usually blended together but are logically and empirically inde-
pendent: 
a. How and when CSR produces positive organizational outcomes. 
b. Whether these outcomes are large enough to cover the costs of the relat-
ed CSR actions. 
The way in which the business case is typically tested obfuscates the dis-
tinction, because the possible absence of a general CSP-CFP link does not ex-
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clude that, in given conditions, CSR produces substantial positive organizational 
outcomes, which may or may not cover the costs of CSR. When focusing on these 
outcomes, a range of interesting questions arises: Which types of CSR activities 
are more probable to produce different types of outcomes? In which different de-
grees of intensity? Which contributing factors make more or less probable that 
these outcomes materialize? Which resources and activities do firms need to de-
ploy to obtain these outcomes? 
Research on the conditions surrounding the production of organizational 
outcomes has been infrequent in the period in which studies focused on the CSR-
CFP link. Notable exceptions were found in the marketing research, which inves-
tigated the effects of CSR on customers, finding a variety of results, such as the 
existence of a gap between customer intentions to support socially responsible 
firms and actual customer behaviour (Smith, 2008), or the fact that the effects 
seem to depend on customers’ identification with firm values (Bhattacharya & 
Sen, 2004). Organizational behaviour research also studied specific effects of 
CSR on employees, such as commitment (Maignan, Ferrell, & Hult, 1999) or or-
ganizational identification (Carmeli, Gilat, & Waldman, 2007). As I am going to 
show in Chapter 1 of this thesis, research on organizational outcomes has signifi-
cantly increased in recent years, especially after 2011. 
A problem that often surfaces when investigating organizational outcomes 
is that most stakeholders are not in the position to observe whether the claimed 
CSR attributes of a firm are real. CSR involves the promise by a firm that given 
values, rules, or stakeholders’ interests are respected in the way it carries on its 
activities. When stakeholders cannot observe the operations of the firm, they do 
not directly know whether the promises are kept. Moreover, it is not obvious that 
the firm will continue in its CSR activities in the future. These uncertainties im-
ply that trust is important to elicit stakeholder response. In the next section, I 
will discuss why trust is an important mechanism driving the organizational out-
comes of CSR and formulate the research question that I am going to study in 
this thesis. 
3. Trust and CSR 
According to a common definition, trust is “the willingness of a party to be vul-
nerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other 
will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the abil-
ity to monitor or control that other party” (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). 
This definition includes what trust research considers as the two key dimensions 
of the concept, that is, the trustor’s positive perceptions of the trustee’s inten-
tions, and the trustor’s willingness to depend on the trustee (Fulmer & Gelfand, 
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2012). Such willingness makes trust critical in all business transactions in which 
other control systems are lacking, impossible, or expensive (Schoorman, Mayer, 
& Davis, 2007), facilitating any investment that involves risk for the trustor. As 
frequently observed, without trust, business as we know it would be impossible 
(Audi, 2008); this observation can be extended to any other human interaction, 
to the extent that a party needs to believe the other without complete evidence of 
accuracy. 
The concept of trust can be applied across different levels of analysis (inter-
personal, inter-group, or inter-organizational), and multiple referents (individual, 
teams, and organizations). Trust is generally founded on trustee’s attributes of 
trustworthiness, which are revealed to the trustor by past interaction or other 
sources of information. Mayer et al. (1995) identified three main attributes of 
trustworthiness. The first is ability, which is the level of trustee’s knowledge and 
competencies, which enable it to function reliably and therefore to meet respon-
sibilities or fulfil promises. The second is benevolence, which is an attitude that 
demonstrates trustee’s genuine concern for the welfare of the trustor. The final 
attribute is integrity, which is trustee’s behaviour in adherence to moral princi-
ples, such as honesty, sincerity, or fairness. A related distinction, focused on 
trustor’s internal processes that lead to positive expectations about the trustee, 
separates cognitive and affective trust (McAllister, 1995). Cognitive trust is driv-
en by trustor’s calculative assessment of trustee’s intentions and abilities, or the 
characteristics of the situation that may incentivize the trustee to be dependable; 
this type of trust is short-term and exchange-oriented. Affective trust is based on 
trustor’s emotions that are generated by the care that the trustee demonstrates; 
it is accompanied by a sense of security and it can easily push trust beyond what 
is supported by information available to the trustor; affective trust also tends to 
foster long-term relationships between the parties. 
Trust research has looked at many antecedents of the production of trust, 
trying to identify what leads trustors to ascribe ability, benevolence, or integrity 
to the trustee, or to develop emotions of trust (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). CSR is a 
potential indicator of the benevolence and integrity of an organization, or even of 
its ability, as far as the organization provides effective remedies to social and en-
vironmental issues. As a consequence, a growing body of research has investigat-
ed the role of CSR as an antecedent of trust, finding that a firm’s adoption of CSR 
actually seems to make the firm more trustworthy in the eyes of stakeholders 
(Bhattacharya, Korschun, & Sen, 2009; Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2011a; Lin, 
2010b; Stanaland, Lwin, & Murphy, 2011). A similar effect has been found for 
distributive, procedural, and interactional justice in work environments (Cohen-
Charash & Spector, 2001), which can be related to CSR practices in human re-
source management. Trust has also been independently found to produce posi-
tive outcomes at the level of some stakeholders, such as employees (organiza-
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tional identification, reduced turnover, citizenship behaviour, collaboration and 
teamwork), customers (purchase intentions, satisfaction, consumer cooperation), 
or suppliers (decreased negotiation costs, contract flexibility, information shar-
ing), and in general to be associated with reduced conflict, increased willingness 
to cooperate, and continuous business relationships between parties (see Fulmer 
& Gelfand, 2012, for a complete recent review). Therefore, this research is highly 
suggestive that trust can be an important mediator between CSR and a variety of 
positive organizational outcomes linked to productive stakeholder behaviour and 
attitudes. 
Problems with CSR as an indicator of trustworthiness 
However, research has given only limited attention to how a firm’s approach to 
CSR, or its preference for certain CSR practices over others, drive trustworthi-
ness ascriptions by stakeholders. As an indicator of trustworthiness, CSR suffers 
from at least two limitations. First, stakeholders may be uncertain about the real-
ity of CSR practices, because firms may disclose their behaviour selectively, em-
bellish information about actual implementation and outcomes, or even com-
municate non-existent activities. This uncertainty is especially large when the 
relationship between firm and stakeholders is distal; for example, customers may 
be asked to believe that a product has certain ‘green’ attributes (such as organic 
production methods or protection of animal welfare) that they cannot verify, giv-
en that the attributes are not revealed by taste or visual inspection. In contrast, 
proximal relationships can allow stakeholders to personally experience CSR 
practices; employees who participate in a friendly work environment, and receive 
equal opportunities or generous welfare benefits by their employer, are an exam-
ple. 
Distal CSR practices are exposed to a vicious circle, as far as trust is con-
cerned. Even when the practices are real, the adopting firm may not be taken se-
riously unless it is trustworthy to begin with, because stakeholders might be 
sceptical of the firm’s declarations. Therefore, a firm that is not already trusted 
might fail to generate trust through CSR. This problem generalizes well beyond 
green customers, because other stakeholders are often distal (such as govern-
ments or non-governmental organizations) or, even when they are proximal, they 
may be asked to ascribe attributes to the firm based on CSR practices with which 
they are not in direct contact (e.g., supply chain practices in developing countries, 
as seen by the domestic employees of a Western firm). 
The second limitation is that, even when the stakeholders have reasons to 
believe that a firm’s CSR practices are real, they can still doubt whether these 
practices will continue. This is important for stakeholders who have long-term 
relationships with the firm and have to decide their level of commitment, or 
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whether or not to make specific investments in the relationship, based on the 
shadow of the future (Poppo, Zhou, & Ryu, 2008). The uncertainty here is not 
about the substance of the CSR practices, but the motives and prospective ac-
tions of the firm. In particular, the point is whether the CSR efforts of the firm 
are conditional on self-interest, which could change in new circumstances, or 
genuine intentions and intrinsic motivation, which are more stable. 
Research has shown that behaviour that seems intrinsically motivated is 
more likely to generate trust (Rempel, Holmes, & Zanna, 1985). But we have 
again a difficulty: if demonstrations of intrinsic motivation are advantageous, 
then dishonest firms or individuals could simulate such motivation and take ad-
vantage of trustors who mistakenly believe in it. In turn, the problem for honest 
agents who have real benevolence and integrity is how they can credibly signal 
that they are not fakers. In absence of such signals, dire consequences would 
arise for social interaction in general, because trust would be impossible except 
in short-term and arm’s-length settings. 
Frank (1988) observed that, since trust is highly beneficial for in-group co-
operation (among humans or other species), marks of honest behaviour are evo-
lutionary efficient. Therefore, these marks could enter behaviour through natural 
selection. This is the starting point of Frank’s theory that emotions serve as 
marks of honesty, because they give visible clues about an individual’s true inter-
nal sentiments and, above all, they are difficult to fake. Experiments have shown 
that people can perceive sincere manners in direct interaction, based on voice 
cadence, body talk, or facial blushing and gestures, and in general are able to de-
tect deception better than chance (Bond & DePaulo, 2006). 
According to Frank (1988), another means for agents to demonstrate their 
trustworthiness is reputation, which they can establish through repeated behav-
iour in accordance with their own stated emotions or moral principles. Reputa-
tion is credible because, after a sufficient number of cases, honest agents will 
emerge as consistent, while self-interested agents will be caught cheating at least 
sometimes. As Frank writes, “dishonest persons tend to cheat in situations where 
the odds militate against cheating” (76); this is because the rewards of cheating 
are often immediate and thus self-interested agents will often opt for a quick 
payoff. As a result, these agents will find it difficult to maintain a reputation, 
while agents who are never caught cheating will credibly signal that they are 
probably something more than merely prudent.  
Jones (1995) tried to use Frank’s theory of trustworthiness in support of 
the instrumental view of CSR, since the theory seems to show that honesty is also 
good business. But what the theory implies is that firms that adopt CSR for in-
strumental reasons are exactly those that could give up CSR in situations in 
which the financial benefits of acting responsibly are not large enough. These 
firms are unlikely to consistently adopt CSR in all the functional areas and in face 
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of the continuous economic, political, and technological change that characterize 
business. Therefore, they will usually fail to keep a reputation. In contrast, firms 
that value the interests of stakeholders for their own sake, and therefore inter-
pret CSR in ways that are closer to the normative or political approaches than to 
the instrumental one, will be probably consistent in their practices and establish 
a reputation. These firms may have lapses due to lack of ability (which are to be 
expected when considering the complexities of the social and environmental is-
sues that firms have to address), but these lapses will not harm trust as seriously 
as unprincipled behaviour that reveals a fundamental disregard of society.  
At a deeper level, instrumentalism seems at odds with the fiduciary ele-
ment of trust, i.e., the fact that trust depends on inferences about the motives, 
personality, and purposes of others (Tyler, 2003). For reasons that are never 
completely rational, trustors believe that the trustee will act in their interest. So, 
firms that pursue CSR for their own profit may undermine this fiduciary element. 
If it is only non-instrumental CSR that produces trust, and ultimately the posi-
tive organizational outcomes for firms, then a catch-22 (Heller, 1961) turns up: 
firms can benefit from CSR only if they do not want to benefit from CSR. This is 
an instance of the more general paradox that “in many situations the conscious 
pursuit of self-interest is incompatible with its attainment” (Frank, 1988). 
While reputation is a well-established trait of organizations, it is more diffi-
cult to attribute emotions or ‘sincere manners’ to them. However, long-standing 
CEOs and owners who are strongly identified with their firms may be sources of 
trustworthiness to the extent that they root their business decisions in moral 
principles and demonstrate genuine concern for stakeholders. Putting forth in-
strumental motives may help managers enlarge their discretion to pursue CSR 
and obtain support from shareholders, but risk to annihilate the trust-enhancing 
effects of CSR. When discussing General Electric’s ‘Ecoimagination’ ambitious 
program to reduce the environmental impact of its products on a global scale, the 
CEO Jeffrey Immelt said, “We did it from a business standpoint from Day 1 […], 
it was never about corporate social responsibility” (Lohr, 2011). Compare this 
statement to the vision offered by another business leader, Rajan Tata, former 
chairman of Tata Group, who observed that profits “are like happiness in that 
they are a byproduct of other things” and that firms “need sustainability strate-
gies that recognize that you can make money by doing good things rather than 
the other way around” (quoted in Birkinshaw, Foss, & Lindenberg, 2014: 54). 
If we go back to the previous example of GM’s decision to voluntarily pay 
an extra bonus, which was not clearly based on financial rationality, one could 
argue that the decision conveys fairness and benevolence, and therefore it may 
be effective in building a trusting relationship with employees. Of course, scep-
tics could raise doubts about the future continuation of this attitude by GM, but 
the absence of obvious instrumental considerations may signal a persistent or-
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ganizational attitude, at least as long as the current CEO, Mary T. Barra, stays in 
charge. 
However, identifying the true (principled vs instrumental) motive behind a 
business decision is challenging. Business decisions have multiple rather than 
single motives. The internal complexity of organizations makes it difficult to es-
tablish whether a given decision is taken without any consideration of a return. 
Firms are always in the position to profit from their relationships with stake-
holders. Schwartz & Carroll (2003) presented possible examples of firms’ deci-
sions that were ‘purely ethical’, such as 3M’s decision to retire its pollution cred-
its despite economic loss; however, they acknowledged that it is impossible to 
know all the motives that go into such decisions, which can always be linked to 
indirect economic benefits. Therefore, “it is not clear whether there are corporate 
activities that are engaged in without reference to at least their economic impact, 
the legal system, or ethical principles” (Schwartz & Carroll, 2003: 520). Although 
it is beyond the objectives of this thesis, one could also put in discussion the true 
possibility for firms to suspend the economic calculation of benefits and really 
shed instrumentalism (Jones, 2003).  
The research question 
An understanding of organizational outcomes is important not only for the in-
strumental view, but also for the normative one, because organizational out-
comes that do not cover their costs can still help firms achieve long-term viability 
and enter the moral calculus of whether given actions can be reasonably asked 
from a profit-oriented organization. Organizational outcomes are crucial even in 
a political perspective, because the benefits for a firm of filling institutional voids 
and providing public goods help the public understand the motivations and the 
limits of business intervention in political arenas. Therefore, studying these out-
comes improves our knowledge of how firms can be able to adopt socially re-
sponsible behaviour (Schreck, Aaken, & Donaldson, 2013). 
I focus on stakeholder trust as a crucial driver of these outcomes, because 
CSR is typically associated with attributes of trustworthiness, i.e. benevolence 
and integrity, and maybe ability. Research has shown that trust is an antecedent 
of many organizational outcomes that are expected from CSR, such as commit-
ment and other employee attitudes (Glavas & Kelley, 2014). Therefore, trust may 
operate as a mediator between CSR and these organizational outcomes (which in 
turn mediate the effect on financial results, in the instrumental view).  
Until now, research on CSR and trust has dedicated only limited attention 
to two uncertainties that impend over the production of trust from CSR activi-
ties: a) uncertainty about the reality of CSR practices; this uncertainty is larger 
when firms and stakeholders are linked by a distal relationship, rather than 
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proximal; b) uncertainty about motives and prospective actions of firms, which is 
higher when CSR is instrumentally motivated, rather than based on moral prin-
ciples or concern for stakeholders. Among the few existing contributions, Du et 
al. (2011) showed that consumers who directly participate in CSR initiatives (a 
proximal relationship) come to trust the firm more than consumers who are 
merely aware of them (distal); Vlachos et al. (2009) tested the effect on consum-
er trust of different perceived motives of CSR activities, finding that values-
driven (i.e., normative) motives leads to increased trust, while strategic-driven 
(i.e., instrumental) motives do not. 
The research question that I want to address is: When and how does CSR 
lead to increased stakeholder trust and positive organizational outcomes for the 
adopting firms? In trying to answer this question, I plan to advance the theoreti-
cal understanding of the relationship between CSR and trust, by analysing how 
different firm approaches to CSR lead to different relationships with stakehold-
ers, different levels or types of trust, and different organizational outcomes. Alt-
hough the opposition between instrumental and non-instrumental motives is a 
starting point for characterizing such approaches, I intend to present a more nu-
anced theoretical framework of how firms adopt CSR, taking in consideration the 
varieties of CSR as it is implemented in organizations and experienced by stake-
holders. In this framework, I will give room to the external environment of the 
firm and to the institutional pressures that influence the ways and the results of 
CSR adoption (Campbell, 2007). Empirically, I will present two studies that fo-
cus on a distal stakeholder relationship (consumers interested in buying organic 
or Fair Trade products), and show that variance in customer CSR attributions are 
associated with different levels of consumer trust and different outcomes in 
terms of brand loyalty and willingness to pay. 
Since CSR is costly, the existence of organizational outcomes does not nec-
essarily imply that socially responsible firms will outperform their rivals. Howev-
er, the role of trust as a mediator of such outcomes provides a partial answer to a 
traditional problem of the instrumental literature, that is, how a firm can achieve 
competitive advantage through CSR when competitors can easily imitate its CSR 
activities after they prove successful (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). The easiness 
of imitation allegedly derives from the fact that CSR activities must be made visi-
ble to the public if the firm wants to reap the benefits in terms of stakeholder in-
volvement or satisfaction. This problem tends to disappear if the organizational 
outcomes of CSR depend on stakeholder trust in response to an established repu-
tation of a firm, which is more difficult to imitate than specific CSR activities be-
cause it requires sustained commitment to CSR. 
In the next section, in which I present the organization of the thesis, I ex-
plain in more detail the theoretical and empirical contributions that I want to 
make. 
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4. Organization of the thesis 
After this Introduction, the thesis is organized as follows.  
In Chapter 1 (The Organizational Outcomes of Corporate Social Responsi-
bility: A Review of the Literature) I review existing research on organizational 
outcomes of CSR. The review is based on a literature search of leading academic 
journals in management, marketing, organizational behaviour, and business eth-
ics. This chapter contributes to the research question by providing a novel cate-
gorization of organizational outcomes, based on roles that stakeholders play with 
respect to CSR, as identified by Wood & Jones (1995). This categorization allows 
me to classify the theoretical rationales underlying the mechanisms that drive 
outcomes and to integrate fragmented research. I also identify knowledge gaps 
and discuss open questions that future studies should address. 
In Chapter 2 (The Role of Motive Attributions of Corporate Social Respon-
sibility Activities in the Development of Stakeholder Trust), I look at the mecha-
nisms that allow firms to use trust to achieve credibility in their CSR activities. I 
introduce a model that describes the development of stakeholder trust as a two-
stage process: in the first, stakeholders attribute a motive (e.g., stakeholder-
driven or strategic-driven) to the CSR activity; in the second, stakeholders make 
trustworthiness ascriptions to the firm, based on the attributed motive of first 
stage. I use this model to advance eight propositions that link motive attributions 
to different types of stakeholder trust and to different capacity of CSR activities 
to produce organizational outcomes. These propositions solve previous contra-
dictory research on motive attribution and have implications for how firms 
should communicate their CSR activities. 
The two subsequent empirical studies provide evidence that consumers re-
spond differently to product offerings by Italian retailers, based on the degree of 
pro-social attitudes ascribed by consumers to them. The first study (Chapter 3, 
The Missing Link Between Corporate Social Responsibility and Consumer 
Trust: The Case of Fair Trade Products) covers Fair Trade products and was 
published as a co-authored article in the Journal of Business Ethics in 2009. 
This study tests a mediated relationship between CSR and organizational out-
comes, showing that trust drives positive customer response to Fair Trade prod-
ucts in terms of willingness to pay a premium price and brand loyalty. The sec-
ond study (Chapter 4, The Impact of Corporate Social Responsibility Associa-
tions on Trust in Organic Products Marketed by Mainstream Retailers: a Study 
of Italian Consumers) covers organic products and was also published as a co-
authored article, on Business Strategy and the Environment in 2010. This study 
shows that customers are sensitive not only to ‘Consumer CSR’ (i.e., the degree of 
care and concern that the retailer has for them), but also to ‘Environmental CSR’ 
(i.e., the willingness of the retailer to protect the natural environment). Both Fair 
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Trade products and organic food are ‘credence goods’ (Emons, 1997) that depend 
heavily on consumer trust. These two studies use different datasets and data col-
lection techniques.  
In Chapter 5 (Convergent and Divergent Corporate Social Responsibility), 
I examine how firms use CSR to pursue their strategies. One could expect that 
socially responsible firms try to maximize organizational outcomes of CSR by dif-
ferentiating themselves from industry rivals and choosing hard-to-imitate activi-
ties. Starting from evidence that points in the opposite direction, I delineate a 
distinction between what I call ‘convergent CSR’ (in which firms adopt practices 
that have been developed collectively) and ‘divergent CSR’ (in which firms build 
unique CSR practices). I provide a list of strategic reasons (i.e., motivated by or-
ganizational outcomes) that explain why many firms choose the convergent ap-
proach. This chapter extends knowledge of how organizational outcomes shape a 
firm’s decisions about its CSR activities. It has been published in the collection 
edited by C. Louche, S. O. Idowu, & W. L. Filho, Innovative CSR: From Risk 
Management to Value Creation, Greenleaf Publishing, 2010. 
In Chapter 6 (Corporate Social Responsibility and Implicit Contracts), I 
propose an integrative view of CSR, stakeholder trust, and implicit contracts that 
help explain how organizational outcomes are produced in complex relationships 
with stakeholders. I criticize literature that treats CSR as a way of satisfying im-
plicit contracts and suggest that CSR facilitates firms in entering and maintain-
ing implicit contracts by signalling a firm’s long-term orientation and by sup-
porting stakeholder ascriptions of firm benevolence and integrity. I also identify 
five empirical domains in which an implicit-contract perspective produces testa-
ble predictions about CSR adoption. 
In the Conclusion I summarize the main contributions of the thesis to the 
original research question, discussing theories and results from the previous 
chapters. I also present implications and limitations of the work and suggest per-
spectives for future research.  
References 
Accenture & UNGC. 2013. https://www.accenture.com/sk-en/insight-un-global-
compact-ceo-study-sustainability-2013. The UN Global Compact-Accenture 
CEO Study on Sustainability 2013. Retrieved from 
https://www.accenture.com/sk-en/insight-un-global-compact-ceo-study-
sustainability-2013 (last accessed October 1, 2016). 
Audi, R. 2008. Some Dimensions of Trust in Business Practices: From Financial and 
Product Representation to Licensure and Voting. Journal of Business Ethics, 
80(1): 97–102. 
Balot, R. 2001. Aristotle’s critique of phaleas: Justice, equality, and pleonexia. 
Hermes, 129(H. 1): 32–44. 
22   |   CSR, Stakeholder Trust, and Organizational Outcomes  
 
Banerjee, S. B. 2008. Corporate Social Responsibility: The Good, the Bad and the 
Ugly. Critical Sociology, 34(1): 51–79. 
Bartley, T., & Child, C. 2014. Shaming the Corporation: The Social Production of 
Targets and the Anti-Sweatshop Movement. American Sociological Review, 
79(4): 653–679. 
Bhattacharya, C. B., Korschun, D., & Sen, S. 2009. Strengthening Stakeholder–
Company Relationships Through Mutually Beneficial Corporate Social 
Responsibility Initiatives. Journal of Business Ethics, 85(S2): 257–272. 
Bhattacharya, C. B., & Sen, S. 2004. Doing Better at Doing Good: When, Why, and 
How Consumers Respond to Corporate Social Initiatives. California 
Management Review, 47(1): 9–24. 
Birkinshaw, J., Foss, N. J., & Lindenberg, S. 2014. Combining Purpose With Profits. 
Sloan Management Review, 55(3): 49–56. 
Bond, C. F., & DePaulo, B. M. 2006. Accuracy of deception judgments. Personality 
and Social Psychology review, 10(3): 214–34. 
Bowen, H. P. 1953. Social responsibilities of the businessman. New York (NY): 
Harper & Row. 
Boyde, E. 2013. The MBA – a degree of relevance for the 21st century? Financial 
Times. 
Campbell, J. L. 2007. Why Would Corporations Behave In Socially Responsible 
Ways? An Institutional Theory Of Corporate Social Responsibility. Academy of 
Management Review, 32(3): 946–967. 
Carmeli, A., Gilat, G., & Waldman, D. A. 2007. The role of perceived organizational 
performance in organizational identification, adjustment and job performance. 
Journal of Management Studies, 44(6): 972–992. 
Carroll, A. B. 1999. Corporate Social Responsibility: Evolution of a Definitional 
Construct. Business & Society, 38(3): 268–295. 
Cassidy, J. 2015. Mark Zuckerberg and the Rise of Philanthrocapitalism. The New 
Yorker. 
Chatterji, A. K., Durand, R., Levine, D. I., & Toubol, S. 2016. Do Ratings of Firms 
Converge? Implications for Managers, Investors and Strategy Researchers. 
Strategic Management Journal, 37(8): 1597–1614. 
Chatterji, A. K., Levine, D. I., & Toffel, M. W. 2009. How Well Do Social Ratings 
Actually Measure Corporate Social Responsibility? Journal of Economics & 
Management Strategy, 18(1): 125–169. 
Cohen-Charash, Y., & Spector, P. E. 2001. The Role of Justice in Organizations: A 
Meta-Analysis. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 
86(2): 278–321. 
Cragg, W. 2012. Plato, Business and Moral Leadership. In G. P. Prastacos, F. Wang, & 
K. E. Soderquist (Eds.), Leadership through the Classics (pp. 23–31). Berlin: 
Springer. 
Crane, A., Palazzo, G., Spence, L. J., & Matten, D. 2014. Contesting the Value of 
“Creating Shared Value.” California Management Review, 56(2): 130–153. 
Davis, K. 1973. The Case for and Against Business Assumption of Social 
Responsibilities. Academy of Management Journal, 16(2): 312–322. 
Delmas, M. A., & Burbano, V. C. 2011. The Drivers of Greenwashing. California 
Management Review, 54(1): 64–87. 
Dhalla, R., & Oliver, C. 2013. Industry Identity in an Oligopolistic Market and Firms’ 
Responses to Institutional Pressures. Organization Studies, 34(12): 1803–1834. 
Donaldson, T., & Preston, L. E. 1995. The Stakeholder Theory of the Corporation: 
Concepts, Evidence, and Implications. Academy of Management Review, 
20(1): 65–91. 
Introduction   |   23  
  
Du, S., Bhattacharya, C. B., & Sen, S. 2011. Corporate social responsibility and 
competitive advantage: Overcoming the trust barrier. Management Science, 
57(9): 1528–1545. 
Eccles, R. G., Ioannou, I., & Serafeim, G. 2014. The Impact of Corporate 
Sustainability on Organizational Processes and Performance. Management 
Science, 60(11): 2835–2857. 
Emons, W. 1997. Credence goods and fraudulent experts. The RAND Journal of 
Economics, 28(1): 107–119. 
Flammer, C. 2015. Does Corporate Social Responsibility Lead to Superior Financial 
Performance? A Regression Discontinuity Approach. Management Science, 
61(11): 2549–2568. 
Frank, R. H. 1988. Passions Within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions. New 
York (NY): Norton. 
Freeman, R. E. 1984. Strategic management: A stakeholder approach. Boston (MA): 
Pitman. 
Friedman, M. 1970. The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits. 
The New York Times Magazine. 
Fulmer, C. a., & Gelfand, M. J. 2012. At What Level (and in Whom) We Trust: Trust 
Across Multiple Organizational Levels. Journal of Management, 38(4): 1167–
1230. 
Galaskiewicz, J. 1997. An urban grants economy revisited: Corporate charitable 
contributions in the Twin Cities, 1979-81, 1987-89. Administrative Science 
Quarterly, 42(3): 445–471. 
Garriga, E., & Melé, D. 2004. Corporate Social Responsibility Theories: Mapping the 
Territory. Journal of Business Ethics, 53(1/2): 51–71. 
Glavas, A., & Kelley, K. 2014. The Effects of Perceived Corporate Social Responsibility 
on Employee Attitudes. Business Ethics Quarterly, 24(2): 165–202. 
Goldfarb, B., & King, A. 2016. Scientific apophenia in strategic management research: 
Significance tests & mistaken inference. Strategic Management Journal, 37(1): 
167–176. 
Gond, J.-P., Palazzo, G., & Basu, K. 2009. Responsibility through the Mafia Metaphor. 
Business Ethics Quarterly, 1(January): 57–85. 
Hambrick, D. C., & Finkelstein, S. 1987. Managerial discretion: A bridge between 
polar views of organizational outcomes. In L. L. Cummings & M. Staw (Eds.), 
Research in organizational behavior (pp. 369–406). Greenwich (CT): JAI 
Press. 
Heller, J. 1961. Catch-22. New York (NY): Dell. 
Hoffman, A. J. 1999. Institutional Evolution and Change: Environmentalism and the 
U.S. Chemical Industry. Academy of Management Journal, 42(4): 351–371. 
Howard-Grenville, J., Nash, J., & Coglianese, C. 2008. Constructing the license to 
operate: Internal factors and their influence on corporate environmental 
decisions. Law & Policy, 30(1): 73–107. 
Jensen, M. C. 2000. Value maximization and the corporate objective function. In M. 
Beer & N. Nohria (Eds.), Breaking the code of change (pp. 37–57). Boston 
(MA): Harvard Business School Press. 
Jones, C. 2003. As if Business Ethics were Possible, ‘within Such Limits’... 
Organization, 10(2): 223–248. 
Jones, T. M. 1995. Instrumental Stakeholder Theory: a Synthesis of Ethics and 
Economics. Academy of Management Review, 20(2): 404–437. 
Kacmar, K. M., Bachrach, D. G., Harris, K. J., & Zivnuska, S. 2011. Fostering good 
citizenship through ethical leadership: exploring the moderating role of gender 
and organizational politics. Journal of Applied Psychology, 96(3): 633. 
Kurucz, E. C., Colbert, B. A., & Wheeler, D. 2008. The Business Case for Corporate 
Social Responsibility. In A. Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon, & D. S. 
24   |   CSR, Stakeholder Trust, and Organizational Outcomes  
 
Siegel (Eds.), The Oxford Handbook on Corporate Social Responsibility (pp. 
83–112). Oxford (UK): Oxford University Press. 
Lin, C. P. 2010. Modeling corporate citizenship, organizational trust, and work 
engagement based on attachment theory. Journal of Business Ethics, 94(4): 
517–531. 
Lohr, S. 2011. First, Make Money. Also, Do Good. The New York Times. 
Lys, T., Naughton, J. P., & Wang, C. 2015. Signaling through corporate accountability 
reporting. Journal of Accounting and Economics, 60(1): 56–72. 
Maignan, I., Ferrell, O. C., & Hult, G. T. M. 1999. Corporate Citizenship: Cultural 
Antecedents and Business Benefits. Journal of the Academy of Marketing 
Science, 27(4): 455–469. 
Manne, H. G., & Wallich, H. C. 1972. The modern corporation and social 
responsibility. Washington (DC): American Enterprise Institute for Public 
Policy Research. 
Margolis, J. D., Elfenbein, H. A., & Walsh, J. P. 2007. Does it pay to be good? A meta-
analysis and redirection of research on the relationship between corporate 
social and financial performance. HBS Working Paper. 
Matten, D., & Crane, A. 2005. Corporate citizenship: Toward an extended theoretical 
conceptualization. Academy of Management Review, 30(1): 166–179. 
Mayer, R. C., Davis, J. H., & Schoorman, F. D. 1995. An integrative model of 
organizational trust. Academy of Management Review, 20(3): 709–734. 
McAllister, D. J. 1995. Affect-and cognition-based trust as foundations for 
interpersonal cooperation in organizations. Academy of Management Journal, 
38(1): 24–59. 
McGuire, J. B., Sundgren, A., & Schneeweis, T. 1988. Corporate social responsibility 
and firm financial performance. Academy of Management Journal, 31(4): 
854–872. 
McKinsey. 2014. Sustainability’s strategic worth: McKinsey Global Survey results. 
Retrieved November 30, 2015, from http://www.mckinsey.com/business-
functions/sustainability-and-resource-productivity/our-
insights/sustainabilitys-strategic-worth-mckinsey-global-survey-results 
McWilliams, A., & Siegel, D. 2001. Corporate social responsibility: A theory of the 
firm perspective. Academy of Management Review, 26(1): 117–127. 
Moon, J. 2014. Corporate social responsibility: A very short introduction. Oxford 
(UK): Oxford University Press. 
Nidumolu, R., Prahalad, C. K., & Rangaswami, M. R. 2009. Why Sustainability Is 
Now The Key Driver Of Innovation. Harvard business review, 87(September): 
57–64. 
Painter-Morland, M., & ten Bos, R. 2016. Should Environmental Concern Pay Off? A 
Heideggerian Perspective. Organization Studies, 37(4): 547–564. 
Phillips, R. A., Berman, S. L., Elms, H., & Johnson-Cramer, M. E. 2010. Strategy, 
stakeholders and managerial discretion. Strategic Organization, 8(2): 176–183. 
Poppo, L., Zhou, K. Z., & Ryu, S. 2008. Alternative Origins to Interorganizational 
Trust: An Interdependence Perspective on the Shadow of the Past and the 
Shadow of the Future. Organization Science, 19(1): 39–55. 
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. 2002. The competitive advantage of corporate 
philanthropy. Harvard Business Review, 80(12): 56–68. 
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. 2006. Strategy and society: The link between 
competitive advantage and corporate social responsibility. Harvard Business 
Review, 84(12): 78–92. 
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. 2011. Creating shared value. Harvard Business 
Review, 89(1/2): 62–77. 
Porter, M. E., & Kramer, M. R. 2014. A response to Andrew Crane et al.’s article. 
California Management Review, 56(2): 151–153. 
Introduction   |   25  
  
Prahalad, C. K., & Hammond, A. 2002. Serving the world’s poor, profitably. Harvard 
Business Review, 80(9): 48–59. 
Rempel, J. K., Holmes, J. G., & Zanna, M. P. 1985. Trust in close relationships. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 49(1): 95–112. 
Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. 2007. Toward a political conception of corporate 
responsibility: Business and society seen from a Habermasian perspective. 
Academy of Management Review, 32(4): 1096–1120. 
Scherer, A. G., & Palazzo, G. 2011. The New Political Role of Business in a Globalized 
World: A Review of a New Perspective on CSR and its Implications for the Firm, 
Governance, and Democracy. Journal of Management Studies, 48(4): 899–931. 
Schneider, S., & Pintilii, A. CSR and the Tobacco Industry: A contradiction in terms? , 
Université de Genève 1–23 (2013). 
Schoorman, F. D., Mayer, R. C., & Davis, J. H. 2007. An Integrative Model of 
Organizational Trust: Past, Present, and Future. Academy of Management 
Review, 32(2): 344–354. 
Schreck, P., Aaken, D. van, & Donaldson, T. 2013. Positive economics and the 
normativistic fallacy: Bridging the two sides of CSR. Business Ethics Quarterly, 
23(02): 297–329. 
Schwartz, M. S., & Carroll, A. B. 2003. Corporate Social Responsibility: A Three-
Domain Approach. Business Ethics Quarterly, 13(4): 503–530. 
Shamir, R. 2004. Between Self-Regulation and the Alien Tort Claims Act: On the 
Contested Concept of Corporate Social Responsibility. Law & Society Review, 
38(4): 635–664. 
Simons, R. 2013. The Business of Business Schools: Restoring a Focus on Competing 
to Win. Capitalism and Society, 8(1): 1–37. 
Slawinski, N., Pinkse, J., Busch, T., & Banerjee, S. B. 2017. The Role of Short-
Termism and Uncertainty Avoidance in Organizational Inaction on Climate 
Change: A Multi-Level Framework. Business & Society, 56(2): 253–282. 
Smith, N. C. 2008. Consumers as drivers of corporate social responsibility. In A. 
Crane, A. McWilliams, D. Matten, J. Moon, & D. S. Siegel (Eds.), The Oxford 
Handbook of Corporate Social Responsibility (pp. 281–302). Oxford (UK): 
Oxford University Press. 
Stanaland, A. J. S., Lwin, M. O., & Murphy, P. E. 2011. Consumer Perceptions of the 
Antecedents and Consequences of Corporate Social Responsibility. Journal of 
Business Ethics, 102(1): 47–55. 
Summers, L. 2015. Corporate long-termism is no panacea — but it is a start. 
Financial Times. 
Sundaram, A. K., & Inkpen, A. C. 2004. The Corporate Objective Revisited. 
Organization Science, 15(3): 350–363. 
Tyler, T. R. 2003. Trust within organisations. Personnel Review, 32(5): 556–568. 
Vlachos, P. A., Tsamakos, A., Vrechopoulos, A. P., & Avramidis, P. K. 2009. Corporate 
social responsibility: attributions, loyalty, and the mediating role of trust. 
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, 37(2): 170–180. 
Vlasic, B. 2015. Despite Recalls, G.M. Pays Workers a Big Bonus. The New York 
Times. 
Vogel, D. J. 2005. Is there a market for virtue? The business case for corporate social 
responsibility. California Management Review, 47(4): 19–45. 
Werhane, P. H. 2000. Business Ethics and the Origins of Contemporary Capitalism: 
Economics and Ethics in the Work of Adam Smith and Herbert Spencer. 
Journal of Business Ethics, 24(3): 185–198. 
Whiteman, G., Walker, B., & Perego, P. 2013. Planetary Boundaries: Ecological 
Foundations for Corporate Sustainability. Journal of Management Studies, 
50(2): 307–336. 
26   |   CSR, Stakeholder Trust, and Organizational Outcomes  
 
Wissenburg, M. 2013. Substantive representation in a post-democratic environment. 
Public Reason, 5(1): 115–136. 
Wood, D. J. 1991. Corporate Social Performance Revisited. Academy of Management 
Review, 16(4): 691–718. 
Wood, D. J., & Jones, R. E. 1995. Stakeholder Mismatching: A Theoretical Problem in 
Empirical Research on Corporate Social Performance. International Journal of 
Organizational Analysis, 3(3): 229–267. 
Young, I. M. 2008. Responsibility and global justice: a social connection model. In A. 
G. Scherer & G. Palazzo (Eds.), Handbook of Research on Global Corporate 
Citizenship (pp. 137–165). Cheltenham (UK): Edward Elgar. 
Young, S. L., & Makhija, M. V. 2014. Firms’ corporate social responsibility behavior: 
An integration of institutional and profit maximization approaches. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 45(6): 670–698. 
 
Chapter 1 
The Organizational Outcomes of 
Corporate Social Responsibility: 
A Review of the Literature 
1. Introduction 
The literature on corporate social responsibility (CSR) emphasizes that CSR has 
the potential to yield positive organizational outcomes for adopting firms, such 
as heightened effort by employees, improved reputation in the marketplace, or 
efficiency gains from ‘green’ innovation (Eccles et al., 2014). These outcomes 
have led many scholars to advance a business case for CSR, arguing that a firm 
can ‘do well by doing good’ (Kurucz, Colbert, & Wheeler, 2008). The literature 
has often studied the empirical link between CSR and financial performance; 
previous meta-analyses have mainly supported the existence of a positive link, 
even though the results of studies are mixed and some of them may be biased or 
methodologically flawed (Margolis et al., 2007; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 
2003). Recently, CSR research has started to move away from studies on the 
CSR-financial performance link and has increasingly investigated the specifics of 
organizational outcomes of CSR. This emerging trend in the literature makes a 
critical review of research on organizational outcomes of CSR timely. 
Previously published reviews have offered different attempts at synthetiz-
ing the organizational outcomes of CSR. Laplume, Sonpar, & Litz (2008) re-
viewed the contributions to stakeholder theory that are related to Freeman’s 
(1984) legacy and identified ‘firm performance’ as one of the major themes of 
this stream of research, including which organizational outcomes are produced 
by stakeholder management. Peloza & Shang (2011) focused on the marketing 
outcomes of CSR, that is, the ways in which CSR can create value for customers. 
Aguinis & Glavas (2012) presented a multi-level framework of the CSR literature, 
looking at both the predictors of CSR actions and policies and their outcomes, 
which they classified as affecting internal or external stakeholders. Mellahi, 
Frynas, Sun, & Siegel (2016) looked at research about the performance implica-
tions of nonmarket strategy – which consists of corporate political activity and 
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the strategic use of CSR to enhance financial results – focusing in particular on 
strategy formulation. 
The review that I present in this chapter extends these previous syntheses 
in many ways. First, it covers important recent contributions that enriched our 
knowledge of organizational outcomes of CSR; as I will show, most studies in this 
area that appeared in leading academic journals have been published after 2011. 
Second, the scope of the literature search is broader than previous reviews that 
have merely considered the organizational outcomes related to customers 
(Peloza & Shang, 2011) or to nonmarket strategies (Mellahi et al., 2016). Finally, 
this review focuses only on organizational outcomes and aims at providing a 
novel categorization of these outcomes, based on the different roles played by 
stakeholders with respect to CSR; this categorization is intended to surpass 
commonly used distinctions based on stakeholder categories (e.g., internal vs ex-
ternal, Aguinis & Glavas, 2012) and provide a better integration of the contribu-
tions. 
The research on organizational outcomes is highly fragmented. Various 
theoretical approaches are applied to different outcomes, ranging from institu-
tional approaches to individual psychology. This theoretical fragmentation mir-
rors the wide-ranging implications of CSR for firms and stakeholders. The CSR 
literature often presents lists of outcomes that mix inconsistent categorizations 
or different stages in the production of effects. For example, Aguinis & Glavas 
(2012) lists reputation, consumer loyalty and positive firm evaluations, stake-
holder relations, customer choice, financial performance, firm capabilities, re-
duced risk, and enhanced employee attitudes as the main organizational out-
comes of CSR (see also Mellahi et al., 2016, for a substantially similar list). This 
list mixes a categorization based on stakeholders (consumer, employees) with 
one based on firm resources (reputation, firm capabilities); ‘stakeholder relations’ 
overlap with consumer and employee positive attitudes, and possibly with repu-
tation; ‘financial performance’ is presented as an autonomous outcome, but it 
presumably is a consequence of the other outcomes in the list; the same might be 
said of ‘reduced risk’. 
The categorization that I use in this review is based on Wood & Jones 
(1995), who observed that stakeholders serve at least three roles: a) they set ex-
pectations about the firm’s actions and policies, defining what is desirable or un-
desirable; b) they experience the effects of the firm’s behaviour; and c) they eval-
uate the firm’s behaviour, that is, they make judgments about how well the firm 
meets expectations or affects societal interests. This partition is useful because 
the outcomes of CSR are driven by a firm’s relationships with stakeholders; by 
specifying what role is taken by stakeholders with respect to a focal CSR policy or 
action, one can provide a theoretical rationale for the outcomes and define the 
conditions under which the outcome happens and with what degree of intensity.  
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Integration of research is a major purpose of this review. As noted by 
Peloza & Shang (2011), researchers have investigated a variety of specialized CSR 
policies, from philanthropic expenditures to employee ethical training. This vari-
ety is a barrier to relate findings across studies and increases the risk of accumu-
lating fragmented knowledge (Maignan & Ferrell, 2004). My aim here is to pre-
sent a coherent framework of organizational outcomes of CSR, which is still 
missing in the literature. Some of the existing fragmentation is probably irreduc-
ible, because it results from different meanings bestowed on CSR within different 
theoretical conversations. However, by identifying common threads in the litera-
ture, this framework can provide a ground for comparable empirical work and 
for theoretical contributions that draw connections among different perspectives. 
The review is structured as follows. I begin by describing the scope of the 
review and the method used in the literature search. Next, I introduce the key 
concepts regarding the roles played by stakeholders with respect to CSR, and I 
present a critical review of the research on organizational outcomes, based on the 
proposed categorization. Within each stakeholder role (expectation, experience, 
evaluation), I classify the contributions according to whether they apply to gen-
eral mechanisms that cut across stakeholders, to organizational-level outcomes, 
or to specific stakeholder categories (in particular customers and employees, who 
have attracted the most studies). Then, I offer an integrative framework of the 
processes that drive organizational outcomes and use it to identify important 
knowledge gaps that need to be filled and to provide recommendations for future 
research. In the conclusion, I summarize the findings of the review. 
2. Scope of the review 
This review relies on a literature search of 17 leading academic journals. Nine of 
them are the management journals that were surveyed in Mellahi et al. (2016), 
that is, Academy of Management Review, Academy of Management Journal, 
Administrative Science Quarterly, Journal of International Business Studies, 
Journal of Management, Journal of Management Studies, Organization Sci-
ence, Organization Studies, and Strategic Management Journal. The tenth is 
Management Science, which has published notable contributions on CSR in re-
cent years. I added three well-known specialty journals in the areas of business 
ethics and social issues in management (Business & Society, Business Ethics 
Quarterly, and Journal of Business Ethics), following Laplume et al. (2008). The 
list is completed by two leading journals in organizational behaviour (Journal of 
Organizational Behavior and Personnel Psychology) and another two in mar-
keting (Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science and Journal of Market-
ing), all of them surveyed in Aguinis & Glavas (2012). 
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I used the EBSCOhost database to search for articles with the words corpo-
rate social responsibility, corporate social performance, or stakeholder appear-
ing in the title, the abstract, or in the subject terms, and published in the 16-year 
period between January 2000 and December 2015. I excluded commentaries, 
replies, dialogues, literature reviews, and meta-analyses. Within the articles gen-
erated by this search, I further selected those that addressed the organizational 
outcomes of CSR. Articles devoted to the antecedents of CSR or general contribu-
tions about CSR without immediate implications for organizational outcomes 
were excluded. I also eliminated articles that were merely concerned with the ef-
fects of CSR on financial performance because this outcome has been extensively 
surveyed by previous reviews or meta-analyses; however, I included the articles 
where the financial performance was the dependent variable when they present-
ed mediators or moderators that were related to other organizational outcomes 
of CSR. Finally, I excluded the articles that dealt with non-profit organizations to 
concentrate on the mechanisms that drive organizational outcomes in firms. I 
applied these criteria by directly examining the abstract or the main body of all 
the articles generated by the initial search. In order to build a representative 
sample of the extant research, I used stringent selection for specialty journals 
and a more liberal approach for management, organizational behaviour, and 
marketing journals, following again Laplume et al. (2008). 
The selection produced an initial list of 131 articles. To reflect the most re-
cent research, I also searched the in-press sections of all the journals in the list to 
identify forthcoming papers that satisfied the selection criteria (as of December 
2015). Seventeen articles were found. Finally, I cross-referenced the sample with 
previous reviews and the references of the latest articles to identify impactful ar-
ticles that were published in journals that were not in the search list. This proce-
dure generated 12 additional articles. Therefore, the final sample for the review 
consists of 160 contributions in 26 different journals (17 in the search list and 
nine that published the additional impactful articles). Table 1 presents a break-
down of the articles by journal and by journal type. 
I coded all the articles using a formalized codebook to identify the theories 
used, the examined organizational outcomes, the type of CSR activity presumed 
to originate the outcomes, the stakeholder categories involved, and the role 
stakeholders played in terms of expectations, experience, and evaluation. The 
appendix presents the complete codebook. 
The breakdown of the articles by year (Figure 1) indicates a strong growth 
in the interest in the organizational outcomes of CSR in recent years. Less than 
five articles per year were published until 2003. A noticeable increase appears 
first in 2004. The growth becomes evident after 2011: actually, more than half of 
the articles in the sample (84 out of 160) have been published in the last five 
years (between 2012 and 2016, which includes only papers that were forthcom-
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ing at the end of December 2015). The growth is entirely due to empirical articles, 
while the number of conceptual articles has been stable during the period. Over-
all, there were only 21 conceptual articles, compared to 139 empirical articles. 
TABLE 1. Breakdown of the articles by journal 
Management  59 
Academy of Management Journal 6  
Academy of Management Review 4  
Administrative Science Quarterly 1  
California Management Review 1  
Journal of International Business Studies 1  
Journal of Business Research 1  
Journal of Management 5  
Journal of Management Studies 9  
Management Science 8  
Organization Science 5  
Strategic Management Journal 18  
Specialty  63 
Business & Society 9  
Business Ethics Quarterly 4  
Journal of Business Ethics 49  
Journal of Corporate Citizenship 1  
Organizational behaviour/Human resource man-
agement 
 7 
International Journal of Human Resource Management 1  
Journal of Organizational Behaviour 2  
Personnel Psychology 3  
Research in Organizational Behavior 1  
Marketing  31 
Journal of Consumer Affairs 1  
Journal of Consumer Psychology 2  
Journal of Consumer Research 2  
Journal of Marketing 15  
Journal of Marketing Research 1  
Journal of Public Policy & Marketing 1  
Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science 9  
Total  160 
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FIGURE 1. Breakdown of the articles by type and by year 
 
3. Review of the literature: expectation, experience, and evaluation 
effects 
In this section, I critically review the literature on organizational outcomes of 
CSR. In organizing contributions, I start from the premise that the ability of CSR 
to produce these outcomes lies in generating positive relations between stake-
holders and the firm (Barnett, 2007). This premise is shared by virtually all re-
search in this area. However, the variety of outcomes considered and the differ-
ent theoretical perspectives adopted make it hard to integrate the contributions 
in a coherent framework. For this purpose, I use the partition of stakeholder 
roles that has been proposed by Wood & Jones (1995). 
Distinguishing among different stakeholder roles is important because 
stakeholders do not serve a single function for a firm. The idea itself that firms 
are responsible for their activities implies that stakeholders are not simply con-
sidered factors of production, as they were in the neoclassical view of the firm (in 
which, e.g., the only role of workers was to work). Even the modern stakeholder 
theory sometimes reduces stakeholders to the mere role of providers of resources 
of varying quantity and quality, depending on how satisfying the relationship is 
that they have with the firm. In this perspective, the basic mechanism for pro-
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ducing organizational outcomes is to satisfy stakeholder needs. As stated clearly 
in Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips (2010), “A firm that manages for stakeholders allo-
cates more resources to satisfy the needs and demands of its legitimate stake-
holders than would be necessary to simply retain their wilful participation in the 
firm’s productive activities” (58). Research has indeed seen stakeholder satisfac-
tion as an important driver of organizational outcomes, but most contributions 
have focused on other mechanisms in which stakeholders have different roles 
and engage in behaviours that cannot be reduced to providing resources to firms. 
Wood & Jones (1995) proposed that stakeholders fill at least three roles 
with respect to firms: 
- they set expectations for corporate performance, defining norms and in 
general what constitutes desirable or undesirable behaviour; 
- they experience the effects of firm behaviour, as recipients of firm ac-
tions or as contributors to them; 
- they evaluate the outcomes of corporate behaviour, making judgments 
on how well a firm meets the expectations or affects the stakeholders in 
its environment. 
As an example, consider a firm that buys a new treatment plant for reduc-
ing pollution. This investment meets the expectations that a firm should limit its 
impact on the environment; such stakeholders as activists, governments, the 
media, or the public at large set these expectations. The local community that 
benefits from reduced pollution is the stakeholder who experiences the effects of 
the new plant. All these stakeholders will probably evaluate the investment posi-
tively; other stakeholders that neither set expectations for the firm environmen-
tal policies nor experience their effects can also fill the role of evaluators, e.g., the 
shareholders of the company, who may form an opinion on the value of this in-
vestment. 
Wood & Jones (1995) emphasized that this partition is useful in under-
standing the mechanisms that translate CSR in organizational outcomes. Moreo-
ver, identifying the roles played by stakeholders allows one to avoid stakeholder 
mismatches when predicting organizational outcomes. For example, studies on 
the impact of charitable contributions on stock market returns may incur a mis-
match because the stakeholders who experience the contributions (charities) are 
not the same as those who act in the stock market (investors). To avoid the mis-
match, one has to theorize a connection between action and effect. The impact on 
stock returns is not driven by the experiences of stakeholders but possibly by 
generalized stakeholder expectations about the proper conduct of business; since 
meeting these expectations can confer legitimacy to a firm and improve its access 
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to resources, investors could see financial benefits in making charitable contribu-
tions and increase demand for the stock of the firm. 
The partition allows for the same stakeholder to play different roles in the 
same CSR activity. For example, the government participates in defining expec-
tations about the level of safety required on oil platforms; in the case of an oil 
spill, the government also experiences the effects of the disaster, by managing 
the crisis and participating in remedial activities; finally, the government make 
judgments about the involved firms, which will influence future dealings with 
them. Conversely, the same organizational outcome may derive from different 
stakeholder roles: e.g., employee identification (a well-known employee-related 
outcome of CSR) is empirically linked to both the fair treatment that the employ-
ee personally experiences at work and the employee’s positive evaluation of how 
the firm treats other employees or other stakeholders. Therefore, the multiplicity 
of stakeholder roles is associated with different types of relationships that could 
lead to different organizational outcomes. 
Each stakeholder role is associated with mechanisms that have been inves-
tigated in the research on the organizational outcomes of CSR. In general, the 
outcomes may depend on a) meeting stakeholders’ expectations, b) changes in 
the attitudes of stakeholders who experience the firm’s policies and actions, or c) 
developing resources and positive relationships based on stakeholders’ evalua-
tions. 
In the following sub-sections, I critically review the mechanisms investi-
gated by the research, considering expectation, experience, and evaluation roles 
in turn. 
For expectation, research has focused on two broad effects of conformity to 
norms and values. The first, legitimacy, is produced at the institutional level (i.e., 
the firm’s external environment) and involves greater access to resources and 
support from a firm’s constituencies. The second, deontic response, is produced 
at the individual level and regards how individuals react to behaviour that is con-
sistent with ethical norms that they support, even when these individuals are not 
the direct beneficiaries of it. 
For experience, research has identified effects at the organizational and the 
individual level. At the organizational level (i.e., the firm as a whole), the effects 
are connected to how CSR policies may lead a firm to build assets and capabili-
ties. At the individual level, research has looked at how CSR improves satisfac-
tion of the recipients, induces reciprocity, or stimulates positive attitudes in 
stakeholders who directly contribute to or are involved in CSR initiatives; I pre-
sent separately the effects on customers and employees, which are the only 
stakeholder categories that have been investigated by this research. 
 For evaluation, research has individuated far-reaching outcomes that can 
be obtained from different CSR activities and have comprehensive impacts on 
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the firm’s operations: two of them are reputation and moral capital, which are 
institutional-level effects; the third is trust, which is typically multi-level and can 
be produced both in individuals (e.g. customers) and organizations (e.g. suppli-
ers). Further outcomes related to positive stakeholder attributions regarding the 
firm have been investigated at the individual level; again, I distinguish between 
effects on customers and employees, given the absence of studies on other stake-
holder categories. 
Table 2 presents a summary of the contributions that I am going to review. 
The first column classifies the stakeholder roles; the second identifies the differ-
ent types of outcomes at different levels that have been studied; the third de-
scribe the underlying mechanisms of the outcomes, as presented in the sampled 
contributions. 
TABLE 2. Summary of research about organizational outcomes of CSR 
Stakeholder 
role 
Outcome Underlying mechanism 
Expectation Institutional-level 
outcomes: legiti-
macy 
Environmental responsibility (Bansal & Clelland, 2004) 
Corporate philanthropy (e.g., Wang & Qian, 2011) 
How the firm is organized (Heugens, Kaptein, & van 
Oosterhout, 2008) 
Do-good vs. do-no-harm activities (Crilly, Ni, & Jiang, 2016b) 
Individual-level 
outcomes: deontic 
response 
Stakeholder reaction to third-party justice (e.g., Rupp et al., 
2013) 
Rewards for fairness (e.g., Bosse et al., 2009) 
Experience Organizational-
level outcomes 
Stakeholder satisfaction (e.g., Berrone et al., 2007) 
Information sharing (Harrison et al., 2010) 
High-quality stakeholder relationships (e.g., Wang & Choi, 
2013) 
Innovativeness of stakeholder relationships (e.g., Harting, 
Harmeling, & Venkataraman, 2006) 
Development of internal capabilities (e.g., Tang, Hull, & 
Rothenberg, 2012) 
Leadership (e.g., Vlachos, Panagopoulos, & Rapp, 2013) 
Individual-level 
outcomes: custom-
er related 
Customer satisfaction (e.g., Luo & Bhattacharya, 2009) 
Warm-glow effect in CRM (e.g., Andrews, Luo, Fang, & 
Aspara, 2014) 
Firm-cause fit in CRM (e.g., Ellen, Webb, & Mohr, 2006) 
Other forms of customer involvement (e.g., Popkowski 
Leszczyc & Rothkopf, 2010) 
Individual-level 
outcomes: employ-
ee related 
Reciprocity by employees (e.g., Cohn, Fehr, & Goette, 2015) 
Quality of work experience (e.g., Jayasinghe, 2016) 
Employee experimentation (e.g., Riivari & Lämsä, 2014) 
Job satisfaction (e.g., Wang & Hsieh, 2012) 
Leader-follower exchange (de Luque, Washburn, Waldman, 
& House, 2008) 
Direct participation in CSR activities (e.g., Kim, Sung, & Lee, 
2012) 
Enhanced identification with the firm in corporate volunteer-
ism (Caligiuri, Mencin, & Jiang, 2013) 
Enhanced meaningfulness in corporate volunteerism (Bode, 
Singh, & Rogan, 2015) 
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Evaluation Institutional-level 
outcomes: reputa-
tion 
Stakeholder positive judgment of CSR (e.g., Wang & Berens, 
2015) 
Anticipation of future performance (e.g., Attig, El Ghoul, 
Guedhami, & Suh, 2013) 
Attribution of genuine intentions (e.g., Kim, Kim, & Qian, 
2016) 
Signals of substantial effort (e.g., Hond, Rehbein, Bakker, & 
Kooijmans-van Lankveld, 2014) 
Reputation of the industry (e.g., Leonidou, Katsikeas, & 
Morgan, 2013) 
Time consistency (e.g., Koschate-Fischer, Huber, & Hoyer, 
2016) 
Domain consistency (Oikonomou, Brooks, & Pavelin, 2014) 
Institutional-level 
outcomes: moral 
capital 
Corporate philanthropy (e.g., Godfrey, 2005) 
Signals of substantial effort (Cuypers, Koh, & Wang, 2016) 
Multi-level out-
comes: trust 
Stakeholder trustworthiness attributions (e.g., Lacey & 
Kennett-Hensel, 2010) 
Trust as a mediator of other outcomes (e.g., Aryee, 
Walumbwa, Mondejar, & Chu, 2015) 
Degree of interdependence between firm and stakeholders 
(e.g., Pirson & Malhotra, 2011) 
Perceived motives behind CSR (Vlachos et al., 2009) 
Individual-level 
outcomes: custom-
er related 
Impact on customer attitudes (e.g., Olsen, Slotegraaf, & 
Chandukala, 2014) 
Fit between the firm and CSR initiative (e.g., Simmons & 
Becker-Olsen, 2006) 
Firm credibility (e.g., Inoue & Kent, 2014) 
Halo effects (e.g., Chernev & Blair, 2015) 
Perceived motives behind CSR (e.g., Groza, Pronschinske, & 
Walker, 2011) 
Price fairness (e.g., Habel, Schons, Alavi, & Wieseke, 2016) 
Negative consumer evaluations of CSR (e.g., Newman, 
Gorlin, & Dhar, 2014b) 
Individual-level 
outcomes: employ-
ee related 
Job attractiveness (e.g., Gully, Phillips, Castellano, Han, & 
Kim, 2013) 
Employee attitudes (e.g., El Akremi, Gond, Swaen, De Roeck, 
& Igalens, 2016) 
Team efficacy (Lin, Baruch, & Shih, 2012a) 
Meaningfulness of work (e.g., Bauman & Skitka, 2012) 
3.1. Expectations 
Institutional-level outcomes: legitimacy. The literature has extensively studied 
legitimacy-seeking as an antecedent of CSR, starting from the idea that socially 
responsible firms earn legitimacy when they conform to stakeholder expectations 
(e.g., Bansal & Roth, 2000; Delmas & Toffel, 2008). Legitimacy has been defined 
as the “generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are de-
sirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, 
values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995: 574). Research on legitimacy as 
an outcome of CSR has been less frequent, but scholars have shown that both 
environmental responsibility (Bansal & Clelland, 2004) and corporate philan-
thropy (Wang & Qian, 2011) help firms gain legitimacy. In turn, legitimacy elicits 
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positive stakeholder responses; in particular, socio-political legitimacy conferred 
by engaging in philanthropy has been found to facilitate corporate political activ-
ities and to grant firms political access (Werner, 2015). The effect on political ac-
cess is larger for firms that are visible, subject to higher stakeholder expectations, 
and have no previous political connections because for these firms, gaining legit-
imacy is more important (Wang & Qian, 2011). Since legitimacy facilitates access 
to resources, investors are expected to react positively to initiatives that are legit-
imacy-enhancing and negatively to those that are legitimacy-threatening; 
Flammer (2013) showed that further positive initiatives have a low impact on 
stock value when the social performance of a firm is already high, or conversely 
that the negative effects of harmful events are reduced because of the high stake-
holder support that characterize legitimate firms. Similarly, Bansal & Clelland 
(2004) found that environmentally legitimate firms incur less unsystematic stock 
market risk than illegitimate firms. 
Research has also investigated the conditions that make CSR initiatives 
more or less legitimating. According to Heugens, Kaptein, & van Oosterhout 
(2008), CSR is more likely to cause external support and to earn legitimacy when 
a firm is organized as a moral community (seen as a distinct organizational type 
where specific structures and shared beliefs of members bind the firm to self-
imposed moral constraints), than when it is a nexus of contracts (a set of rela-
tionships in which individuals pursue their personal interests) or an utilitarian 
organization (which is oriented toward collective goals and value internal coop-
eration), because CSR efforts by moral communities are more likely to be seen as 
sincere. Crilly, Ni, & Jiang (2016) studied the effectiveness of CSR to overcome 
the liability of foreignness (the lack of legitimacy that foreign firms suffer when 
operating abroad) and showed that ‘do-good’ activities that create positive exter-
nalities are more legitimating than ‘do-no-harm’ activities, in which the firm at-
tenuates negative externalities; the contrast could be explained by motive attrib-
utions by stakeholders who assume that do-good activities are driven by intrinsic 
values and do-no-harm activities by situational pressures. 
Individual-level outcomes: deontic response. Deontic justice theory 
(Cropanzano, Goldman, & Folger, 2003) suggests that individuals react not only 
to the ethical treatment they receive (first-party justice) but also to the ethical 
treatment of others (third-party justice). Deontic responses are automatic and 
morality-driven, transcend economic self-interest, and can be retributive in reac-
tion to injustice or positive in reaction to justice (Rupp, Ganapathi, Aguilera, & 
Williams, 2006). CSR is infused with issues of ethics and defines the level of so-
cial justice adopted by a firm (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, & Ganapathi, 2007); 
therefore, it may stimulate positive stakeholder reaction when the firm meets ex-
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pectations of fairness or generate adverse responses when the firm violates ethi-
cal assumptions (Rupp et al., 2013).  
Stakeholder theory also introduced the possibility that stakeholders re-
spond to a firm’s actions in ways that are not self-interested, even though these 
scholars do not use the deontic language. Bosse, Phillips, & Harrison (2009) the-
orized that most actors’ utility maximization is bounded by norms of fairness, 
which means that they reward fair behaviour and punish unfair behaviour even 
when they have to incur costs to do so; as a consequence, stakeholders will in-
crease their contribution in stakeholder-oriented firms that adopt procedural 
and interactional justice towards all stakeholders. Relatedly, Hahn (2015) pro-
posed that normative stakeholder demands (i.e., societal expectations for pro-
social behaviour) may trigger stakeholder responses that reward friendliness and 
punish unfriendliness even if this conduct does not provide benefits to them. 
Bridoux & Stoelhorst (2014) relaxed the assumption that most actors are bound-
ed by norms of fairness, leaving room for self-regarding stakeholders that do not 
reward fairness; however, fairness is still effective in attracting, retaining, and 
motivating the morality-driven stakeholders. 
The only article in the sample that empirically tested deontic theory is 
Rupp et al. (2013). In their experiment, they found that the moral identity of in-
dividuals positively moderates the effect of the firm’s CSR in attracting job seek-
ers and activating organizational citizenship behaviour (OCB). They also found 
that first-party justice negatively moderates the effect, suggesting that deontic 
responses are actually at work. 
3.2. Experience 
Organizational-level outcomes. Scholars have researched how CSR policies and 
actions improve various dimensions of the experience of stakeholders, generat-
ing improvements in the internal and external conditions that allow a firm to op-
erate properly and fulfil its economic objectives. A dominant perspective in this 
research area is that CSR satisfies stakeholder needs. CSR may provide stake-
holders with functional benefits (such as higher salaries), psychosocial benefits 
(such as work-life balance), and values (such as self-esteem), which improve the 
quality of their relationship with the firm (Bhattacharya et al., 2009). By satisfy-
ing needs, a firm may also induce behavioural responses in stakeholders, such as 
a feeling of bonding, that can elicit organizational identification and increase the 
resources that stakeholders make available to the relationship (Maignan & 
Ferrell, 2004). Measures of stakeholder satisfaction in general are found to me-
diate the relationship between CSR and financial performance (Berrone et al., 
2007).  
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An underlying theme in this area is how firms can achieve a competitive 
advantage through CSR. Researchers have often adopted the perspective of the 
resource-based view (RBV): an improved relationship with stakeholders is valu-
able to the firm but potentially easy to imitate because there are no obvious bar-
riers to the adoption of CSR policies. To explain how the benefits of CSR can be 
isolated from imitation, scholars have mostly invoked the socialized nature of the 
relationship with stakeholders. Harrison et al. (2010) argued that satisfied 
stakeholders share nuanced information with the firm, which increases the firm’s 
ability to innovate and generates a competitive advantage due to path depend-
ence and causal ambiguity in stakeholder relationships. Wang & Choi (2013) 
highlighted the role of path dependency, arguing that high-quality stakeholder 
relationships develop over time; as a consequence, the financial benefits from 
CSR should be higher when it is characterized by inter-domain and temporal 
consistency. Their study found evidence of this effect, which seems stronger in 
knowledge-intensive firms, which rely more heavily on relational assets. Positive 
stakeholder relationships are more effective when they are innovative, rather 
than standardized, because innovative relationships are more complex and sub-
ject to causal ambiguity; therefore, they are difficult to imitate and provide a ba-
sis for a sustainable advantage (Harting et al., 2006; Hillman & Keim, 2001). All 
these contributions indicate that competitive advantage is not associated with 
having better CSR than other firms (something that would be difficult to ascer-
tain or even to define meaningfully), but with establishing specific histories of 
relationships with stakeholders. However, other contributions try to identify spe-
cific characteristics of CSR initiatives that could be more conducive to competi-
tive advantage. Mena & Chabowski (2015) found that CSR improves financial 
performance when it is based on responsiveness to stakeholder needs and on 
stakeholder-focused innovation, while ceremonial and imitative CSR do not let 
firms achieve differentiation and may actually have a negative impact on finan-
cial performance. Previously, Hull & Rothenberg (2008) had found that the link 
between CSR and financial performance is stronger in industries with high levels 
of innovation and differentiation, while Surroca, Tribó, & Waddock (2010) had 
shown that firm innovation and human capital mediate the relationship between 
CSR and financial performance. 
Directing CSR towards aspects that are internal to the firm and that allow 
generation and absorption of knowledge seems to make it more likely that CSR 
turns into financial performance. Aragón-Correa & Sharma (2003) presented ev-
idence that proactive environmental strategies allow firms to develop internal 
capabilities that can be exploited to pursue competitive advantages. The effect of 
CSR on internal capabilities is even stronger when CSR is characterized by tem-
poral consistency, that is, by the continued effort that is required for organiza-
tional learning (Tang et al., 2012). CSR activities also contribute to more organi-
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zational transparency and improve internal moral standards of behaviour, reduc-
ing the agency costs of managerial conduct (Lopatta, Buchholz, & Kaspereit, 
2016). 
Characteristics of leaders are relevant regarding how CSR is turned into 
practice and experienced by stakeholders. Vlachos, Panagopoulos, & Rapp (2013) 
found that when employees believe that their managers possess charismatic 
leadership qualities, the employees attribute the CSR activities of the firm to in-
trinsic values, which support the production of organizational outcomes. 
Petrenko, Aime, Ridge, & Hill (2016) focused on CEO narcissism, showing that it 
is a positive antecedent of the level and profile of CSR, apparently because nar-
cissistic CEOs have a high need for praise and a strong desire to have their posi-
tive self-views reinforced; however, CEO narcissism reduces the effect of CSR on 
firm performance because it tends to produce unfocused CSR efforts that maxim-
ize contacts with multiple constituencies and sensation-seeking but reduces ex-
ploitation of the strategic opportunities linked to CSR. 
Individual-level outcomes: customer related. The marketing literature has 
frequently observed that CSR can satisfy customer needs, motivating purchase 
intentions, and conversely, that inadequate CSR is a potential source of dissatis-
faction (Lacey, Kennett-Hensel, & Manolis, 2015). Luo & Bhattacharya (2009) 
found that the effect of CSR on financial performance is mediated by customer 
satisfaction. Research has also explored whether direct participation of custom-
ers in the CSR activity of a firm enhances the consumer response. An important 
case is cause-related marketing (CRM), in which a firm asks the customers to 
buy a product to finance donations to a charity or other worthy cause. Barone, 
Miyazaki, & Taylor (2000) showed that the purchase intentions of customers in 
CRM campaigns depend on the perceived motivation of the firm (cause-
beneficial vs. cause-exploitative). The purchase intention is driven by the feel-
good emotion (the ‘warm glow’) that the consumer experiences when participat-
ing in the campaign; an indirect demonstration of the warm glow is that the pur-
chase intention fails to materialize when the campaign is accompanied by deep 
price discounts, which reduce the amount of the donation and spoil the good 
feeling of helping others (Andrews et al., 2014). Increasing the degree of partici-
pation has been found to reinforce purchase intentions: Robinson, Irmak, & 
Jayachandran (2012) showed that CRM campaigns in which the firm allows con-
sumers to choose the cause that receives the donation have greater consumer 
support than those in which the firm chooses the cause; the effect is even greater 
when consumers can choose causes that have a low perceptual fit with the firm. 
The effect is also driven by enhanced consumer perceptions of their personal role 
in helping the cause. 
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The fit between the firm and the cause has been seen as boosting consumer 
response in CRM (Ellen et al., 2006). The effect could depend not only on the 
improved credibility of the campaign when the firm is meaningfully associated 
with the cause but also on the cognitive ease due to reduced consumer mental 
elaboration; in particular, Kuo & Rice (2015) found that mere perceptual congru-
ence (e.g., colour of brands) between the firm and the cause improves purchase 
intentions. 
Positive consumer responses have been found in other forms of direct in-
volvement. Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen (2011) found that consumers who personally 
participated in a CSR initiative (an oral care campaign) formed a trust-based 
bond with the firm, while the consumers who were merely aware of the campaign 
did not; the participating consumers also exhibited better attitudinal and behav-
ioural outcomes than the others. Popkowski Leszczyc & Rothkopf (2010) showed 
that charity auctions, in which a percentage of the revenues are donated to a 
charity, stimulate the buyers’ willingness to pay. 
Individual-level outcomes: employee related. The organizational justice 
literature has theorized that the first-party justice that is experienced by employ-
ees in the workplace may evoke a range of emotional, attitudinal, and behaviour-
al responses that lead to many organizational outcomes, such as organizational 
attractiveness (improving talent retention), job satisfaction, organizational 
commitment, OCB, and job performance (Rupp et al., 2006). Here the basic 
mechanism is that fairness by the firm induces reciprocity in employees. Cohn, 
Fehr, & Goette (2015) found that workers improve their performance when their 
salaries are raised to a level that they believe fair; the effect does not seem to de-
pend on economic incentive because further increases beyond the perceived fair 
level do not increase performance. In other empirical studies, Shin, Sung, Choi, 
& Kim (2015) showed that procedural justice led employees to increased OCB, 
while Thornton & Rupp (2016) found that the overall justice climate in a firm in-
duces pro-social behaviour in groups of workers. 
CSR practices can change the work environment, the contents of the job, 
and the employees’ relationships with supervisors and other aspects of the work 
experience, exerting a variety of positive organizational outcomes. Jayasinghe 
(2016) studied voluntary labour code adoption in apparel companies in Sri 
Lanka, finding that it provided greater physical and psychological health to 
workers, decreased exhaustion and psychological stress, and facilitated work-life 
balance; the organizational outcomes were increased employee engagement, re-
duced conflicts with supervisors, and improved timeliness and attendance on the 
job. Sánchez & Benito-Hernández (2015) reported an increase in labour produc-
tivity in small firms that adopted policies that are related to employee care. 
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A stakeholder orientation in firms may also prompt employee experimen-
tation, leading to an increased level of firm innovation, as measured by patent 
data (Flammer & Kacperczyk, 2016). Relatedly, Riivari & Lämsä (2014) found an 
association between an ethical organizational culture and organizational innova-
tiveness. Indirect evidence that firms use CSR to improve the engagement of em-
ployees is presented in Flammer & Luo (2016), who found that firms increase 
employee-related CSR (work-life balance, health & safety, employee involve-
ment) in response to a higher risk that employees engage in adverse behaviour. 
Miller, Lee, Chang, & Breton-Miller (2009) showed that strong firm commitment 
to employees (e.g., fair pay, employee security, general concern for employee 
personal growth and well-being) arouses reciprocity emotions that lead employ-
ees to higher motivation and dedication to the firm. A caring and rule-following 
organizational climate is related to employees’ job satisfaction (Wang & Hsieh, 
2012), as is ethics training (Valentine & Fleischman, 2008). An emphasis on 
stakeholder values in decision-making can positively influence the leader-
follower relationship, increasing the likelihood of employee visionary leadership 
perceptions, which lead to employee extra-effort, while autocratic leadership 
perceptions do not (de Luque et al., 2008). Responsible human resource man-
agement produces organizational identification that, combined with organiza-
tional support to employees, determines improved task performance and extra-
role behaviour (Shen & Benson, 2014). 
Research has also investigated whether the organizational outcomes of CSR 
are reinforced when employees directly participate in CSR initiatives. Mirvis 
(2012) theorized that the effects of a firm’s CSR activities on employees depend 
on how the firm engages its employees; he distinguished among a transactional 
approach, where programs are undertaken to meet the need of employees to take 
part in CSR efforts (improving the likelihood of retaining talent); a relational ap-
proach, where the employees and the firm make a shared commitment to CSR 
(facilitating employee identification); and a developmental approach, which acti-
vates CSR in the organization and helps the employees become responsible cor-
porate citizens (creating external opportunities for competing in the marketplace 
through CSR). Empirically, Kim, Sung, & Lee (2012) found that direct participa-
tion is more powerful than mere awareness of the CSR initiatives in stimulating 
employee identification; Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen (2015) showed that CSR prox-
imity (the degree to which the employees are aware of or involved in the activity) 
positively moderates the impact of CSR on job satisfaction, turnover intention, 
and other employee-related outcomes. Experiments reported in Tonin & 
Vlassopoulos (2015) indicated that social incentives (in the form of a donation 
received by a charity of the employee’s choice) are motivating and increase effort, 
even when the donation is a lump sum and is not related to the employee’s per-
formance. 
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Research has recently focused on the effects of employees’ participation in 
corporate volunteerism programs, which seems to generate identification in the 
employees, under the condition that the programs make a meaningful contribu-
tion to society, are provided with adequate resources, and allow employees to 
make good use of their professional skills (Caligiuri et al., 2013). Volunteering 
initiatives with social impact have also been found to improve employee reten-
tion, due to an enhanced sense of meaningful existence (Bode et al., 2015). Final-
ly, the employees’ contact with recipients of corporate philanthropy generates 
good feelings in the employees and subsequent positive attitudes on the job 
(Block, Glavas, Mannor, & Erskine, 2016).  
3.3. Evaluation 
Institutional-level outcomes: reputation. The CSR literature generally assumes 
that stakeholders will judge CSR efforts positively. These judgments may turn 
into social evaluations that help firms achieve their economic objectives. The 
most extensively researched of these social evaluations is reputation, which can 
be defined as a collective representation that gauges a firm’s relative standing 
with interested audiences (Fombrun & Van Riel, 1997). Studies have repeatedly 
shown that firms that perform well with CSR are also rated high in reputation 
(Hur, Kim, & Woo, 2014; Wang & Berens, 2015). Bermiss, Zajac, & King (2014) 
found that this link has become stronger in recent years, thanks to the growing 
coverage by the business press of social and environmental issues. This result is 
paralleled by the increasing attention that financial analysts have been paying to 
the CSR profile of firms (Ioannou & Serafeim, 2015). Lev, Petrovits, & 
Radhakrishnan (2010) found that the positive effect of philanthropic expendi-
tures on firm sales is stronger in high consumer-sensitive industries (e.g., con-
sumer goods) than in low consumer-sensitive industries (e.g., banks), suggesting 
an effectiveness of these expenditures in increasing a firm’s reputation among 
customers. Studies have also identified reputation-like effects of CSR, which in-
dicate that observers anticipate positive future performance for socially respon-
sible firms; these effects are a reduced perceived risk of financial distress (Attig 
et al., 2013), an ability to access external capital that makes a firm’s investments 
less sensitive to its current cash flows (Attig, Cleary, El Ghoul, & Guedhami, 
2014), reduced capital constraints (Cheung, Jiang, Mak, & Tan, 2013), and a re-
duced idiosyncratic risk in stock price, connected to investor beliefs in the supe-
rior capacity of socially responsible firms to manage adverse events (Mishra & 
Modi, 2013). 
Stakeholder attribution of genuine intentions to socially responsible firms 
is expected to reinforce the effect of CSR on reputation (Sen, Bhattacharya, & 
Korschun, 2006). Kim, Kim, & Qian (2016) found evidence that the intensity of 
44   |   CSR, Stakeholder Trust, and Organizational Outcomes  
 
competitive actions taken by socially responsible firms is seen by stakeholders as 
a signal of genuine intentions and contributes to reputation, because in the ab-
sence of such actions, stakeholders believe that firms are using CSR to compen-
sate for poor economic performance. Similarly, the effect of CSR on reputation is 
augmented when CSR activities are aligned with corporate political activity; oth-
erwise, stakeholders perceive the misalignment as a sign of hypocrisy (Hond et 
al., 2014). The positive effect of philanthropic expenditures on reputation is 
greater for those firms that involve employees in the initiatives, another signal of 
substantial effort (Brammer & Millington, 2005). Janney & Gove (2011) found 
that reputation buffers firms from the consequences of a scandal but not when 
the scandal is on the same issues on which the reputation was built, revealing 
that the reputation was founded on hypocrisy rather than real performance. The 
effect of CSR on reputation is greater when the type of performance matches ma-
terial issues in the industry (Brammer & Pavelin, 2006), which can also be inter-
preted as a signal that the firm is using CSR to address important issues and not 
extrinsically to feign good intentions. 
Given stakeholder suspicions on the real motives behind CSR actions, the 
endorsement of CSR activities by third parties is useful to achieve positive repu-
tation; for example, the inclusion of firms in ethical indexes has been shown to 
improve investor evaluations of the firm, while deletion from these indexes has 
the opposite effect (Doh, Howton, Howton, & Siegel, 2010). Analyst recommen-
dations have also been found to mediate the relationship between social and fi-
nancial performance, which supports the idea that external observers, including 
investors, find it difficult to evaluate the substance of CSR efforts and refer to ex-
pert judgments in their investment decisions (Luo, Wang, Raithel, & Zheng, 
2015). The credibility of the CSR efforts of a firm is also dependent on the CSR 
performance of firms in the same industries: Leonidou, Katsikeas, & Morgan 
(2013) found that the environmental reputation of an industry moderates posi-
tively the product-market performance of a firm’s green marketing initiatives. 
Reputation is generally based on the collective perceptions of a firm’s past 
behaviour (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Sever, 2005), which makes time-
consistency a crucial issue for building and maintaining reputation. Koschate-
Fischer, Huber, & Hoyer (2016) found that previous CSR efforts reinforce the ef-
fects of subsequent initiatives; Servaes & Tamayo (2013) showed that prior low 
CSR performance negatively moderates the effect of current high CSR. Similarly, 
Barnett (2007) theorized that a positive history of stakeholder relationships 
helps firms develop ‘stakeholder influence capacity’, which is the ability of a firm 
to identify, act on, and profit from opportunities to improve financial perfor-
mance through CSR initiatives. However, Philippe & Durand (2011) found that 
the reputational effects of new environmental disclosures can be greater for firms 
with a previously weak reputation if these disclosures demonstrate compliance 
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with socially accepted goals. Consistency of CSR performance across dimensions 
is also important: Oikonomou, Brooks, & Pavelin (2014) found that investors 
have a more favourable attitude towards uniformly positive or uniformly nega-
tive firm performance in the spectrum of the CSR dimensions than towards 
mixed indicators. 
Institutional-level outcomes: moral capital. Socially responsible firm be-
haviour has also been found to generate moral capital, which has insurance-like 
properties because it protects relational wealth, brand, stakeholder affective 
commitment, and other intangible assets (Godfrey, 2005; Luo & Bhattacharya, 
2009). Moral capital is related to reputation and may even be defined as the di-
mension of reputation that is based on the past ethically-oriented behaviour of a 
firm, which disposes stakeholders to hold positive beliefs on its intentions 
(Godfrey, 2005). The insurance-like properties of moral capital are supported by 
the fact that the positive relationship between CSR and firm value is stronger in 
industries at high risk of litigation, in firms in financial distress, and in socially-
contested industries, that is, where an insurance against adverse events is more 
needed (Koh, Qian, & Wang, 2014). However, moral capital can be depleted: 
Shiu & Yang (2016) showed that the insurance-like effect quickly disappears af-
ter the second and third adverse events. 
The accumulation of moral capital has been related to corporate philan-
thropy (Godfrey, 2005). Cuypers, Koh, & Wang (2016) found that innovative and 
generous corporate donations are likely to be interpreted by stakeholders as sub-
stantial effort and to generate moral capital, while non-innovative and non-
generous giving are interpreted as symbolic initiatives and fail to be effective. 
Moral capital produced by donations can also attract institutional investors be-
cause they have a long-term orientation, facilitating firms in raising capital (Jia & 
Zhang, 2014). 
Multi-level outcomes: trust. CSR may demonstrate a firm’s concern for the 
welfare of stakeholders, adherence to moral principles, or effectiveness in deal-
ing with social and environmental challenges, all of which are attributes of trust-
worthiness (Mayer et al., 1995). Trust has been defined as “the willingness of a 
party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation 
that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespec-
tive of the ability to monitor and control the other party” (Mayer et al., 1995: 712). 
Since trust is an essential element of business interactions (Audi, 2008), the im-
plications for the production of organizational outcomes are extensive. Research 
has found a clear link between CSR and trust. Contributions have associated 
trust to both general CSR (Lacey & Kennett-Hensel, 2010) and to specialized di-
mensions of CSR, such as global organizational justice (Aryee et al., 2015), ethi-
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cal decision-making (Hosmer & Kiewitz, 2005), ethical leadership (Newman, 
Kiazad, Miao, & Cooper, 2014a), ethicality of the brand (Singh, Iglesias, & 
Batista-Foguet, 2012), firm transparency in labour conditions (Kang & Hustvedt, 
2014), and CSR engagement (Homburg, Stierl, & Bornemann, 2013; Vlachos et 
al., 2009). 
Trust also mediates the relationship between CSR and many organizational 
outcomes at the individual level across stakeholder categories, such as intrinsic 
motivation in employees (Aryee et al., 2015), reduced turnover intention and im-
proved OCB in employees (Hansen, Dunford, Boss, Boss, & Angermeier, 2011; 
Newman et al., 2014a), employee identification with the firm (De Roeck & 
Delobbe, 2012), work engagement (Lin, 2010a) and organizational commitment 
(Farooq, Payaud, Merunka, & Valette-Florence, 2013), customer loyalty 
(Homburg et al., 2013), purchase intentions (Tian, Wang, & Yang, 2011), cus-
tomer recommendation, patronage intention, or positive word-of-mouth (Kang & 
Hustvedt, 2014; Lacey & Kennett-Hensel, 2010; Vlachos et al., 2009), and stake-
holder identification with the firm (Pirson & Malhotra, 2011). 
The production of trust has been found to depend on the degree of interde-
pendence between a firm and its stakeholders, along with features of the context 
that support trust building and trust-based strategies (Wicks & Berman, 2004). 
Pirson & Malhotra (2011) investigated the interaction of various attributes of 
firm trustworthiness with characteristics of the relationship, finding that firm 
transparency leads to trust in shallow (low-interaction) relationships, while firm 
benevolence is crucial to produce trust in deep (high-interaction) relationships; 
firm integrity contributes to trust in all relationships but to a lesser degree in 
deep rather than shallow relationships.  
Like other social evaluations, the production of trust seems to depend on 
stakeholder perceptions of the motives of the firm’s CSR initiatives: only per-
ceived values-driven motives lead to trust, while stakeholder-driven motives (i.e., 
stakeholder satisfaction) are seen as pragmatic considerations that do not corre-
spond to true feelings of the firm; strategic (i.e., profit-oriented) and egoistic mo-
tives are counterproductive and raise suspicions (Vlachos et al., 2009). This re-
sult partially differs from previous research showing that customers respond 
most positively to CSR efforts even when they judge them to be strategic-driven 
(Ellen et al., 2006). The contrast could be explained by the fact that strategic-
driven motives may not make the firm trustworthy but are a basis for believing 
that the firm is interested in the initiative; relatedly, De Roeck & Delobbe (2012) 
found that the attribution of self-centred motives to a firm’s CSR activities, re-
flecting the firm’s economic interest, positively moderates employee identifica-
tion with the firm. 
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Individual-level outcomes: consumer related. A variety of studies have 
found a positive link between the social performance of firms and purchase in-
tentions (Mohr & Webb, 2005; Sen et al., 2006) or other consumer attitudes, 
such as willingness to pay (Carvalho, Sen, de Oliveira Mota, & de Lima, 2010), 
customer satisfaction (Hsu, 2012), customer loyalty (Valenzuela, Mulki, & Jara-
millo, 2010), or brand attitudes (Olsen et al., 2014). CSR initiatives involving 
specific products have also been shown to generate positive spillovers in con-
sumer intentions regarding other products in a firm’s portfolio (Krishna & Rajan, 
2009). A firm’s socially responsible behaviour, and philanthropy, in particular, 
may also produce customer-company identification (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004; 
Currás-Pérez, Bigné-Alcañiz, & Alvarado-Herrera, 2009; Lichtenstein, 
Drumwright, & Braig, 2004; Lii & Lee, 2012; Marin & Ruiz, 2007; Marin, Ruiz, & 
Rubio, 2009; Pérez & Rodríguez del Bosque, 2015). Homburg et al. (2013) re-
ported evidence that such identification related to philanthropy can extend to the 
business-to-business (B2B) context. The general basis of all these outcomes is 
that when consumers have other-regarding values and are informed of the social 
performance of a firm, they will develop a positive evaluation of the firm (Schuler 
& Cording, 2006).  
Various characteristics of the product, the firm, or the initiative mediate or 
moderate consumer response. Berens, van Riel, & van Bruggen (2005) found 
that the effect is moderated by the degree of consumers’ personal interest in the 
product category. In social sponsorships, a high fit between the firm and the 
sponsored partner is beneficial to brand equity, while incongruence and low fit 
may damage it (Simmons & Becker-Olsen, 2006). When fit is high, consumers’ 
positive attitudes are stronger when they perceive that the sponsorship is social-
ly-motivated (rather than profit-motivated) and is taken by the firm proactively 
rather than reactively, e.g., in response to boycotts or other external pressures 
(Becker-Olsen, Cudmore, & Hill, 2006). Ellen et al. (2006) found that company-
cause fit positively moderates the purchase intentions of customers in CRM initi-
atives. However, a fit between the firm and the cause may also lead customers to 
question the firm’s motives towards the CRM initiatives, inducing scepticism 
(Koschate-Fischer et al., 2016). Inoue & Kent (2014) theorized that in corporate 
social marketing initiatives (which aim at changing consumer behaviour in order 
to achieve societal benefits, e.g., a campaign to promote the use of recycling bins), 
the consumer response is driven by the credibility of the firm, which in turn de-
pends on attributes of the initiative (such as the perceived level of the firm’s ef-
forts or personal investment of managers and employees) and of the firm (per-
ceived CSR). 
Research has also investigated the specific mechanisms that drive consum-
ers to develop positive attitudes towards the products of socially responsible 
firms (an area inaugurated by the seminal contribution of Brown & Dacin (1997). 
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CSR associations seem to be only weak signals of product quality (Biehal & 
Sheinin, 2007) and cannot compensate for the perception of a lack of it (Vlachos 
et al., 2009). These findings suggest that the mechanisms are not rational; in-
deed, recent research indicated that halos created by CSR might be at the origin 
of the positive consumer attitudes. Chernev & Blair (2015) found that acts of so-
cial goodwill (e.g., charitable giving) have halo effects under the condition that 
consumers believe that the acts are driven by benevolence instead of self-
interest; the halo is powerful enough to change product perceptions even when 
consumers can directly observe and experience the product. Peloza, Ye, & 
Montford (2015) found experimentally that CSR activities generate a health halo 
in which consumers underestimate the calorie content of foods marketed by 
firms with strong CSR reputations (this could have the counterproductive effect 
of generating overconsumption by customers). CSR also positively moderates the 
effect of the disclosure of nutrition information on the subsequent evaluation of 
the product by the customers (Ye, Cronin, & Peloza, 2015). A firm’s engagement 
in CSR can produce feelings of a warm glow in consumers who buy its products 
(Habel et al., 2016).  
Overcoming consumer scepticism has been identified as a major barrier to 
realizing the benefits of CSR. Customer attributions about the motives of CSR 
seem to mediate the effects of CSR on customer attitudes. Groza, Pronschinske, 
& Walker (2011) distinguished among values-driven, strategic-driven, and stake-
holder-driven attributions and found that proactive CSR initiatives elicit values-
driven or strategic-driven attributions, which increase the likeliness of favoura-
ble consumer response (because customers see these motives as planned), while 
the reactive CSR strategies elicit unfavourable stakeholder-driven attributions 
(they are seen as defensive). Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, & Bozok (2006) found that 
CSR activities improve a firm’s image when consumers attribute sincere motives, 
are ineffective when the sincerity of motives is ambiguous, and hurt the firm’s 
image when motives are perceived as insincere. According to Sen & Bhattacharya 
(2001), the issue defining a firm’s CSR efforts interacts with consumers’ personal 
position on that issue and their general beliefs about the trade-offs firms make in 
supporting CSR initiatives to affect consumers’ responses to CSR initiatives. 
CSR efforts or CSR attributes of products may influence consumer percep-
tions that the price is fair. This effect is not necessarily to the benefit of the firm. 
Consumers may suspect that a socially responsible firm’s prices include a mark-
up to finance the CSR engagement, which can damage the consumers’ evaluation 
of price fairness, leading to negative attitudes or reduced loyalty (Habel et al., 
2016). However, in CRM, the firm’s donation amount positively influences con-
sumers’ perceived price fairness (Koschate-Fischer et al., 2016). 
Research has investigated the possibility that CSR can elicit other negative 
consumer evaluations. Newman, Gorlin, & Dhar (2014b) found that consumers 
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are less likely to purchase a green product when they perceive that the company 
intentionally made the product better for the environment compared to when it 
occurred as an unintended side effect; this counterintuitive result might happen 
because of lay theories about resource allocation that lead consumers to believe 
that the firm diverted resources away from product quality to obtain the intend-
ed green enhancements. Luchs, Naylor, Irwin, & Raghunathan (2010) showed 
that consumers associate higher product ethicality with gentleness-related at-
tributes and lower product ethicality with strength-related attributes; therefore, 
ethicality enhances preference when the gentleness attributes are valued, but the 
benefit of product ethicality is reduced or can be even negative when strength-
related attributes are valued. 
Individual-level outcomes: employee related. Research has extensively 
shown that perceived CSR increases the organizational attractiveness of a firm 
for job-seekers (Backhaus, Stone, & Heiner, 2002; Greening & Turban, 2000; 
Lin, Tsai, Joe, & Chiu, 2012b; Luce, Barber, & Hillman, 2001; Pettijohn, 
Pettijohn, & Taylor, 2008; Rupp et al., 2013; Sen et al., 2006). This relationship 
seems to be based on a perceived person-organization fit (Albinger & Freeman, 
2000) and value fit (Jones, Willness, & Madey, 2014). The relationship is strong-
er when the aspiring workers want to make a significant impact through their 
work (Gully et al., 2013), when CSR is part of one’s personal job responsibilities 
(Randy Evans & Davis, 2011), and when the job-seekers have more choices 
(Albinger & Freeman, 2000). All these results strongly suggest that CSR is valua-
ble for attracting talented employees. A job-seeker’s pride and anticipation of 
good treatment and prospects may mediate the relationship (Jones et al., 2014; 
Wang, 2013).  
Research has often explained the attractiveness effects of CSR in terms of 
the social identity theory (Ashforth & Mael, 1989), according to which employees 
derive a better conception of themselves from working for a firm to which they 
attribute positive values. An alternative explanation is offered by the signalling 
theory (Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011), according to which CSR sig-
nals positive aspects of the work environment that job seekers are not yet in the 
position to ascertain directly, such as fair treatment of workers, career opportu-
nities, or quality of the relationship with supervisors. Both theoretical perspec-
tives were laid down in Turban & Greening (1997). 
Studies have also identified a positive relationship between employee or-
ganizational commitment and perceived CSR (Rego, Leal, Cunha, Faria, & Pinho, 
2010; Turker, 2009; Vlachos, Panagopoulos, & Rapp, 2014) or some of its di-
mensions, such as perceived community-related and environmentally-related 
corporate citizenship (Stites & Michael, 2011), CSR in the community (Brammer, 
Millington, & Rayton, 2007), ethical values (Sharma, Borna, & Stearns, 2009), 
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and ethical measures of corporate citizenship (Peterson, 2004), based again on 
social identity theory. El Akremi, Gond, Swaen, De Roeck, & Igalens (2016) 
found that organizational identification and job satisfaction are also positively 
associated with employee perceptions of a firm’s CSR. As for identification, the 
result is attributed to how positive evaluations of a firm contribute to the self-
concept of the employees (Carmeli et al., 2007) or to their self-esteem (Bauman 
& Skitka, 2012). Relatedly, the effect of CSR on organizational identification 
seems to be stronger among employees for whom CSR is tied to their sense of self, 
i.e., how much they perceive CSR to be important (Korschun, Bhattacharya, & 
Swain, 2014), or for whom the salience of CSR is greater (Glavas & Godwin, 
2013).  
Other outcomes have been found. Glavas & Piderit (2009) reported a posi-
tive connection between the perceived corporate citizenship of a firm and em-
ployee high-quality connections and creative involvement. Lin, Baruch, & Shih 
(2012a), in a rare study on the effects of CSR at the group level, reported a posi-
tive impact of corporate citizenship on team efficacy. Lin, Lyau, Tsai, Chen, & 
Chiu (2010) showed that corporate citizenship positively influences OCB. Social 
performance also seems to contribute to the meaningfulness of work (Bauman & 
Skitka, 2012). This happens not only when employees directly experience and 
benefit from pro-social orientation or an ethical climate, but also when they per-
ceive that the firm treats others fairly (Glavas & Kelley, 2014). Meaningfulness at 
work could also be a mediator of the relationship between social performance 
and job satisfaction or employee organizational commitment, serving as an al-
ternative to the dominant social-identity perspective (Glavas & Kelley, 2014). 
Finally, CSR can also stimulate feelings of belongingness, linked to positive 
evaluations of a firm’s policies in specific philanthropic causes, protection of the 
environment, respect of diversity, and other demonstrations of value-based and 
principled behaviour; the expected effect is to stimulate psychological ownership 
and sense of responsibility, leading to OCB or extra-role effort (Bauman & Skitka, 
2012). 
4. Knowledge gaps and recommendations for future research 
In this section I identify knowledge gaps in the literature about organizational 
outcomes of CSR and provide recommendations for future research. In their re-
view of stakeholder theory, Laplume et al. (2008) noticed that a disproportionate 
share of research was devoted to large publicly listed firms and that qualitative 
and mixed methods were rare in empirical studies. Research on the antecedents 
of CSR may have partially filled these gaps; for example, it has investigated the 
socio-emotional wealth of family firms as an important driver of the adoption of 
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CSR (Berrone, Cruz, Gomez-Mejia, & Larraza-Kintana, 2010). However, in the 
sample of articles about the organizational outcomes that I surveyed, there are 
still no contributions on family firms and only a few deal with small firms (e.g., 
Jayasinghe, 2016; Sánchez & Benito-Hernández, 2015). Moreover, qualitative or 
mixed-method studies are absent. As I previously noticed, a dearth of conceptual 
articles is evident as well, which limits our understanding of the underlying 
mechanisms of the organizational outcomes of CSR. 
In order to find further gaps and provide guidance for research, I offer an 
integrative framework of the organizational outcomes of CSR (Figure 2), based 
on the three stakeholder roles defined by Wood & Jones (1995) and used in this 
review. The framework identifies the processes that connect CSR policies and ac-
tions to positive stakeholder responses. The processes are highly simplified; the 
purpose of the framework is to stress differences among stakeholder roles in 
terms of how they lead to responses. When CSR policies and actions meet expec-
tations, stakeholder response is relatively automatic; the interpretive work that is 
necessary to attach a meaning to behaviour of firms has already been done, in 
the societal and cultural domains that define expectations; the institutional 
logics perspective in particular emphasized the taken-for-grantedness of institu-
tionalized norms and the mindlessness of conformity (Thornton & Ocasio, 2008). 
In contrast, when stakeholders personally experience CSR policies and actions, 
they need to make sense of events; satisfaction and other positive attitudes are 
driven by how stakeholders interpret the behaviour of the firm or the CSR activi-
ties to which they are contributing. Finally, when stakeholders evaluate CSR, the 
first stage in the process is their perceptions of policies and actions; this stage is 
crucial because stakeholders do not directly experience CSR; so they may not be 
fully aware of it or they may misperceive CSR policies and actions due to inade-
quate information or cognitive limitations; the resulting perceptions will serve as 
input to the judgement stage, in which stakeholders evaluate firm behaviour and 
respond to it. In all the stakeholder roles, the response will depend on factors 
that are internal to the individual, e.g., values or personal interest in the focal so-
cial and environmental issues; negative reactions to disapproved CSR activities 
are part of the possibilities. 
The framework also considers factors that provide a context to all these 
processes and shape stakeholder expectations, interpretations, perceptions, and 
judgments. Some of these factors are firm-level, i.e., organizational attributes 
and other actions and policies (different than CSR) that define a firm’s relation-
ship with stakeholders; the other factors are part of the environment that sur-
rounds any firm-stakeholder relationship, including other firms (which, for ex-
ample, are terms of comparison for evaluating an individual firm’s behaviour) 
and stakeholders (which, for example, are relevant in third-party fairness expec-
tations). 
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FIGURE 2. Integrative framework of the organizational outcomes of CSR 
 
When looking at stakeholder expectations, a major gap is the limited atten-
tion that research has given to whether and how socially responsible firms 
achieve legitimacy, compared to the large literature about how institutional pres-
sures push firms to adopt CSR. Research could test empirically the link between 
CSR and subsequent measures of legitimacy (Vergne, 2011). Moreover, the as-
sumption that conformity produces legitimacy is problematic in conditions of 
institutional complexity (Greenwood, Raynard, Kodeih, Micelotta, & Lonsbury, 
2011), in which the firms face multiple prescriptions from incompatible logics; 
institutional complexity can arise in CSR when different stakeholders have di-
vergent expectations; as a consequence, CSR initiatives may be legitimacy-
enhancing in a given institutional context and legitimacy-threatening in another, 
something that the research has only started to investigate (Luo, Wang, & Zhang, 
2016). More research is also needed on the antecedents of stakeholder deontic 
responses, which until now have been investigated only in the organizational be-
haviour literature; apart from employees, other stakeholder categories could dis-
play these responses, e.g. customers or local communities. 
Research on the experience of stakeholders needs a more nuanced concep-
tualization of the benefits that stakeholders draw from CSR. As noticed, the dom-
inant perspective is that CSR satisfies stakeholder needs. This is a rather impov-
erished view of the experience of the stakeholders, which is socially situated and 
reflects a complex set of worldviews, interests, and personal histories. A focus of 
research on how stakeholders interpret CSR initiatives seems promising, espe-
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cially in conjunction with qualitative or mixed-methods studies. The organiza-
tional sensemaking perspective, which has already been applied to examine how 
managers think of their stakeholders (Basu & Palazzo, 2008), could be extended 
to examine how stakeholders think of their firms. Research on organizational 
outcomes could also take advantage of previous CSR contributions that have in-
vestigated the variety of situations that complicate the firm-stakeholder relation-
ship, e.g. conflict (Del Bosco & Misani, 2011) or cross-cultural contact (Zhao, 
Park, & Zhou, 2014). At the organizational level, a better characterization of the 
experience of stakeholders could be useful in clarifying how they participate in 
building the relational and socially complex assets that CSR is expected to gener-
ate in the RBV perspective. Current research on stakeholder participation in CSR 
is also limited to customers and employees, excluding local communities, NGOs 
and other stakeholders that are powerful enough to produce significant organiza-
tional outcomes. 
When considering organizational outcomes that are based on stakeholder 
evaluations, research has usually assumed rather than tested that stakeholders 
pay attention to CSR. Madsen & Rodgers (2015) have started to investigate de-
terminants of stakeholder attention to CSR, showing that reactions of stakehold-
ers to corporate disaster relief depend heavily on media coverage; more research 
is definitely needed on the other factors that shape stakeholder awareness of CSR 
initiatives. Stakeholders are often sceptical about the substance of these initia-
tives, which makes the information asymmetries between firms and stakeholders 
worth of investigation as well; recently, Husted, Jamali, & Saffar (2016) studied 
the effect of geographical proximity, which is a way of mitigating these asymme-
tries, showing that firms located in areas with a higher density of CSR activities 
are better evaluated in financial markets, due to lowered asymmetries and a 
greater base of informed investors in these areas. Stakeholder misperceptions of 
the social and environmental performance of firms are well known to practition-
ers, who have often reported dramatic gaps between actual and perceived CSR 
(Coombs & Holladay, 2011), but little is known about how stakeholders use 
available clues to form perceptions of the CSR profile of firms. In the judgment 
stage, it is surprising that research has still to investigate the effects of CSR on 
status, which is an important social evaluation that has different characteristics 
than reputation (Sorenson, 2014). Research on reputation, moral capital, and 
trust has been extensive but we have still an inadequate knowledge of how they 
relate to attributes of CSR initiatives. For example, scholars who have studied the 
effects of corporate philanthropy on reputation have mostly looked at the 
amount of donation and company-cause fit, but stakeholders could evaluate oth-
er aspects; recently, Su & Tsang (2015) found that the heterogeneity of donations 
(in terms of variety of recipients) is also valuable. Finally, research is often con-
fusing in terms of theoretical explanation of how stakeholder evaluations trans-
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late to actual responses; social identity theory, signalling theory, and common-
sense psychology are sometimes mixed in a rather ad-hoc way; conceptual con-
tributions that integrate findings in this area are sorely needed. Moving to exter-
nal factors that shape the processes that lead to stakeholder response, the CSR 
literature has often hinted at industry conditions that might impact organiza-
tional outcomes of CSR. For example, it is well-known that misbehaviour by 
some firms in an industry can negatively impact reputation of other firms in the 
same industry who behave well (so-called reputational spillovers, Barnett & 
Hoffman, 2008). Moreover, research indicated that the positive association be-
tween CSR and financial performance is stronger in dynamic industries than in 
those that are stable (Goll & Rasheed, 2004); this effect has been demonstrated 
for very diverse dimensions of CSR, such as proactive environmental strategy 
(Aragón-Correa & Sharma, 2003) and corporate philanthropy (Wang, Choi, & Li, 
2008). However, not much is known about effects of other important industry 
attributes, such as concentration, firm heterogeneity, or the stage of the product 
life cycle. Cultural, political, and social forces, which have been investigated as 
antecedents of CSR adoption (e.g., Hoffman, 1999), are still a conspicuous ab-
sence in research on the organizational outcomes of CSR. 
Among the firm-level factors, this review reveals that motives attributed by 
stakeholders to firms that engage in CSR are essential in eliciting responses: mo-
tive attribution participates in how stakeholders grant legitimacy to firms, how 
they interpret the CSR actions that they experience, and how they evaluate the 
firm. Although motive attribution depends on characteristics of the specific initi-
ative (such as innovativeness or amount of invested resources), firm attributes 
are important as well. Heugens et al. (2008) theorized that firms organized as 
moral communities are more likely to be perceived as sincere in their CSR efforts 
than other organizational forms; relatedly, Basu & Palazzo (2008) looked at dif-
ferences among firms in terms of identity orientation or type of commitment; all 
of these are conceptual contributions that still wait for empirical testing. 
Research could also investigate more deeply the role of firm capabilities or 
investments in realizing the outcomes of CSR. Until now, the contributions have 
focused on marketing: Mishra & Modi (2016) found that CSR impacts on stock 
returns and idiosyncratic risk only in presence of marketing capability; Luo & 
Bhattacharya (2009) showed that advertising enhances the insurance-like prop-
erties of CSR; Servaes & Tamayo (2013) also found that advertising expenditures 
positively moderate the relationship between CSR and firm value. Given that 
firms may have to take an active role in generating and capturing value from 
their CSR efforts, other firm capabilities and investments could be fruitfully in-
vestigated. 
Corporate governance is potentially impactful as well. A flourishing stream 
of research is investigating how various corporate governance attributes affect 
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the level and the types of CSR engagement, while the effects of corporate govern-
ance on the outcomes of CSR are rarely investigated (Jain & Jamali, 2016). Cor-
porate governance mechanisms can be useful in making sure that a firm’s CSR 
efforts are directed to improve material stakeholder relationships; recently, Su & 
Sauerwald (2016) contributed to this area by finding that CEO long-term pay, 
CEO tenure, and outside director monitoring positively moderate the effects of 
corporate philanthropy on firm value. 
A general recommendation for future research is that it specifies the causal 
link between the specific CSR initiatives and the predicted outcome. This is im-
portant in any type of research, but it is even more so in CSR research, because 
an empirical association between social performance and financial performance 
may easily arise due to reverse causality or omitted variables (such as quality of 
management or long-term orientation). Research on organizational outcomes 
should also consider that each initiative involves multiple stakeholders in differ-
ent roles. Wood & Jones (1995) suggested that understanding the organizational 
outcomes of CSR requires to define which stakeholders are setting the expecta-
tions, which stakeholders experience the behaviour, which stakeholders evaluate 
the firm’s performance, and on what basis. 
Finally, most studies presented in this review have been conducted in sin-
gle countries, which may raise doubts about the generalizability of the findings, 
but also invites research about how CSR initiatives may causally interact with lo-
cal cultures or worldviews to produce specific organizational outcomes.  
5. Conclusion 
The first goal of this review was to synthetize the burgeoning research on the or-
ganizational outcomes of CSR, providing a state-of-the-art analysis of the extant 
knowledge. The CSR literature is moving away from the debate on the social-
financial performance link and is increasingly investigating how CSR relates to 
the strategies and the operations of the firm. A second goal was to reduce the 
fragmentation of research, by providing a categorization of the organizational 
outcomes of CSR that is more consistent than previous miscellaneous lists. This 
categorization is based on the partition of stakeholder roles advanced in Wood & 
Jones (1995), in which stakeholders set the expectations for firm behaviour, ex-
perience a firm’s policies and action, and evaluate the firm. Starting from this 
categorization, I provided an integrative framework that describes the different 
processes that connect CSR to organizational response for each stakeholder role; 
this framework reveals important knowledge gaps in the literature and suggests 
opportunities for future research.  
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This survey reveals that the implications of CSR for the economic objec-
tives of firms are indeed numerous and significant. As CSR becomes prominent 
in modern society, due to widespread concerns with the social and environmen-
tal impacts of business, research about the organizational outcomes of CSR can 
improve our understanding of the conditions under which firms, qua for-profit 
organizations, can adopt socially responsible behaviour. In the next chapter, I 
concentrate on one of these organizational outcomes, trust. I build on research 
presented in this review that indicate that attributions of motives to CSR activi-
ties are important drivers of stakeholder response to CSR activity and provide a 
model of how motive attributions participate in the development of stakeholder 
trust.  
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Appendix. Codebook 
Variable Definition 
Authors List of authors 
Year Publication year (2016 for forthcoming papers, as of Decem-
ber 2015) 
Title Article title 
Journal Title of the journal that published the article 
Institution Institution of the first author 
Type Conceptual or empirical (including experiments, surveys, field 
studies, case studies, qualitative studies) 
Summary A short summary of the contents and the contributions of the 
article 
Theory The main theoretical perspective used in the article (Agency 
theory, Consumer psychology, Deontic theory, Employee psy-
chology, Industrial organization, Institutional theory, Organi-
zational justice, Resource-based view, Resource-dependence 
theory, Stakeholder theory) 
Activity A short description of the activities responsible for the organi-
zational outcomes (e.g. corporate social performance, philan-
thropy, cause-related marketing, ethical decision-making, 
etc.) 
Stakeholder The stakeholders involved in the activity (e.g. employees, cus-
tomers, local communities, all stakeholders, etc.) 
Roles The roles played by stakeholder with respect to the organiza-
tional outcomes (expectation, experience, evaluation) 
Outcome A short description of the considered organizational outcomes 
(e.g. access to finance, consumer purchase intentions, re-
duced employee turnover, legitimacy, etc.) 
Level The level at which the outcome is expected to manifest (indi-
vidual, organizational, institutional) 
Industry The industry from which data are collected (empirical arti-
cles) 
Country The countries from which data are collected (empirical arti-
cles) 
Dependent variable The dependent variable of the study (empirical articles) 
Independent variables The independent variables of the study (empirical articles) 
Mediators The mediators considered in the study (empirical articles) 
Moderators The moderators considered in the study (empirical articles) 
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Chapter 2 
The Role of Motive Attributions of 
Corporate Social Responsibility Activities in 
the Development of Stakeholder Trust 
1. Introduction 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) is an attempt by firms to use resources 
and capabilities to the benefit of society. This attempt seems to have become 
ubiquitous if one looks at the growing percentage of CEOs who declare sustaina-
bility a strategic priority (McKinsey, 2014), the increasing adoption of sustaina-
bility reporting (Cho, Laine, Roberts, & Rodrigue, 2015), or the myriad activities 
undertaken by firms with the stated goal of mitigating the social and environ-
mental costs of their activities. CSR implies that a firm moves from a focus on 
shareholders to a consideration of all stakeholders, i.e., all parties that are affect-
ed or are in the position to affect the activities of the firm, such as customers, 
employees, or local communities (Freeman, 1984). However, CSR is ambiguous, 
because stakeholders see that the same firms that present themselves as socially 
responsible persist in pursuing the old profit objective as well. Corporate leaders 
often assert that CSR and profits can be combined and support each other, a po-
sition that is known as the ‘instrumental view’ (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Ac-
ademically, this view has both supporters (e.g., Porter & Kramer, 2006) and de-
tractors (e.g., Gond, Palazzo, & Basu, 2009). For the general public, the adoption 
of CSR by firms that fully remain for-profit organizations can be dissonant and 
raise the suspicion that the true motives behind CSR are not those stated by 
firms, but merely aim at ingratiating audiences or avoiding social penalties. 
Scepticism about CSR mirrors cultural concerns with how firms are ex-
tending their reach into all dimensions of social life and the risk that firms use 
their power in exploitative ways (Lange & Washburn, 2012). The public trust in 
business, after hitting historical lows in 2008 with the financial crisis, has some-
what recovered in the latest surveys (Edelman, 2016). However, the recent scan-
dals, such as Toshiba’s manipulation of financial results or Volkswagen’s ‘diesel-
gate’, have given new life to narratives in which amoral firms are ready to lie, 
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cheat, or go to any extreme to increase sales or profits (Harris & Wicks, 2010). 
Volkswagen’s scandal is especially worrying, because the German manufacturer 
was advertising the low emissions of its cars and was the industry leader for sus-
tainability according to the Dow Jones Sustainability Index. This scandal implies 
that reputations for CSR can be built on deception and that firms can escape 
monitoring by regulatory agencies or independent observers for years before be-
ing discovered. 
Stakeholders exercise their scepticism on two aspects of CSR. First, stake-
holders may doubt whether the CSR performance of a firm is reported honestly, 
because firms have incentives to disclose information selectively, exaggerate 
their accomplishments, or communicate non-existent activities or outcomes, as 
exemplified by the practice of ‘greenwashing’ (Delmas & Burbano, 2011; Lyon & 
Montgomery, 2015). Second, even when stakeholders are convinced that the 
available information about CSR performance is complete and accurate, they can 
still doubt whether the firm is driven by genuine motives or rather by self-
interest or other external considerations. Identifying these motives is particularly 
important for stakeholders who have long-term relationships with the firm and 
must choose their level of commitment. While genuine motives are usually stable 
and can be counted upon, self-interest depends on circumstances that could 
change in the future (Poppo et al., 2008). 
Research has shown that the motives that stakeholders attribute to firms 
engaging in CSR have actually a bearing on how stakeholders respond to CSR ef-
forts. Motives have been classified in terms of basic dichotomies, such as social-
ly-motivated vs. profit-motivated (Becker-Olsen et al., 2006), or richer parti-
tions, such as that introduced by Ellen, Webb, & Mohr (2006), who distinguished 
between egoistic-driven, values-driven, stakeholder-driven, and strategic-driven 
motives. Empirical results revealed that motive attributions mediate or moderate 
many organizational outcomes of CSR, including firm image (Yoon et al., 
2006a), moral capital (Cuypers et al., 2016), reputation (Sen et al., 2006), and 
trust (Vlachos et al., 2009). However, these results are often contradictory, espe-
cially for strategic-driven motives, i.e., the case in which stakeholders believe 
that the firm engages in CSR in order to increase profits or in general to attain 
business goals. Ellen et al. (2006) and Groza, Pronschinske, & Walker (2011) 
found that stakeholders respond positively to strategic-driven motives, Becker-
Olsen et al. (2006) and Walker, Heere, Parent, & Drane (2010) that they respond 
negatively, and Vlachos et al. (2009) and Vázquez, Lanero, García, & García 
(2013) that strategic-driven motives have no significant effect on stakeholder re-
sponse. 
Moreover, studies have given limited attention to how motive attributions 
may influence stakeholder evaluations of the veracity itself of the CSR activities. 
If stakeholders believe that a CSR initiative is not a manifestation of the firm’s 
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character, and that the true motive is in some way devious, the stakeholders can 
start to suspect that these activities are not real to begin with. The suspicion is 
more than appropriate when stakeholders cannot personally observe the initia-
tive and have to rely on the firm as the primary source of information. It has long 
been recognized that a source that is perceived as self-interested is less credible 
than one whose motives are trusted (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). Indeed, it is 
exactly when trust is limited that all deeds of a source are heavily scrutinized and 
the assessment of motives becomes complex (Fein, 1996). Therefore, motive at-
tribution is likely to influence the credibility that stakeholders grant to infor-
mation provided by a firm about its CSR activities. While research has been con-
cerned with how motive attribution relates to stakeholder scepticism about CSR 
(Skarmeas & Leonidou, 2013), it has not yet clearly distinguished issues of inter-
pretation of a firm’s intentions from issues of source credibility; therefore, a con-
ceptualization of these different issues seems urgent. 
In this chapter I offer a two-stage model of how the attribution of motives 
to a firm’s CSR activities guides the development of stakeholder trust. This chap-
ter is based on extant research on organizational outcomes of CSR, as discussed 
in the initial chapter, and identifies the processes that stakeholders use to make 
sense of information produced by firms about their CSR activities. This chapter 
is strictly linked to the next two chapters, which are empirical studies about how 
stakeholders (in particular, customers) translate their perceptions and evalua-
tions of CSR activities in favourable attitudes toward a firm. 
In the first stage of the model that I present here, stakeholders evaluate 
source credibility, based on the attributed motive and other elements, such as 
information content, likeability of the source, or circumstantial evidence. In the 
second stage, stakeholders make trustworthiness ascriptions to the firm, to the 
extent that they consider the CSR activities real; in this stage, motive attributions 
link CSR to the trustworthiness dimensions that can be ascribed to a firm. How-
ever, when trustworthiness ascriptions are lacking, trust may still materialize due 
to calculative considerations. I use the four motives introduced by Ellen et al. 
(2006) and provide a model of the different evaluations made by stakeholders in 
the two stages according to the motives they attribute to the firm. Based on this 
model, I provide a series of theoretical propositions that link each of the motives 
advanced by Ellen et al. (2006) to source credibility and trustworthiness ascrip-
tions. 
I choose to focus on trust for two reasons. First, trust is a fundamental as-
pect of business transactions and allows firms to improve their relationships with 
stakeholders, through reduced negotiation costs, increased willingness to coop-
erate, better information sharing, improved flexibility, and lower levels of con-
flict (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). Conversely, lack of trust leads stakeholders to 
withdraw from the relationship or moderate their commitment, reducing possi-
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bilities of action for the firm. Second, trust differs from other organizational out-
comes of CSR because it also seems to be a precondition of all of them. On one 
hand, CSR signals to stakeholders that the firm is benevolent or has integrity, 
qualities that should lead stakeholders to consider the firm trustworthy. On the 
other hand, the credibility of the signal may rest on information that is provided 
by the firm and is potentially inaccurate or fabricated. This leads to circularity: if 
a firm is socially responsible, then stakeholders trust it; but, before they trust it, 
they do not believe that it is socially responsible. Bachmann, Gillespie, & Priem 
(2015: 1133) have recently highlighted this circularity: “…the transparent disclo-
sure of information may reveal organizational competence, integrity, and benev-
olent treatment of stakeholders (i.e. trustworthiness) or the opposite. So a bigger 
problem and limitation of transparency […] is that it paradoxically requires 
stakeholders to trust that the organization is being honest, comprehensive and 
balanced in its transparent reporting”. 
This paradox creates the problem of how firms that are truly socially re-
sponsible, provide complete and accurate information, and are inspired by genu-
ine pro-social motives, can credibly signal that they are not fakers (Frank, 1988). 
The problem is even more challenging in the presence of successful deceivers, 
e.g. Volkswagen, which demonstrate that the public trust in business can be 
abused. Research has shown that, as a matter of fact, a firm’s (perceived) adop-
tion of CSR succeeds in making the firm trustworthy in the eyes of stakeholders 
(Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Lin, 2010b; Stanaland et al., 2011). These results im-
ply that the development process of stakeholder trust contains mechanisms that 
solve the paradox – although not necessarily to the advantage of the firms that 
are really responsible. 
By providing a model of trust development that links stakeholder motive 
attribution to both source credibility and the interpretation of a firm’s intentions, 
this chapter contributes to a growing stream of research on the role of motive at-
tribution in CSR activities (Donia & Tetrault Sirsly, 2016; Marín, Cuestas, & 
Román, 2016; Vlachos et al., 2013). In particular, I examine the impact of motive 
attribution on the evaluation of source credibility of second-hand CSR infor-
mation. Source credibility has not received adequate consideration in previous 
conceptualizations and studies, a gap that could explain the contradictory results 
found with regard to strategic-driven and other types of motives. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section I present 
the theoretical foundations of the paper, by introducing concepts related to 
stakeholder trust, the signalling value of CSR, and the attribution of motives. In 
section 3, I describe the two-stage model of trust development, linking attribu-
tions of specific motives to stakeholder evaluations of source credibility (in the 
first stage) and firm trustworthiness ascriptions (in the second stage); I use the 
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model to provide eight empirically testable propositions. In section 4, I discuss 
the implications of this chapter. Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical foundations 
2.1. Trust and ignorance 
According to a widely accepted definition, trust is “the willingness of a party to be 
vulnerable to the actions of another party based on the expectation that the other 
will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the abil-
ity to monitor and control the other party” (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995: 
712). Trust emerges when a party desires that the other party acts in a certain 
way, but the available information implies that there is only a probability p that 
the party will do so. If p = 0, the first party can be certain that the other party will 
not perform these actions; thus, trust is impossible. If p = 1, the first party can 
consider the actions of the other party as certain (for example because the first 
party can enforce them); here trust is redundant. It is when 0 < p < 1 that trust 
becomes an option, because the trustor has some reason to believe that the trus-
tee will behave as desired but this reason does not amount to certainty. For the 
trustor, choosing to trust means to put doubts to rest and act as if the trustee will 
deliver the expected actions. The complexity-reducing properties of trust are 
prominent in Luhmann (1979), who adopted a social systems view to show that 
the unstable structures of social life constantly challenge the human need to ex-
hibit a control over the realization of one’s plans. By excluding uncertainties, 
trust fulfils a fundamental function of allowing human action that could seem 
inconsiderate in face of all the contingencies involved: “In trusting, one engages 
in action as though there were only certain possibilities in the future” (Luhmann, 
1979: 20).  
Given that the available information does not support rational certainty, 
trust has been described as taking a ‘leap of faith’ (Möllering, 2001). The trustee 
has always some room for abusing trust and taking advantage of the situation, 
especially when the trustor relinquishes attempts at monitoring due to the belief 
that vigilance is not needed (Stevens, MacDuffie, & Helper, 2015). An inherent 
feature of trust is the possibility that it is betrayed (Zaheer, McEvily, & Perrone, 
1998). However, trust allows parties to engage in risky relationships when con-
trol systems are impossible or too expensive (Schoorman et al., 2007). Diego 
Gambetta deserves the credit for having drawn the attention on how trust is a 
pre-condition of cooperation; while traditional game theory had assumed that 
rational cooperation emerged when both parties had adequate motives for coop-
erating, Gambetta showed that parties do not cooperate unless they have reasons 
to trust each other. The need for building trust makes costly and apparently irra-
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tional signalling activities effective ways of committing to a relationship 
(Gambetta, 1987). Trust is also essential when control systems are unappealing, 
because moral or political principles may require that others retain the freedom 
to disappoint our expectations (Dunn, 1984). Groups in which formal and infor-
mal institutions do not support adequate levels of trust tend to be static and inef-
ficient; for example, Fukuyama (1995) argued that recent cultural disruption in 
Western societies impaired fundamental mechanisms of trust generation, reduc-
ing the capacity of these societies to accept internal dissent, absorb immigrants, 
and integrate scientific advancement. 
Alternative definitions of trust offered by the literature, such as that in 
Rousseau, Sitkin, Burt, & Camerer (1998: 395) – “a psychological state compris-
ing the intention to accept vulnerability based upon positive expectations of the 
intentions or behavior of another” – share the idea that the trustor must assume 
risk. However, trust is not blind but it depends on the trustor’s consideration of 
the characteristics of the situation and the trustee. Trust may have both cognitive 
and affective foundations (McAllister, 1995). Cognitive trust is driven by the 
trustor’s assessment of the characteristics of the trustee and the situation that 
may encourage the trustee to fulfil expectations. This assessment includes a cal-
culation of the possible losses if trust is betrayed and the potential benefits from 
trusting, e.g. the returns from specific investments in support of the relationship 
(Williamson, 1993). This type of trust is dominant in transactions between or-
ganizations, especially when they are short-term and exchange-oriented. 
Affective trust is based on the feelings of the trustor generated by the rela-
tionship with the trustee. These feelings are stirred by the care and concern that 
the trustee displays, the personal investment of the trustor in the relationship, or 
even the trustor’s perception of depending on the trustee and the related need to 
preserve a sense of confidence and security (Weber, Malhotra, & Murnighan, 
2004). Affective trust easily arises in personal relationships with friends, lovers, 
and family, but an affective component is often present in more detached rela-
tionships with service providers, public figures, or organizations. This type of 
trust is known to venture well beyond what is justified by available information 
(Johnson & Grayson, 2005). 
Some referents will be abler than others to elicit trust, given the character-
istics of the situation and the relationship. Mayer et al. (1995) identified ability, 
benevolence, and integrity (the so-called ABI framework) as the three main di-
mensions that make a referent trustworthy. Ability consists of the skills and 
competencies that allow the referent to function reliably and fulfil the trustee’s 
expectations. This feature is domain-specific, so an individual or an organization 
may be trusted to deliver on certain promises but not on others in which they do 
not exhibit the appropriate aptitudes. Benevolence is the extent to which the 
trustee wants to do good to the trustor; it expresses a positive orientation or a 
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specific attachment to the trustor that does not necessarily extend to other par-
ties. An example is the benevolence that a mentor may have for a certain protégé, 
aside from a general professional duty to be helpful. Integrity entails that the 
trustee is honest, fair, and adheres to a set of values that the trustor approves. 
Given that trustors may vary in which values they find acceptable, integrity may 
come close to the construct of ‘value congruence’, that is, the degree to which the 
values of the trustor and the trustee are compatible (Sitkin & Roth, 1993). 
Other dimensions of trustworthiness have been suggested by the literature, 
such as identification, openness, or transparency (Pirson & Malhotra, 2011). 
However, the ABI framework has gained wide acceptance in the trust literature 
because it is a parsimonious but encompassing set of trustee characteristics 
(Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Ability captures the ‘can-do’ component of trust-
worthiness, by describing whether the trustee has the skills needed to act as ex-
pected (Colquitt, Scott, & LePine, 2007); this component appears to be central to 
cognitive trust. Benevolence and integrity capture the ‘will-do’ component, by 
describing whether the trustee will want to use those skills to act in the interest 
of the trustee. In this respect, benevolence and integrity could seem to be redun-
dant to each other; however, integrity provides a rational reason to trust a refer-
ent, and thus it is related to cognitive trust, while benevolence inspires positive 
emotions in the trustor and serves as a basis for affective trust (Colquitt et al., 
2007). 
Trust has been studied across different levels of analysis (inter-personal, 
inter-group, inter-organizational) and referents (individuals, teams, organiza-
tions). CSR is a potential antecedent of organizational trust, that is, trust in an 
organization (Bhattacharya et al., 2009). In particular, CSR can drive stakehold-
er trust (Pirson & Malhotra, 2011), which is the willingness by a stakeholder to 
accept vulnerability to the actions of the firm. Stakeholders are individuals (e.g. 
employees, customers, members of local communities) and organizations (e.g. 
the state, NGOs), but stakeholder trust is usually examined at the individual-to-
organization level of analysis. This methodological choice assumes that trust has 
always its origin in the psychological states of individuals; thus, organizations 
cannot be properly said to trust someone, but only to include individuals who 
share trust orientations (Zaheer et al., 1998). 
The reason why CSR can be an antecedent of stakeholder trust is that it 
might demonstrate that the firm is honest, fair, and wants to comply with ethical 
principles (integrity) and that it has care and concern for the well-being of par-
ticular stakeholders (benevolence). Ability ascriptions are also possible, because 
CSR can indicate that the firm is able to deal effectively with complex issues, 
such as finding ways to reduce climate change emissions or avoid human rights 
violations in global supply chains. 
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Research has found that stakeholder perceptions of CSR are effective ante-
cedents of trust (Bhattacharya et al., 2009; Lin, 2010b; Stanaland et al., 2011). 
Apparently, CSR inspires trust both in the stakeholders who personally observe 
or experience CSR outcomes and in those who evaluate the outcomes based on 
second-hand information. Employees provide an example of the former case, be-
cause their trust is known to increase when they experience organizational jus-
tice in the workplace (Aryee et al., 2015) or when their supervisors exhibit ethical 
leadership (Newman et al., 2014a). Customers provide an example of the latter, 
because they seem to develop trust based on the CSR reputation of the firm 
(Homburg et al., 2013; Vlachos et al., 2009). 
Personal experience of CSR activities allows stakeholders to develop organ-
izational trust over time, through a gradual gathering of information (supporting 
cognitive trust) and repeated positive interaction (which can fuel affective trust). 
This mechanism fully conforms to standard models of trust development (Weber 
et al., 2004). The emergence of stakeholder trust from second-hand CSR infor-
mation is much more problematic, because stakeholders should be sceptical of 
the credibility of such information, especially when it comes from reports pro-
duced by firms. Recurring scandals reveal that firms are prone to wrongdoing. 
Given the benefits of appearing trustworthy, firms have incentives to provide bi-
ased accounts of their activities or to simulate false attributes. For example, firms 
may state that certain products have ‘green’ features (such as organic production 
or protection of animal welfare) that customers cannot verify through visual in-
spection or taste and therefore should doubt (Atkinson & Rosenthal, 2014). 
We know that trust can develop even when the initial conditions do not 
seem to be there. Individuals show a disposition to take inconsiderate risks and 
trust people they do not know or will never meet (Weber et al., 2004). A degree 
of illusion is always involved in the development of trust (McKnight, Cummings, 
& Chervany, 1998). However, it is important to understand the grounds on which 
stakeholders assess (not necessarily in a rational way) the credibility of CSR in-
formation when they are not in a position to verify whether the information is 
complete and accurate. As I discuss in the next section, there are reasons to think 
that second-hand CSR information is a rather weak signal of organizational 
trustworthiness. 
2.2. Credibility of CSR as a signal of trustworthiness  
The initial development of trust provides a useful context for examining stake-
holder trust when it is grounded on second-hand CSR information. In fact, the 
initial stage of development, in which a party takes the decision to trust another 
party, is always characterized by a lack of first-hand information and interac-
tional experience (McKnight & Chervany, 2006). This lack does not necessarily 
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result from the newness of the relationship, because when parties are distant 
they may not gather solid and verifiable information for some time. Three factors 
contribute to the initial trust development (McKnight et al., 1998): 
- personality factors that predispose a person to assume that others are 
trustworthy (disposition to trust); 
- institutional structures that protect an individual from harm deriving 
from misplaced trust (such as safety nets and social or legal enforce-
ment); 
- cognitive processes with which individuals process the available infor-
mation and form the impression that the other party is trustworthy. 
CSR information suffers from drawbacks when used to activate any of these 
factors.  
Personality factors. An individual disposition to trust (or ‘trust propensi-
ty’) may depend on faith in humanity, which is the belief that others are typically 
well-meaning, or on a trusting stance, which rests on the belief that better results 
are obtained as a rule by dealing with others as if they were trustworthy, irre-
spective of whether they are or not (McKnight et al., 1998). While an individual 
may extend his or her trusting stance to any type of referent, stakeholder trust 
relates specifically to firms and involves the substitution of faith in humanity 
with trust in business (Pirson, Martin, & Parmar, 2016). Given that firms are im-
personal entities and are constitutionally aimed at pursuing economic objectives, 
they are less likely than human beings to inspire faith and more likely to invite 
cynicism. In turn, cynicism is associated to scepticism, distrust, resistance, and 
even hostility (Stanley, Meyer, & Topolnytsky, 2005). Widespread societal criti-
cism of business may also trigger fears of embarrassment in the trustor and in-
terfere with the trust development process. Individuals are concerned about their 
own self-impressions, even when they are trusting individually (Weber et al., 
2004). This mechanism can block stakeholder trust when the spectacle of exploi-
tative and dishonest behaviour by firms makes trusting business look like some-
thing stupid to do, even for individuals that in general have a high disposition to 
trust. 
Institutional factors. These factors include all impersonal structures that 
enable the fulfilment of trustor expectations about the trustee. First, these struc-
tures defines situational normality, that is, the appearance that all the parties are 
conforming to their expected roles (McKnight et al., 1998). Situational normality 
facilitates trust, because it produces feelings of safety and familiarity (Misztal, 
2001). To the extent that CSR has been institutionalized as a norm of doing busi-
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ness (Campbell, 2007), the adoption of CSR by a firm can contribute to percep-
tions of situational normality. Second, institutional structures are expected to 
provide regulations, guarantees, and the possibility of legal recourse when the 
trustee does not fulfil promises. These institutional factors are important to as-
suage doubts about the veracity of CSR information, in face of the risk of green-
washing or other embellishment of the firm’s actions and outcomes. However, at 
least in the major economies, the corporate disclosure of environmental and so-
cial performance is not yet mandatory or assisted by compulsory third-party au-
diting, unlike financial information. Although institutional pressures or legitima-
cy-seeking can make sure that firms voluntarily disclose information, in particu-
lar through sustainability reports, a satisfactory institutional set of rules for en-
suring the quality of the represented information is still lacking. Sustainability 
reports may cherry pick favourable news and completely ignore such material 
issues as ecological footprints, safety of work, or human rights (Milne & Gray, 
2013). The reports can also contain spurious claims and announce commitments 
that firms may never meet without paying any serious legal consequence (Cho, 
Roberts, & Patten, 2010). 
Cognitive factors. When stakeholders have no access to CSR policies and 
practices and depend on second-hand information, the credibility of such infor-
mation is small because the firm may engage in cheap talk. Societal pressures on 
firms to improve social and environmental performance can drive firms to devel-
op façades (Abrahamson & Beaumard, 2008) and engage in hypocrisy 
(Brunsson, 1993). CSR information may aim at fooling stakeholders (Graffin, 
Carpenter, & Boivie, 2011) or at communicating adoption that is only ceremonial 
(Lim & Tsutsui, 2011). The degree of information asymmetry will depend on the 
nature of the relationship between the stakeholder and the firm, and on the type 
of CSR policies and practices being considered, but in general stakeholders will 
find it difficult to identify which firms make truthful claims (Crilly, Hansen, & 
Zollo, 2016). As a result, stakeholders might feel that they lack adequate 
knowledge and cannot understand whether firms actually implement the policies 
they claim to; thus, stakeholders will attach a low signalling value to CSR infor-
mation. 
The signalling value of CSR information is even lower if the disclosed ac-
tions are not costly. An essential feature of a strong signal is that firms that lack 
the latent and underlying qualities find it exceedingly costly to produce it 
(Connelly et al., 2011). This may be the case for CSR if it requires expensive in-
vestments that make sense only if a firm embraces integrity or has real concern 
and care for stakeholders, or if the firm plans to act consistently in a responsible 
way to capitalize on better stakeholder relations or other instrumental benefits of 
CSR (Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). Then, firms that have no integrity, be-
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nevolence, or real intention to be responsible could not absorb the cost of CSR. 
Unfortunately, many CSR activities do not seem to be expensive. For example, 
research has repeatedly found that corporate philanthropy produces valuable or-
ganizational outcomes, such as legitimacy (Wang & Qian, 2011) and reputation 
(Brammer & Millington, 2005); however, the descriptives of these studies reveal 
that the philanthropic expenditures of firms are typically low, e.g. about 0.1% of 
firm sales in the US firms sampled by Lev, Petrovits, & Radhakrishnan (2010) 
and about 0.05% of firm sales in the Chinese firms sampled by Wang & Qian 
(2011). The costs of the communicated CSR behaviour can be even lower for oth-
er popular activities, such as adopting an ethical code, creating a sustainability 
committee, or adhering to UN Global Compact. 
Finally, CSR does not seem to suit categorization processes that facilitate 
initial trust development. These processes lead an individual to apply the charac-
teristics of a category to a referent that is identified as belonging to it (Hauswald 
& Hack, 2013; McKnight et al., 1998). The problem with categorization is that a 
socially responsible firm is exposed to negative reputation spillovers when firms 
that belong to the same category (e.g., industry peers) exhibit irresponsible be-
haviour (Barnett & Hoffman, 2008). So, the Volkswagen scandal is likely to in-
spire distrust in the reported emissions of cars in general, hurting firms that ac-
tually respect regulations. Negative stereotyping of business can also target firms 
as a whole, leading to the belief that they are generally greedy, reckless, and ma-
nipulative. Moreover, people expect more abrasive interaction when they deal 
with groups, such as organizations and firms, rather than individuals (Ent & 
Baumeister, 2015). Groups may be seen as less likely than individuals to keep 
promises, because members of the group can always blame one another for the 
failure. Finally, firms are beyond the reach of token control efforts, non-verbal 
social cues, shared membership, and schmoozing that generate an illusion of 
control in the relationship with individuals and facilitate initial trust (Huang, 
Gattiker, & Schwarz, 2008; McKnight et al., 1998). 
To summarize, CSR information that is not backed by direct experience or 
verification by stakeholders seem to be a relatively weak basis for trust develop-
ment. Disposition to trust firms may find a constraint in the limited public trust 
in business; the institutional structures that should make sure that CSR infor-
mation is accurate and complete are still embryonic; information asymmetries 
make it difficult for stakeholders to separate truthful from unfounded claims; 
many CSR endeavours do not seem to be costly enough to be strong signals of 
underlying firm integrity and benevolence; socially responsible firms may find it 
challenging to distance themselves from less responsible peers, due to categori-
zation processes. These drawbacks suggest that stakeholder trust must depend 
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heavily on other mechanisms, and in particular that subjective perceptions and 
attribution processes must be important drivers, as I argue in the next section.  
3. A model of stakeholder trust development and motive attributions 
When a firm discloses its CSR activities or outcomes, it might hope that stake-
holders take them at their face value and evaluate their objective merits. Howev-
er, stakeholder reactions are necessarily grounded in perceptions, not reality 
(Wry, 2009). Processes of selective attention and interpretation filter the evi-
dence disclosed by the firm (Fiske & Taylor, 2013), leading stakeholders to attach 
subjective meanings to CSR activities and outcomes. Stakeholders will not draw 
the conclusion that a firm has integrity or benevolence just because it is appar-
ently engaging in CSR. Rather, stakeholders will elaborate on the message, trying 
to understand what might be hidden behind the activities and outcomes being 
communicated (Becker-Olsen et al., 2006). This elaboration will be often fraught 
with scepticism about CSR, caused by frequent association of firms with social 
ills or fraudulent behaviour (Lange & Washburn, 2012). As suggested by Gilbert 
& Malone (1995), uncertainty and suspicion may lead stakeholders to care less 
about what firms are doing than about the reasons why they are doing it, making 
the attribution of motives to firm’s behaviour critical to how stakeholders re-
spond to it (Groza et al., 2011). 
Attribution theory tries to understand how individuals attribute causes to 
events (in particular to others’ actions) and how these attributions drive the sub-
sequent behaviour of individuals (Kelley & Michela, 1980). The theory presents 
individuals as intuitive psychologists who try to make sense of the world, contin-
uously engaging in causal inferences that explain the behaviour of people or or-
ganizations (Heider, 1958). A central tenet of attribution theory is that individu-
als elude formal guidelines and hate to scan all the available information. Rather, 
individuals tend to use simplified schemas, incorporating naïve preconceptions 
and basic cause-and-effect relationships (Ferrin & Dirks, 2003). An example is 
the preference of individuals for attributing another person’s behaviour to her 
internal forces (personality, motives, or beliefs) rather than to external features 
of the situation (Heider, 1958). 
Trust development has been seen as an attributional process in which the 
trustor makes inferences about the situation and the trustee’s characteristics and 
attitudes (Ferrin & Dirks, 2003; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). The trustor will use 
experience from previous interaction with the trustee and information gleaned 
from third parties to attribute ability, benevolence, and integrity to the trustee. 
Specific causal schemas will play a role in trust development. For example, 
trustworthiness ascriptions are enhanced when the trustor explains trustee’s be-
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haviour as internally motivated, rather than externally driven (Malhotra & 
Murnighan, 2002). 
Attribution theory predicts that stakeholders will interpret CSR activities 
and outcomes simplistically, without doing justice to the complex organizational 
motives that can move firms to adopt CSR. Although firms may engage in CSR 
with the purpose of serving both economic and social objectives, or even as a way 
of experimenting with new logics in absence of immediate objectives, stakehold-
ers will draw black-or-white pictures (Drumwright, 1996). The central question 
for stakeholders is whether CSR is a candid manifestation of the firm’s underly-
ing intentions, vision, and character, or is it designed to ingratiate the firm 
among the public (Godfrey, 2005). Research on motive attributions has often 
used some variant of this bipolar attribution, such as egoistic vs altruistic 
(Handelman & Arnold, 1999; Webb & Mohr, 1998), firm-serving vs public-
serving (Barone et al., 2000), or intrinsic vs extrinsic motives (Vlachos et al., 
2013). However, Ellen et al. (2006) identified a second dimension of motive at-
tributions, based on positive vs negative evaluations of the motive. In fact, stake-
holders can evaluate even self-serving activities positively if the purpose of the 
action is legitimate. The resulting motives are four. 
- Egoistic-driven motive: the firm is perceived to exploit rather than help 
stakeholders, to mislead them, and to have the secret purpose of profit-
ing from the false impressions it generates; e.g. the stakeholders believe 
that the firm wants to pocket the donations of a cause-related marketing 
initiative. This is a self-centred and negative motive. 
- Strategic-driven motive: the firm is perceived to use CSR to boost sales, 
profits, or other economic objectives, staying within the limits of honest 
and transparent behaviour. This is a self-centred but positive motive, to 
the extent that stakeholders accept economic value creation as a legiti-
mate business purpose. 
- Stakeholder-driven motive: the firm is perceived to engage in CSR pas-
sively, in order to meet external pressures and stakeholder require-
ments; the engagement is attributed to situational circumstances and 
not to the firm’s real values and beliefs. This is an other-centred but 
negative motive, because it raises doubts of opportunism and insincerity 
in the firm’s behaviour. 
- Values-driven motive: the firm is perceived to act on its principles, with 
a genuine desire to help stakeholders; although the firm maintains its 
constitutional economic objectives, it is seen as acting out of character 
by contributing voluntarily to society. This is an other-centred and posi-
tive motive. 
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This categorization of the motives behind CSR (adopted also in Skarmeas & 
Leonidou, 2013, Vlachos et al., 2009, and elsewhere) is simple enough to work as 
a schema for stakeholder attributions. At the same time, it allows for a more nu-
anced characterization of how stakeholders react to second-hand CSR infor-
mation. Stakeholders will need first to judge whether the information is credible; 
then they will ask whether the information demonstrates the trustworthiness of 
the firm. I suggest that the attribution of these four motives impacts on both 
questions but in different ways, as I explain below. 
3.1. Source credibility 
By providing information about their own CSR activities, firms present an ap-
pealing image of themselves as generous and concerned corporate citizens. Since 
the message comes directly from the firms, stakeholders will perceive it as a per-
suasion attempt (Friestad & Wright, 1994). Thus, stakeholders will question the 
credibility of the information and try to understand the purposes of the firm. 
In general, the attributes that make a source of information credible are a) 
trusted motives, b) expertness, and c) likeability (Hovland et al., 1953). The mo-
tives are trusted in virtue of previous positive interaction with the source or be-
cause the features of the source or the situation make unlikely that the source 
provides biased information. In general, sources are trusted when they do not 
have anything to gain from lying. Expert sources are believed because they are 
perceived as knowledgeable about the subject at hand. The likeability of the 
source (including pleasantness, friendliness, or warmth) is known to be associat-
ed with credibility in a variety of contexts, from advertising (Kamins, Brand, 
Hoeke, & Moe, 1989) to evaluation of witnesses in trials (Brodsky, Griffin, & 
Cramer, 2010). When these attributes are applied to CSR information, expert-
ness is usually immaterial, since firms are generally supposed to be aware of 
their own CSR activities. Likeability can instead produce variance in stakeholder 
response, according to the extent that the firm is admired or circumfused by pos-
itive associations; the halo effects that reinforce consumer outcomes of CSR for 
famous brands (Madden, Roth, & Dillon, 2012) could be linked to heightened 
credibility of the activities. Here I focus on the attribution of motives, which de-
cides whether the source is perceived as biased or not. 
In attributing a motive to a firm, stakeholders will elaborate a variety of 
cues related to the firm itself, the contents of the CSR activity, or the ways it is 
communicated. A clear fit between the activity and the social or environmental 
issue that it targets (e.g. when a cosmetics company such as L’Oréal supports re-
search into ovarian cancer) avoids cognitive dissonance and make easier for 
stakeholders to attribute strategic-driven or values-driven motives to the firm 
(Marín et al., 2016). An activity that pursues a specific goal, accompanied by per-
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formance measures and an overt expected result, is more likely to be interpreted 
as substantial (Donia & Tetrault Sirsly, 2016), mitigating the suspicion that the 
activity is ceremonial and stakeholder-driven. The amount of resources invested 
by the firm also signals that the activity is substantial, especially for firms that 
are financially constrained (Cuypers et al., 2016). The degree of innovativeness of 
the activity makes it distinctive, increasing the probability that it is ascribed to 
internal causes (Kelley, 1967) and favouring values-driven motive attributions. 
Conversely, the activities that replicate those already adopted by competitors will 
be seen as passive and probably stakeholder-driven. The innovativeness also 
suggests that the firm gave a thoughtful consideration to the issue and invested 
time and resources to think of a solution, a signal that can be difficult to produce 
for firms that do not take CSR seriously (Cuypers et al., 2016). Moreover, any ac-
tivity will be interpreted in the context of the previous known activities of the 
firm. Temporal consistency in pursuing CSR suggests that an activity is not op-
portunistic, because fakers find it hard to avoid cheating for long (Frank, 1988). 
Domain consistency also suggests intrinsic motives, in particular values-driven; 
conversely, strategic-driven motives become less salient, because it is unlikely 
that CSR is profit-enhancing in all the domains. Both temporal and domain con-
sistency have been found to improve stakeholder relationships (Koschate-Fischer 
et al., 2016; Oikonomou et al., 2014; Wang & Choi, 2013). Finally, the firm may 
increase the likeliness of positive motive attributions by presenting information 
in ways that neutralize scepticism; for example, disclosing unfavourable infor-
mation about oneself (by indicating areas of improvement or issues that wait to 
be solved) may signal absence of bias and increase the credibility of concomitant 
positive information (Fisher, Ilgen, & Hoyer, 1979). 
When stakeholders perceive that the firm is driven by egoistic motives, 
CSR information will lack credibility. Egoistic motives imply an inconsistency 
between the statements of the firm, which presents itself as engaging in CSR, and 
the exploitative aims behind these activities that stakeholders identify. Once 
stakeholders believe that firm is insincere in its intentions, their scepticism of 
any firm communication will be intense. So, it is unlikely that stakeholders will 
spend further cognitive resources to examine whether the communicated CSR 
activities might be real (which would not necessarily contrast with the egoistic 
motives behind them). In absence of direct verification or experience of the activ-
ities, stakeholders will promptly notice cues that the information may be inaccu-
rate, confirming the motive attribution; scepticism will be deployed against pos-
sible endorsement by third parties as well, because they will be suspected to be 
confederates of the firm. 
Proposition 1. When stakeholders attribute egoistic-driven motives to a 
firm, they will not consider credible the CSR information that the firm discloses. 
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The attribution of strategic motives to the CSR activity could trigger con-
trasting considerations in the mind of stakeholders. A firm’s attributed self-
interest may tend to produce the impression in the stakeholders that the infor-
mation provided by the firm could be biased. However, strategic-driven motives 
also imply that the firm may need to pursue substantial CSR to maximize the de-
sired organizational outcomes, such as better reputation or increased consumer 
demand. False communications about CSR activities should be particularly 
harmful to firms with these motives. For example, if a firm is launching an or-
ganic line of food to increase sales in a high-growth segment of the market, it is 
in the interest of the firm that the products actually meet the standards of organ-
ic production, in order to avoid any reputational risk that could turn consumers 
away. So, strategic-driven motives do not provide a reason to lie. Moreover, stra-
tegic motives usually involve a close match between the CSR activity and the 
business of the firm, enhancing perceptions of firm expertness and facilitating 
the transfer of positive stakeholder feelings from the issue being addressed to the 
firm (Ellen et al., 2006). Therefore, as a whole, strategic-driven motives attribu-
tions should be accompanied by stakeholder perceptions that CSR information is 
credible. 
Proposition 2. When stakeholders attribute strategic-driven motives to a 
firm, they will consider credible the CSR information that the firm discloses. 
Stakeholder-driven motives correspond to the perception that the firm is 
engaging in CSR to acquire legitimacy and satisfy external expectations, without 
any fundamental desire to contribute to society. As in strategic-driven motives, 
the firm has an interest in providing self-serving information, but here the im-
plied bias is not balanced by a perception that the firm also wants to draw bene-
fits from CSR activities. When motives are stakeholder-driven, the firm may 
want to maximize appearances and minimize the underlying effort, resulting in 
merely ceremonial adoption. Although it is unlikely that the information provid-
ed by the firm is totally false, it may be embellished or aggrandized. Lack of first-
hand information will make stakeholders alert to cues of ceremonialism, such as 
dearth of innovativeness of the initiatives. In many cases, stakeholders could ar-
rive at a realistic picture of the substance of the CSR activities of the firm by 
thoroughly probing information or collecting alternative evidence from third 
parties. However, stakeholders are likely to economize on cognitive work and ar-
chive CSR information provided by stakeholder-motivated firms in the basket of 
what does not deserve further investigation. So, CSR information released by 
these firms will be discarded as not credible. 
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Proposition 3. When stakeholders attribute stakeholder-driven motives to 
a firm, they will not consider credible the CSR information that the firm dis-
closes. 
When stakeholders attribute a values-driven motive to a firm, they believe 
that the goal of the CSR activities is to genuinely contribute to society. Such an 
intrinsic motive will correspond to high source credibility, because the motive 
implies that the firm is not interested in projecting false impressions. The posi-
tive evaluation of the motive can inspire stakeholder identification with the firm, 
which further contributes to switching off scepticism. Therefore, stakeholders 
will believe that the CSR activities are real and accurately reported. 
Proposition 4. When stakeholders attribute values-driven motives to a 
firm, they will consider credible the CSR information that the firm discloses. 
3.2. Trustworthiness ascriptions 
The outcomes of the first stage are a motive attribution to the firm and an evalu-
ation of the credibility of the CSR information that the firm provides. In the sec-
ond stage, stakeholders connect the CSR activities of the firm to trustworthiness 
ascriptions, in particular integrity and benevolence. I do not consider here possi-
ble ascriptions of ability, which will depend on the challenges that the firm has to 
overcome to implement the activity, and not on the underlying motives. Benevo-
lence and integrity ascriptions will reflect not only the perceived behaviour of the 
firm, but also features of the relationship or categorization processes that associ-
ate the firm to the class to which it belongs. For example, Pirson & Malhotra 
(2011) showed that the intensity of interaction between the stakeholders and the 
firm positively moderate benevolence attributions; Hauswald & Hack (2013) 
found that family ownership or control of a firm lead to increased stakeholder 
perceptions of benevolence and integrity. 
When motives attributed in the first stage are egoistic-driven or stakehold-
er-driven, second-hand CSR information is not credible and therefore useless in 
trustworthiness ascriptions in the second stage. Moreover, egoistic-driven mo-
tives are probable to generate distrust, which can be seen not only as the oppo-
site end of trust (Schoorman et al., 2007), but also as a separate construct char-
acterized by aversion, fear, and increased vigilance (Lewicki, McAllister, & Bies, 
1998; Lumineau, 2016). For stakeholder-driven motives, it is still possible that 
stakeholders arrive at the conclusion that the CSR information is after all accu-
rate. Direct verification and experience by stakeholders, or effective monitoring 
by institutional structures can redeem the absence of a trusted motive. Even so, 
it is unlikely that stakeholders will ascribe integrity and benevolence to the firm, 
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given the stakeholder-driven motive. In fact, this motive implies that the firm 
engages in CSR due to external considerations, and not because of intrinsic val-
ues or specific concern for certain stakeholders. However, CSR activities that are 
recognized as real and substantial may serve as a basis for cognitive stakeholder 
trust, based on calculative considerations. If stakeholders believe that the situa-
tional forces that are driving the CSR activities will go on in the future, they may 
trust the firm to continue to deliver on these activities. This trust, based on a cal-
culation of the situation and the trustee’s interests, will tend to be exchange-
oriented and subject to on-going reassessment. 
When the motives attributed in the first stage are strategic-driven, stake-
holders believe the CSR information but attributed motives will presumably in-
terfere with ascriptions of integrity or benevolence. Trust is less likely to develop 
when the other party’s behaviour is attributed to external situations, rather than 
internal factors (Malhotra & Murnighan, 2002; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). Stra-
tegic-driven motives rest on external market conditions that make it profitable 
for the firm to engage in specific CSR activities. Similarly to stakeholder-driven 
motives, CSR activities with strategic-driven motives can be a platform for cogni-
tive trust, based on belief that the market conditions that make the CSR activities 
profitable will continue. However, these activities do not signal integrity, which 
would require that firms act on ethical principles. Likewise, the activities do not 
reveal benevolence, which manifests in taking risks or making sacrifices for the 
benefit of the trustor. 
Proposition 5a. When stakeholders attribute strategic-driven motives to a 
firm, they will not ascribe integrity to the firm. 
Proposition 5b. When stakeholders attribute strategic-driven motives to a 
firm, they will not ascribe benevolence to the firm. 
Values-driven motives coincide with the principled behaviour that defines 
integrity and thus are expected to elicit the corresponding trustworthiness at-
tribution. Attribution research suggests that behaviour that demonstrate inter-
personal care and concern is probable to produce affect-based trust (McAllister, 
1995), in which benevolence ascriptions play a critical role. However, benevo-
lence is a particularized attachment to certain trustors. So, it is important to dis-
tinguish stakeholders according to the role they play with regard to the focal CSR 
activity (Wood & Jones, 1995). When the stakeholders are beneficiaries of the 
activity, they will perceive that the firm is concerned about their specific well-
being; inclinations to personalism indicate that when others’ behaviour is appar-
ently intended to have an impact on us, we assume that the behaviour is personal 
and not the result of external considerations (Jones & Davis, 1965). As a conse-
quence, stakeholders will tend to ascribe benevolence to the firm. Conversely, if 
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they are not beneficiaries and simply evaluate CSR activities that involve other 
groups or individuals, stakeholders will ascribe integrity but not benevolence, 
given the absence of a particularized tie. For example, if a firm invests philan-
thropic money in the local community in which it has established factories or 
headquarters, it is likely to be ascribed integrity and benevolence by residents 
but only integrity by other observers. 
Proposition 6a. When stakeholders attribute values-driven motives to a 
firm, they will ascribe integrity to the firm. 
Proposition 6b. When stakeholders attribute values-driven motives to a 
firm, they will ascribe benevolence to the firm if the stakeholders are beneficiar-
ies of the CSR activities. 
4. Discussion 
The primary objective of this chapter is to provide a model of how motive attrib-
utions contribute to the development of stakeholder trust. Recent literature has 
shown that stakeholder attributions of the motives of CSR activities are im-
portant antecedents of CSR organizational outcomes (Donia & Tetrault Sirsly, 
2016; Marín et al., 2016) and that stakeholders are often sceptical of the motives 
behind a firm’s engagement in CSR (Skarmeas & Leonidou, 2013). The contribu-
tion of this paper is to separate issues of credibility of CSR information from is-
sues of trustworthiness of a firm, which in previous research have usually been 
mixed, and to analyse how motive attributions participate in these different is-
sues. Distinguishing them allows for a nuanced interpretation of the effects of 
motive attributions on stakeholder trust. 
Table 1 summarizes the main propositions and implications of the two-
stage model that I present in this chapter. The attribution of egoistic-driven mo-
tives deprives the firm of credibility, blocks the ascription of benevolence and in-
tegrity, and makes unlikely that the CSR activities are included in the calcula-
tions that lead to stakeholder cognitive trust. Strategic-driven motives are a good 
basis for establishing that the CSR information is credible, but not for ascribing 
integrity and benevolence to the firm; however, they can support cognitive trust, 
to the extent that stakeholders believe in the continuation of the conditions that 
make CSR activities profitable. For similar reasons, stakeholder-driven motives 
may also support cognitive trust, but they do not confer credibility to the firm 
and are a barrier to benevolence and integrity ascriptions. Finally, the attribution 
of values-driven motives corresponds to a perceived coincidence between the 
firm’s statements and an underlying pro-social intention, leading stakeholders to 
grant credibility to the firm and ascribe benevolence (in presence of a particular-
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ized tie) and integrity to it; source credibility implies the use of the information 
in cognitive trust. 
The model implies a parallel between stakeholder trust and initial trust 
(McKnight et al., 1998). The parallel is limited to the case in which stakeholders 
have second-hand information about CSR activities of the firm, that is, they are 
not in the position of verifying its accuracy. This case does not cover situations in 
which stakeholders directly watch the activity (e.g. employees who observe the 
behaviour of supervisors and evaluate their ethical standards) or experience its 
outcomes (e.g. a local community that receives a donation from the firm). How-
ever, each stakeholder category will be able to observe or experience only the 
limited set of CSR activities that pertain to their direct relationship with the firm; 
all other CSR activities will be known and interpreted through second-hand in-
formation. Therefore, this type of information will be an important factor not on-
ly in trust, but also in other important organizational outcomes of CSR, such as 
reputation (Wang & Berens, 2015) or moral capital (Godfrey, 2005). 
TABLE 1. Main propositions and implications 
 Egoistic-
driven 
motives 
Strategic-
driven 
motives 
Stakeholder-
driven 
motives 
Values-
driven 
motives 
Source credibility No Yes No Yes 
Benevolence 
ascription 
No No No Yes (with 
particularized 
tie) 
Integrity 
ascription 
No No No Yes 
Basis for cognitive 
trust 
No Yes Yes Yes 
The practical implications of the model regard the problem of how socially 
responsible firms can credibly signal their CSR engagement to audiences of scep-
tical stakeholders. These firms need to distinguish themselves from other firms 
that produce faked or unsubstantial signals of CSR engagement. The model im-
plies that both values-driven and strategic-driven motives can confer credibility 
to a firm. Therefore, frank declarations that the firm expects to profit from CSR 
activities are not detrimental and can even reassure stakeholders that the firm’s 
engagement is substantial. However, stakeholder support to these activities will 
be calculative and the firm should not expect praise for positive social impacts 
that the activities could produce. If firms plan to use CSR activities to build deep 
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and long-standing relationships with stakeholders, it is necessary that profits are 
left in the background and stakeholders can attribute values-driven motives to 
the firm. 
A related implication is that stakeholder trust is inherently fragile, because 
all stakeholder attributions depend upon the individuals’ attention and interpre-
tation, which are subjective and can change. Zaheer et al. (1998) observe that ini-
tial trust, which parallels stakeholder trust based on second-hand information, is 
a function of assumptions that are extrinsic to the trustee and therefore can dete-
riorate without any trustee’s fault, or as a consequence of small violations. 
Stakeholders may have low tolerance for discrepancies between ‘aspirational 
talk’ (Christensen, Morsing, & Thyssen, 2013) and action, even though these dis-
crepancies can be useful in encouraging firms to improve. This fragility implies 
that keeping temporal and domain consistency in CSR engagement is especially 
important for preserving stakeholder trust.  
A limitation of the model is that it looks only at single CSR activities, as-
suming implicitly that the credibility of each is evaluated in isolation. Although 
this assumption is pragmatically useful, it would be interesting to examine how 
stakeholders aggregate different CSR activities in their evaluation of source cred-
ibility or in trustworthiness ascriptions. The model also abstracts away from the 
specific stakeholder categories that evaluate CSR information (employees, cus-
tomers, regulators, local communities, etc.) and the varied nature of CSR activi-
ties (environmental protection, responsible supply chain management, philan-
thropy, ethical conduct, etc.), leaving to future developments to examine the 
specificities involved. 
The model suggests a number of other areas in which more research is 
needed. I mentioned the extant literature on the antecedents of motive attribu-
tions, such as goal specificity (Donia & Tetrault Sirsly, 2016) or innovativeness of 
the initiative (Cuypers et al., 2016). Given the complexity of motive attributions, 
other antecedents at the level of the firm, the activity, or the relationships might 
play a role and deserve to be investigated. For example, it is known that sincere 
manners and display of emotions are effective marks of honesty in interpersonal 
relationships (Frank, 1988), which suggests that leadership style may have im-
portant impacts on stakeholder motive attributions. 
Attribution may also fail to reflect the real motives of the firm or confer 
value to something that does not intrinsically contribute to source credibility. 
Therefore, it would be valuable to investigate empirically the degree to which 
stakeholders attributions actually match reality and which confounding factors 
explain mismatches. Relatedly, future research should focus on how external cir-
cumstances, both positive (e.g. institutional structures) and negative (e.g. indus-
try reputation spillovers), impact the development process of stakeholder trust, 
complementing or supplementing the mechanisms described in the model. 
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5. Conclusion 
Yoon, Gürhan-Canli, & Schwarz (2006b: 378) wrote that “Unless consumers 
trust the company’s pro-social position, they are not willing to reward the com-
pany for its CSR activity”. In this paper, I tried to generalize this intuition to all 
stakeholders and unpack the complexities hidden in trusting the pro-social posi-
tion of a firm. I used Ellen et al. (2006) to enrich the range the motives that 
could be attributed to a firm beyond the basic opposition of pro-social vs self-
serving attitudes, since other motive attributions may have impact on whether 
and how stakeholders reward firms for their CSR activities. The central theme of 
this paper is that trust is necessarily a leap of faith, especially when stakeholders 
need to evaluate second-hand CSR information that could be embellished or ex-
aggerated. This leap of faith is supported by stakeholder interpretations of the 
information that a firm makes available. These interpretations are not always 
correct; it is entirely conceivable that firms that are socially responsible do not 
get credit because the stakeholders do not trust the real motives behind the 
firm’s CSR activities. Conversely, deceivers may convince the public that they are 
driven by values that simply are not there. In this respect, the paper wants to be a 
step toward an improved understanding of the intricate conditions that drive the 
motive attributions and the trustworthiness ascriptions of stakeholders. 
In Chapters 3 and 4, I present two empirical studies that test whether trust 
can act as a mediator between CSR and organizational outcomes at the consumer 
level, i.e. willingness to pay a premium price and brand loyalty. These studies not 
only provide evidence that consumer perceptions that a firm is socially responsi-
ble drive trustworthiness ascriptions, but also indicate that consumers connect 
specific CSR activities (‘Consumer CSR’ and ‘Environmental CSR’) to trust in 
particular products sold by firms. 
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Chapter 3 
The Missing Link Between Corporate Social 
Responsibility and Consumer Trust: 
The Case of Fair Trade Products1 
1. Introduction 
According to the main findings presented in the Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) literature consumers are interested in the social behaviour of firms, and 
this behaviour influences their purchasing decisions (Lacey et al., 2015). Most 
observers expect that ‘good companies’ (that is, companies that have a reputation 
for being socially responsible) will attract consumers to their products, while 
‘bad companies’ (that is, companies that disregard their social obligations) will 
be punished by the consumers – for example, through boycotts. Consumers 
themselves frequently claim that the CSR profile of a company plays a large role 
in what brands they choose to purchase. Several studies report that consumers 
say that they are influenced, more specifically, by the CSR reputation of a firm 
(Smith, 2003; Sen, Bhattacharya, & Korschun, 2006; Hsu, 2012). However, 
some of these studies conclude that this correlation is heavily dependent on 
many variables at the firm or consumer levels (Bhattacharya & Sen, 2004). So, 
there is no guarantee that consumers will consistently choose good companies 
when purchasing products. In some cases, consumers may even fail to notice or 
consider the bad social behaviour of a company when making their purchases 
(Castaldo & Perrini, 2004).2 
This absence of a dependable correlation between a firm’s CSR reputation 
and consumer reactions reflects a larger issue – the notoriously difficult search                                                         
1 Co-authored with Sandro Castaldo (Bocconi University) Francesco Perrini (Bocconi 
University), and Antonio Tencati (Università degli Studi di Brescia). A version of this 
article was published on Journal of Business Ethics, vol. 84, pp. 1–15, 2009. This up-
dated version has been slightly edited to reflect new research that appeared after pub-
lication. 
2 Recent research suggests that consumers may even completely disregard CSR in-
formation or demonstrate a preference for products without ethical attributes (Luchs, 
Naylor, Irwin, & Raghunathan, 2010).  
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for an empirical link between the social performance of a company and its finan-
cial performance (Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh, 2007). If the impact of CSR 
reputation on consumers were universal and significant, we would see a clear 
impact on the bottom line of the firms with a strong social performance. While 
the ‘business case’ is only one of many reasons that managers commit to social 
responsibility, clearer findings are needed about when and how social responsi-
bility helps them to achieve their competitive and financial objectives. In this ar-
ticle we suggest that a company’s reputation for CSR impacts consumer inten-
tions in the presence of at least two conditions. 
1. When the products sold by that company contain an ethical proposition. 
This kind of product is accompanied by the company’s implicit promise 
that a given ethical value will be respected. However, consumers will not 
usually be able to observe the actual realization of the promise (Atkinson 
& Rosenthal, 2014); therefore, companies with a strong CSR reputation 
will have an advantage over competitors trying to sell the same kind of 
products without such a reputation. 
2. When the CSR reputation of the company includes an acknowledged 
commitment to protect consumer rights and interests. While consumers 
may appreciate corporate efforts to protect the environment, or respect 
international labour standards, or advance important social causes, their 
purchasing intentions will largely reflect the relationship between the 
CSR reputation of that company and the specific products that they want 
to buy. 
These two conditions may seem restrictive, but today many companies ad-
vertise their ethical practices to distinguish their products and achieve competi-
tive advantage (Seele & Lock, 2015). In this article we focus on the growing busi-
ness of Fair Trade products, which are marketed in large numbers through main-
stream retail chains (Doherty, Davies, & Tranchell, 2013). When these retailers 
sell Fair Trade products, they are promising consumers to help Third World pro-
ducers and to respect fair contractual provisions in trading with them. Therefore, 
we hypothesize that retailers with a good CSR reputation will be able to elicit 
trust from consumers interested in Fair Trade products, while retailers with a 
weaker CSR reputation will be disadvantaged. This effect should compound 
when the retailers market Fair Trade products under their own private label. 
To examine this idea, we conducted a survey of customers of retail chains 
that offer Fair Trade products. We developed and tested a structural model ac-
cording to which consumer opinions about the retailer’s ethical attitudes are re-
lated to the trust the consumers feel toward the Fair Trade products sold by that 
retailer. The consumer trust, in turn, is related to brand loyalty and a willingness 
Chapter 3   |   99  
  
to pay a premium price. The results of the survey, consistent with our hypothe-
sized model, support the supposition that socially oriented companies can suc-
cessfully leverage their reputation in those business areas where trust is crucial 
in determining consumer choices. 
2. CSR and the market 
The concept of CSR can be seen as the result of two parallel paths: one is aca-
demic research, where over the years CSR has evolved from a vague awareness of 
the involvement of companies in a network of social relations to the identifica-
tion of more detailed management tools; the other encompasses the efforts of 
policy makers and various stakeholder representatives to spread the idea of so-
cially responsible behaviour (Crane, Matten, & Spence, 2008). For example, in 
2001 the European Commission published a Green Paper (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001) which defined CSR as “a concept whereby com-
panies integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations 
on a voluntary basis.” 
On the academic front, a seminal contribution was provided by Bowen 
(1953), who focused on ‘businessmen’ and emphasized that they were responsi-
ble for their actions in a sphere wider than that the mere profit-and-loss account. 
Several approaches have emerged over the years, with the concept of social re-
sponsibility being defined in varied ways by different schools of managerial 
thought. In most of these definitions, the concept that social responsibility has to 
do with stakeholders (Freeman, 1984) has always been at the forefront. Another 
concept almost universally accepted is that social responsibility involves a re-
sponse to needs defined outside (but not necessarily without the participation) of 
the business. Many can easily agree with Wood’s (1991: 693) definition of Corpo-
rate Social Performance (CSP) as “a business organization’s configuration of 
principles of social responsibility, processes of social responsiveness, and poli-
cies, programs, and observable outcomes as they relate to the firm’s societal rela-
tionships.” 
Donaldson and Preston (1995: 67) argued that the basis for the social re-
sponsibility of companies is essentially normative: “The interests of all stake-
holders are of intrinsic value. That is, each group of stakeholders merits consid-
eration for its own sake and not merely because of its ability to further the inter-
ests of some other group, such as the shareowners.” At the same time, there is a 
widespread belief in the literature that satisfying the needs of stakeholder groups 
should bring financial benefits to a socially responsible company, at least in the 
long term. The general rationale for this idea is that when stakeholders observe a 
firm’s socially responsible behaviour, they will consider that firm a preferred par-
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ty to have transactions with. On the revenue side, this means that the socially re-
sponsible firm should attract and retain customers or be able to charge premium 
prices for its products (Barnett, 2007).  
While this rationale is rarely disputed, the confirming evidence is limited, 
especially when consumers are studied in the field. An oft-quoted contribution is 
that by Brown & Dacin (1997), who studied the effect of corporate associations 
on consumer response to new products. The results supported the idea that what 
consumers think about a company does influence their beliefs and attitudes to-
ward the products of that company. At the same time, the study demonstrated 
that corporate ability associations (that is, consumer opinions about a company’s 
ability to produce good products) had stronger effects than did corporate social 
responsibility associations (that is, a company’s perceived response to social ob-
ligations). Moreover, this second category of associations influenced consumer 
evaluations only indirectly, by way of the overall evaluations of a corporation, 
and then these evaluations were shown to influence consumer beliefs about the 
products. 
Brown and Dacin also found that social responsibility works more like an 
insurance policy than like a source of product differentiation: positive social re-
sponsibility associations had a modest influence on product evaluations, while 
negative ones seemed to have more substantial consequences. This result points 
to a ‘license-to-operate’ model, where companies engage in CSR activities to 
avoid social penalties and not to build brand image or other useful market at-
tributes (Porter & Kramer, 2006). 
Subsequent contributions have offered mixed results. There are a number 
of studies in which consumers claimed to be ready to pay higher prices for prod-
ucts coming from socially responsible companies, or to take the social responsi-
bility profile of the producer into consideration when comparing different brands 
(Ellen, Mohr, & Webb, 2000; Mohr, Webb, & Morris, 2001; Carvalho et al., 
2010; Olsen, Slotegraaf, & Chandukala, 2014). But these studies did not try to 
relate consumer perceptions to actual purchasing. Social responsibility typically 
gives rise to an ‘attitude–behaviour gap’: consumers like to express willingness to 
make ethical purchases, but social responsibility may not be an effective criterion 
when they actually go shopping (Boulstridge & Carrigan, 2000). 
Yet other studies reported explicit declarations by consumers that social 
responsibility is not a factor in their purchasing decisions. In a focus group led by 
Carrigan & Attalla (2001), most of the participants said that, while they were 
aware that Nike had a bad ethical record, they would still buy Nike shoes. Castal-
do & Perrini (2004), who conducted a survey on a sample of college students, ob-
tained a similar result. They found that student opinions on the social perfor-
mance of Nike correlated poorly with measures of brand loyalty and willingness 
to pay premium prices for Nike apparel. The only social dimension that influ-
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enced the respondents was the ‘consumer’ one: the questionnaire items included 
in this dimension were related to consumer rights and needs, and the voluntary 
protection of consumer interests by the company. 
Even when consumers consider ethics, they are more likely to value issues 
that directly affect themselves: a company’s fairness in market behaviour is more 
valued than its fairness toward other stakeholders. Page & Fearn (2005) reported 
that the vast majority of the respondents in their study agreed that companies 
must behave in an ethical manner, but they endorsed the statement that “it’s up 
to companies to find ways to produce goods in a responsible way without in-
creasing prices.” Consumers may also fear that a company’s prices include a 
mark-up to finance CSR engagement, leading to negative customer attitudes or 
reduced loyalty (Habel et al., 2016) 
Given these results, the sceptical remarks of many authors are unsurpris-
ing: “There may be very little commercial reward in terms of consumer purchas-
ing to be gained by behaving as an ethical maker” (Carrigan & Attalla, 2001: 571); 
“Evidence to suggest that a significant proportion of consumers will pay more for 
CSR is scant” (Smith, 2003: 62);3 “Studies of the effect of a company’s social 
reputation on consumer purchasing preferences… have been inconclusive at 
best” (Porter & Kramer, 2006: 83). 
However, these results must be reconciled with those of many well-known 
companies that have been able to differentiate their products by means of ethical 
associations. Body Shop, Ben & Jerry’s, and Whole Foods are only some of many 
obvious examples. In all these success stories the products not only contain de-
sirable social attributes (such as natural ingredients or ethical sourcing), but the 
companies themselves seem to have been building a brilliant reputation for being 
good to their stakeholders. The coincidence of these elements seems significant. 
We suggest that, while there is no reason to expect that CSR per se will give 
companies a market lead, a positive corporate social reputation can be leveraged 
to market products that embody ethical and social values. These products will 
primarily appeal to consumers interested in specific issues or who are particular-
ly sensitive to ethical aspects of purchasing (Vitell, 2003). For these products, 
CSR can be a source of competitive advantage, because competitors with bad so-
cial reputations will be unable to replicate the success of the leader. Even when 
they can replicate the products, the bad social reputation will make it difficult for 
                                                        
3 Recent research has shown that consumer willingness to pay for products with sus-
tainability labels can be real and substantial; for Fair Trade in particular see Koppel & 
Schulze (2013) and Van Loo et al. (2015). However, there is still a lack of evidence 
that consumers are ready to pay more for products marketed by socially responsible 
firms in general, i.e., in absence of specific product attributes, such as the Fair Trade 
label explored in this article.  
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them to convince consumers that they will respect the ethical proposition the 
products try to convey. 
This suggestion is consistent with the framework depicted by Bhattacharya 
& Sen (2004), who identified two key moderators of the response of consumers 
to CSR: 
– individual consumer-specific factors (such as support for CSR issues, or 
demand for given product social attributes); 
– company-specific factors (such as the specific CSR issues a company fo-
cuses on). 
In the following pages, we apply this idea to Fair Trade products sold by 
mainstream retail chains. These products are addressed to ethically conscious 
consumers, especially those sensitive to Third World needs (Doherty et al., 
2013). Here it is possible to separate the product attributes (which pertain to 
original producers or to the ‘Fair Trade’ label) from the seller attributes (which 
pertains to social reputation of the retailer). Even retail chains that lack a tradi-
tion of social responsibility have entered the market of the ethical labels. Fair 
Trade is a prominent example, but other labels are subsuming this ‘mainstream-
ing’ trend: eco-labels, organic food labels, forest certification labels, marine certi-
fication labels, antislavery labels, and so on. The implication is that relevant cus-
tomers will tend to trust retailers that have a reputation for ethical conduct more 
than they trust other retailers. However, we do not expect that CSR alone will 
make this happen: based on the consumer studies mentioned above, our pro-
posal is that specific corporate attitudes toward consumers will be required to 
reassure them that the implicit promise included in ethical labels will be kept. 
3. Fair trade and trust 
According to World Fair Trade Organization, Fairtrade International, & FLO-
CERT (2011), Fair Trade is “a trading partnership, based on dialogue, transpar-
ency and respect, that seeks greater equity in international trade. It contributes 
to sustainable development by offering better trading conditions to, and securing 
the rights of, marginalized producers and workers – especially in developing 
countries.” The origins of the Fair Trade concept were related to the development 
of cooperative organizations in the second half of the nineteenth century. In its 
modern form, Fair Trade began to grow and become a real movement during the 
sixties and seventies (Moore, 2004). Then Fair Trade became part of a wider and 
complex ethical consumer movement that demanded socially and environmen-
tally sustainable production processes (Low & Davenport, 2006; Hira & Ferrie, 
2006). 
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Fair Trade is a system of voluntary certification and labelling of products 
obtained according to a harmonized set of standards covering production and 
trade in a range of agricultural or other products. The responsibility for applying 
these standards falls on importers buying the products from the original growers 
or producers. The standards include (Jaffee, 2014): 
– a minimum price for producers and a ‘Fair Trade premium’ to be set an-
nually; 
– social premiums to fund development projects; 
– partial advance payments to finance small producers; 
– long-term contracts with predefined minimal prices; 
– producers participating in democratic cooperatives; 
– sustainable environmental practices by producers. 
Products obtained according to these standards are called ‘Fair Trade 
products’ and receive a Fair Trade label (which may vary from country to coun-
try), which identifies them for concerned consumers. Fair Trade is considered 
one of the best examples of how the economy can be based upon solidarity and 
sustainability (Ims & Jakobsen, 2006). 
Certified importers exist in Australia, Canada, Europe, Japan, and the US. 
Labelling organizations are generally broad coalitions of organizations (NGOs, 
church organizations, trade unions, and so on) that promote the label and the 
sale of labelled products. The labelling organizations administer a register of 
monitored producer groups, a set of criteria for conducting Fair Trade business, 
independent audits, and a social label to distinguish Fair Trade products from 
others. Since 1997, Fairtrade Labelling Organizations International (FLO), a con-
sortium of Fair Trade groups in Japan, Canada, the US, and seventeen European 
countries, have coordinated most Fair Trade labelling. FLO has introduced a 
common label to be applied in all countries. However, different initiatives and 
labelling schemes still exist at the local/national level. 
Typical Fair Trade products are bananas, coffee, tea, cocoa, and other 
goods produced in developing countries. Fair Trade products are distributed 
through a variety of channels: Fair Trade shops, retail chains, and mail order, in-
cluding online retailing. In addition, there are other channels such as direct de-
livery, solidarity groups, wholesale, organic shops, and institutional outlets (can-
teens, public authority offices, etc.). According to Fairtrade International & 
FLOCERT (2014), there are over 1.5 million farmers and workers in certified 
producer organizations (62% of them in Africa and Middle East); generated sales 
for producers amount to about 1 billion €. 
The Fair Trade concept appeals to consumers’ social conscience. The price 
of Fair Trade products is usually higher than that of comparable ‘unfair’ rivals. 
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Clients are effectively asked to pay a premium price to contribute to an allegedly 
worthy social cause. In exchange, Fair Trade importers tell the consumers that 
their purchase will help finance a more equitable way of doing business. 
In Europe, the retail industry is a very active player in the Fair Trade mar-
ket. Many retailers offer a wide range of Fair Trade products, and most major re-
tail chains have developed a range of private-label Fair Trade lines by dealing 
with Alternative Trading Organizations (ATOs) or directly with producers. The 
retailer’s label is usually combined with the label of one or more Fair Trade label-
ling organizations. While it is difficult to obtain comparative data about the 
turnover of private-label versus independent Fair Trade products, anedoctical 
evidence suggests that private labels have been gradually become dominant. Co-
op, the leading Italian retail chain, stated that its private-label lines alone ac-
counted for 10 percent of the total turnover of Fair Trade products in the whole 
country, at the time when the study reported in this article was conducted (Coop, 
2005). Although private labels are typically used to sell products at a lower price, 
private-label Fair Trade products are usually expensive. In this case, differentia-
tion and image building seem to be the main motivations driving the policies of 
retailers. 
A flaw of the Fair Trade concept is that consumers cannot assess whether 
the fair conditions claimed by the importers or the final marketers are respected. 
Gebben & Gitsham (2007) reported that only 42 percent of people who endorse 
the Fair Trade concept were actually buying Fair Trade products. The most fre-
quent reason offered by respondents for their inaction was the high price of the 
products; the second most frequent was ignorance of how and whether the Fair 
Trade system works: “I don’t know enough about it” was a typical justification. 
‘Fairness’ is simply not an attribute that consumers can check in the prod-
uct. Actually, Fair Trade products are not easily distinguishable from their com-
petitors aside from their label. Moreover, while in Europe organic food is sub-
jected to an official process of certification, no such recognized process exists for 
Fair Trade. FLO and the other labelling organizations try to present themselves 
as a trustworthy guarantee that labelled products respect the Fair Trade concept 
(Goodman, 2004). However, none of these organizations has achieved much 
recognition until now. 
Consumers are also concerned that importers and final marketers keep for 
themselves most of the price differential, instead of giving it to producers (Har-
ford, 2005). This situation leads to an information asymmetry between the cus-
tomers and the retailers selling Fair Trade products. To pay the high price at-
tached to Fair Trade coffee or bananas, customers need to believe that the retail-
er will respect the ethical promise implicit in these product labels and will effec-
tively help Third World producers. As a rule, customers do not want to know the 
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details, but they need to be sure that retailers will do what is expected. In a word, 
they need to trust the retailer. 
Trust as a concept has gained a firm foothold in management and market-
ing research (Schoorman et al. 2007; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). It is multidimen-
sional and can be applied across different levels of analysis (inter-personal, inter-
group, or inter-organizational). Trust has been generally defined as the trustor’s 
expectation that the trustee is willing to keep promises and to fulfil obligations 
(Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). The expectation is based on the level of 
competencies, honesty, altruism, and goodwill of the trustee (Barber, 1983; 
Blomqvist, 1997). 
Many typologies of trust have been proposed in literature (Castaldo, 2007). 
They are based on single dimensions of trust (e.g. cognitive, emotional, behav-
ioural), on a variety of contents (and different drivers), on different analytical 
levels (inter-personal, inter-organizational), and on various levels of consistency 
(e.g. thick vs. thin), producing a wide range of concepts. 
Trust is especially important when the trustor is exposed to a risk. Indeed, 
trust can also be defined as the willingness to take risks, or the willingness to be 
vulnerable to another party. In any case, a typical aspect of trust is that it allows 
risk taking in a relationship (Mayer et al., 1995). Trust is considered crucial when 
there is perceived risk and other control systems are lacking (Schoorman et al., 
2007). 
We assume that trust will be central to the behavioural intentions of con-
sumers interested in buying Fair Trade products, given the asymmetry of infor-
mation they are subjected to. A first source of trust in these products will be trust 
in the Fair Trade concept in general. This trust will be nourished by information 
that consumers have about the labelling organizations, by stories they read about 
farmers participating in the Fair Trade system, by endorsements by independent 
testimonials, and other considerations. Such trust is formed at the individual 
level and will translate into a disposition to trust the single Fair Trade products 
the consumer will encounter in the marketplace. Therefore, our first hypothesis 
is: 
Hypothesis 1. Trust in the Fair Trade concept correlates positively with 
trust in Fair Trade products. 
Another source of consumer trust is the expectation that retailers are going 
to be reliable. Through their name recognition and long-term relationship with 
consumers, retailers are in the position to act as brokers of trust. This role is es-
pecially important where consumers are relatively new to Fair Trade, because 
they usually search for corporate reputation when important information about a 
particular product is missing. The role of the retailer becomes even more crucial 
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when the retailer or the retail chain puts its own label on the Fair Trade product, 
along with the name of the Fair Trade labelling organization. 
In any event, we propose that retailers with the best reputations for CSR 
will outperform their competitors at fostering customer trust in Fair Trade prod-
ucts. There are two reasons for this: 
1. Consumers should believe that a reputable retailer, one that has been 
building a positive relationship with society and is commonly appreciat-
ed as an ethical player, has strong incentives to maintain its reputation. 
Therefore we expect that they will think that such a retailer is less prob-
able to renege on promises. 
2. Socially responsible companies are more transparent, because they typi-
cally subject themselves to increased disclosure. Social and ethical ac-
counting, sustainability reports, codes of conduct, and the like are rich 
sources of information that allow the community as a whole to monitor a 
company. Therefore consumers should feel that these companies are 
more probable than competitors to fulfil their obligations. 
We expect that such positive corporate associations will be more effective 
when they include a specific record of fairness and goodwill toward consumers. 
Other positive achievements, such as respect for the environment or high-level 
labour standards, do not necessarily inspire consumer trust in products sold by 
the company. By and large, consumers may form the impression that a company, 
when it is considered ‘good,’ is good to all stakeholders, but the evidence men-
tioned above suggests that they will respond more to how a company treats them 
than to how it treats other stakeholders. 
This leads us to our second hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2. Consumer perceptions that a retailer is sensitive to consum-
er rights and needs correlate positively with trust in the Fair Trade products 
marketed by that retailer. 
Finally, we assume that consumer trust in a product influences consumer 
behavioural intentions. First, we expect trust to translate into an intention to buy 
the product. This should produce brand loyalty. We follow the standard defini-
tion of brand loyalty as “the tendency to be loyal to a focal brand, which is 
demonstrated by the intention to buy the brand as a primary choice” (Yoo & 
Donthu, 2001). 
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Hypothesis 3. Consumer trust in the Fair Trade products marketed by a 
retailer correlates positively with loyalty to and continued purchase of these 
products. 
Second, we expect that trust reassures consumers that the high price paid 
for these products will actually help producers in the Third World. This reassur-
ance should lead to a willingness to pay the required premium price. 
Hypothesis 4. Consumer trust in the Fair Trade products marketed by a 
retailer correlates positively with a willingness to pay a premium price for 
these products. 
4. Methods 
4.1. Samples and procedures 
We conducted our study by interviewing retail chain customers in two Italian cit-
ies (Milan and Florence) between May and June 2005. In Italy, many consumers 
were interested in Fair Trade. In 2005, they spent 1.7 € per capita in Fair Trade 
products. This was much less than the amount spent by the Swiss, the European 
leader (18 € per capita) but more than the amount spent in such major European 
economies as France (1.3 € per capita) and Germany (0.9 € per capita). Retail 
chains accounted for about 45 percent of the turnover of Fair Trade products in 
Italy. The Fair Trade network was administered by an independent organization 
(Consorzio Transfair Italia), which certified 120 different products (Barbetta, 
2006). 
Both Milan and Florence were large cities where the largest Italian retail 
chains were present with many points of sale. Interviews were collected by 
means of the Computer-aided telephone interviews (CATI) method. Interviewers 
verified that respondents knew Fair Trade and could identify examples of the 
names used in Italy (Fair Trade, Transfair, CTM Altromercato, Commercio Equo 
e Solidale) or the associated logos. Respondents who failed this test were not in-
terviewed. Four hundred valid surveys were collected (217 in Milan, 183 in Flor-
ence). Each survey took about 8–10 min to complete. The mean age of the sam-
ple was 43.1 years; 83.5% were females. Within the sample, 13.8 were house-
wives, 48.1% were employees, 14.9% were self-employed employees, 4.0% were 
students, 11.5% were retirees, 2.0% were jobless, and 5.7% comprised other cate-
gories. 
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4.2. Measures 
To measure consumer perceptions of the CSR performance of the retailers, we 
used a scale tested in the already-mentioned study conducted by Castaldo & Per-
rini (2004). Their questionnaire, which included 40 items, tried to cover all the 
main stakeholder issues involved in a company’s operations. An explanatory fac-
tor analysis was conducted on the indicators, which revealed three major dimen-
sions in the public perception that a company is more or less CSR oriented: 
– the environmental dimension (how much a company is considered sen-
sitive to ecological issues); 
– the consumer dimension (how much a company tries to satisfy consum-
er needs and protects their rights and interests); 
– the employee dimension (how much a company guarantees equality of 
economic treatment, avoids social discrimination, practices health and 
safety policies, etc.). 
In accordance with hypothesis 2, which focuses on perceptions that a re-
tailer is sensitive to consumers’ rights and needs, we chose the three-item scale 
obtained by Castaldo and Perrini for the consumer dimension. 
To measure trust, we started from the scale proposed by Chaudhuri & 
Holbrook (2001). The scale was integrated with items derived by Wong & Sohal 
(2002) and Kennedy, Ferrel, & LeClair (2001), which are mainly based on trust 
measures originally proposed by Crosby, Evans, & Cowles (1990) and Morgan & 
Hunt (1994). This scale was used to measure trust toward Fair Trade in general 
and (with slight adaptations) to measure trust in a retailer’s private-label Fair 
Trade products. To measure brand loyalty to these same products, we used the 
three-item scale proposed by Yoo & Donthu (2001), integrated with Kennedy et 
al. (2001) items. Finally, consumer willingness to pay a premium price was 
measured through an adaptation of the Chauduri & Holbrook (2001) scale. The 
English translation of all the items used is in Table 1. 
5. Results 
5.1. Measurement evaluation 
Before testing the hypothesized structural model, we assessed the adequacy of 
the measurement model on the criteria of overall fit with the data and discrimi-
nant validity. We used confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess the quality of 
the resultant measurement model. CFA analysis was run with LISREL 8.72 
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(Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993, 2002). The measurement model had five latent vari-
ables and 15 indicators. 
TABLE 1. Measurement properties 
CONSTRUCTS ITEMS FACTOR 
LOADINGS 
1. Consumer CSR ___ satisfies consumers’ needs 
___ protects consumers’ interests 
and rights on a voluntary basis 
___ assures quality along the 
whole supply chain 
 
AVE: 65.21%. 
.71 
.87 
 
.69 
2. Trust in Fair Trade You can always count on ___ 
I trust ___  
___ is reliable 
 
AVE: 65.08%. 
.88 
.89 
.91 
 
3. Trust in retailer private-
label Fair Trade products 
You can always count on ___ 
I trust ___  
___ are reliable 
 
AVE: 80.41%. 
.92 
.89 
.93 
 
 
4. Brand loyalty ___ are always my first choice 
If ___ were not available at the 
store, I would not buy other 
brands 
I consider myself to be loyal to 
___ 
 
AVE: 82.83%. 
.90 
.68 
 
.86 
5. Willingness to pay a 
premium price 
Buying ___ seems smart to me 
even if they cost more 
I’m ready to pay a higher price for 
___  
I’d still buy ___ if other brands 
reduced their prices 
 
AVE:  66.60%. 
.80 
 
.86 
.86 
The CFA (χ2 = 148.45, df = 80, p < .01) achieved adequate fit as assessed by 
comparative fit index (CFI = .98), root mean square error of approximation 
(RMSEA = .046), and standardized root mean square residual (SRMSR = .039). 
Except for two indicators, all the items loadings were above the suggested .70 
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(Bagozzi & Baumgartner, 1994), with the exceptions of .68 and .69, respectively. 
Average variance extracted (AVE) for all constructs exceeded the recommended 
.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Results are shown in Table 1. 
Following the suggestion of Fornell & Larcker (1981), we assessed discri-
minant validity to verify that all constructs were more strongly correlated with 
their own indicators than with any of the other constructs. The most common 
test is to check whether the confidence interval around the correlation between 
any two latent constructs does not include 1. Of the 10 cases tested, none of the 
confidence intervals reaches 1. The correlation matrix of the constructs is shown 
in Table 2, along with descriptive statistics. 
TABLE 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Consumer CSR 5.71 1.04 (.80)     
2. Trust in Fair Trade 5.18 1.40 .49 (.92)    
3. Trust in retailer private-label Fair 
Trade products 
5.32 1.37 .49 .84* (.93)   
4. Brand loyalty 3.59 1.70 .28 .50 .66 (.85)  
5. Willingness to pay a premium price 4.71 1.73 .38 .64 .73* .74* (.86) 
n = 400. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are on the diagonal in parentheses 
* p ≤ .05 
** p ≤ .01 
The high correlations that existed among some of the constructs raised 
some concerns about the extent to which interviewees make clear distinction be-
tween trust in Fair Trade as a concept and Fair Trade products sold by the retail-
er. Therefore, we used the more conservative test of discriminant validity pro-
posed by Bagozzi, Yi, & Phillips (1991). In this procedure, each pair of constructs 
is set up as a model with the correlation between the constructs set to 1 (con-
strained model) and then compared with the model without the correlation fixed 
(unconstrained model). The procedure involves comparing the chi-square values 
of the models and testing whether the constraints cause a significant decrease in 
fit. The fit of the unconstrained model should be significantly better than the 
constrained one to satisfy the discriminant validity criterion. 
For all the pairs of the model, the chi-square of the unconstrained model 
was significantly lower than that of the constrained model (difference ranges 
from 53.07 to 465.65). Therefore, we concluded that the measurement model fits 
the data well and achieves discriminant validity. 
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5.2. Hypotheses testing 
In our baseline model, we specified paths between the intermediate variables in 
conformity with the four hypotheses to be tested. Structural equation modelling 
(SEM) was applied to the model (again, LISREL 8.72 was used to run the analy-
sis). Residuals were allowed to correlate. As Table 3 shows, all fit indexes of our 
baseline model emerged as good (χ2 = 155.24, df = 83, p < .01). 
TABLE 3. Comparisons of Structural Equation models 
Model χ2 df Δ χ2 RMSEA GFI SRMSR PNFI 
1. Hypothesized model. 155.24** 83  .052 .94 .047 .76 
2. ‘Consumer CSR’  ‘Trust 
in Fair Trade,’ instead of 
‘Consumer CSR’  ‘Trust 
in retailer private-label 
Fair Trade products.’ 
161.12** 84 5.88 .053 .94 .055 .77 
3. ‘Brand loyalty’ and ‘Con-
sumer CSR’ exchange 
places; ‘Trust in Fair 
Trade’ and ‘Premium 
price’ change places. 
163.50** 83 8.26 .055 .94 .055 .76 
4. ‘Trust in Fair Trade’ and 
‘Trust in retailer private-
label Fair Trade products’ 
exchange places. 
432.25** 83 277.01 .114 .85 .160 .72 
5. ‘Trust in Fair Trade’  
‘Brand loyalty’ instead of 
‘Trust in retailer private-
label Fair Trade products’ 
 ‘Brand loyalty’; ‘Trust 
in Fair Trade’  ‘Premi-
um Price’ instead of ‘Trust 
in retailer private-label 
Fair Trade products’  
‘Premium price’;  ‘Con-
sumer CSR’  ‘Brand loy-
alty,’ instead of ‘Consumer 
CSR’  ‘Trust in retailer 
private-label Fair Trade 
products.’ 
437.38** 83 282.14 .114 .85 .160 .72 
RMSEA is an index of absolute fit that takes into account the error of ap-
proximation in the population; usually, values less than .08 are considered a fair 
fit (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). RMSEA of our baseline model was .052. 
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Goodness-of-fit index (GFI) measures how much the actual input matrix is 
predicted by the estimated model. Usually, values above .80 indicate reasonable 
model fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). The GFI of our baseline model was .94. 
SRMSR (Standardized RMSR index) is another typical index of absolute fit. 
Byrne (1998) suggests that this value should be smaller than .05. The SRMSR of 
our baseline model was .047. 
CFI assesses which of two or more competing models provides a better fit 
to the data. Values above .95 indicate a good fit (Bentler, 1992). The CFI of our 
baseline model was .98. 
Parsimonious normed fit index (PNFI) is concerned with the trade-off be-
tween the model fit and the degrees of freedom. PNFI is also used to compare 
competing models. There are no standard high or low values to indicate accepta-
ble parsimonious fit. In our baseline model, PNFI was .76. 
The baseline model provides strong support for our hypotheses (see Figure 
1). 
FIGURE 1. Hypothesized structural model 
 
Standardized estimates are shown. n = 400.  
* p ≤ .05 
** p ≤ .01 
In accordance with hypotheses 1 and 2, consumer trust in Fair Trade in 
general and consumer perceptions of a retailer’s CSR performance (toward con-
sumers) both positively and significantly correlate with trust toward retailer pri-
vate-label Fair Trade products (βs = .39 and .19, respectively; p ≤ .05). This re-
sult suggests that the reputation of a retailer for respecting the rights of consum-
ers and satisfying their needs positively adds to the trust of consumer toward 
Fair Trade products. 
Trust in Fair 
Trade 
Trust in retailer 
private-label 
Fair Trade 
products  
Willingness to 
pay a 
premium price 
Consumer 
CSR 
Brand 
loyalty .19* .68* 
.39* 
.77* 
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In accordance with hypotheses 3 and 4, trust toward retailer private-label 
Fair Trade products was positively and significantly related to brand loyalty to 
these products and to consumer willingness to pay a premium price (βs = .69 and 
.77, respectively; p ≤  .05). The results point to a readiness of concerned consum-
ers to reward Fair Trade products by paying higher prices and being loyal. 
Finally, to verify that alternative models do not provide a better fit to data, 
we tested four more structural models. Table 3 describes the models and reports 
the fit indexes of these models as well as the chi-square differences. The results 
show that, while the alternative models have a more or less acceptable fit with 
the data, the baseline model remains superior in both the χ2 and the fit indexes. 
In summary, we retained our baseline model and concluded that the results 
provide adequate support for our hypotheses 1, 2, 3, and 4. 
6. Discussion 
6.1. Findings 
The purpose of this research was to study how consumer perceptions that a com-
pany is socially responsible translate into intentions to buy products marketed by 
that company. While theory suggests that socially responsible companies should 
have a competitive advantage in the marketplace, specific empirical support is 
limited. Many factors can influence how a company’s CSR activities translate into 
consumer purchases. Both company-level and individual-level moderators are 
probably involved (Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001; Schuler & Cording, 2006). We de-
veloped arguments that suggest that outcomes also depend on the type of prod-
uct the company is marketing. We argued that when the dominant attributes of 
the product are quality, convenience, and the like, customers will not attach 
much weight to the company’s CSR profile. In this case, the only CSR associa-
tions expected to have an impact are negative; for example, when the social repu-
tation of a company is tarnished by communication crises. But when the prod-
ucts sold by the company embody ethical or social values, positive corporate CSR 
associations come into play. Consumers will trust companies with strong reputa-
tions to deliver on the implicit promise of these products. Consumers will be es-
pecially attentive to a company’s reputation for respecting and caring about 
them. 
To test this idea, we studied Fair Trade products sold by Italian retail 
chains with their own private label. Usually, consumers cannot verify that Fair 
Trade products are obtained according to the ‘fair’ terms alleged by the label 
(price paid to producers, workers’ rights, and so on). In general, when infor-
mation pertinent to valuing the relevant good or service is unevenly distributed 
between the parties, trust becomes an important variable. Fair Trade certifica-
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tion and labelling organizations can act as trust mediators, but we argued that 
retailers also have a role to play. Our main hypothesis was that consumers who 
believe that a retailer is committed to respecting consumers’ rights and to volun-
tarily satisfying their needs are more likely to trust the Fair Trade products mar-
keted by that retailer under its own private label. We surveyed Italian customers 
interested in buying Fair Trade products and the results confirmed our hypothe-
ses. We also showed that consumer trust of Fair Trade products translates into 
brand loyalty and a willingness to pay a premium price. 
6.2. Limitations 
Like all empirical research, our study is limited in several ways. First, our con-
structs relied on consumer perceptions. We did not discriminate between com-
panies that are actually socially oriented and those that convincingly pretend to 
be. This is a problem in many studies on CSR, because consumers and other 
stakeholders cannot always know what happens behind the corporate walls. 
Therefore, it is possible that consumer perceptions are distorted by contextual 
factors that are difficult to measure. 
Second, our data referred to a single industry (retailing) and to a single cat-
egory of products (Fair Trade products): it is legitimate to ask whether the same 
results hold in other business environments. 
Third, the technique we used to collect interviews (CATI) raises questions 
about whether interviewees were able and willing to articulate their actual pref-
erences. Even though the questionnaire was designed to check for the consisten-
cy of the answers, individuals may be systematically biased toward verbally ex-
pressing ‘pro-social’ attitudes. Experimental settings may provide an interesting 
means by which to overcome the ‘attitude-behaviour gap’ we described above, 
although in this case there are problems relevant to external validity (Hiscox & 
Smyth, 2007). 
Fourth, we conducted our survey among consumers who knew about Fair 
Trade products. It is therefore possible that they shared a special interest in 
Third World issues; there is no guarantee that the sample represents the broader 
public interested in social causes. 
Fifth, our data were collected in Italy, so it is questionable whether our 
findings apply to other countries. 
In summary, our study was a first step toward a new avenue of research 
about the interplay between trust, CSR, and consumer behaviour. Further stud-
ies are needed to ascertain that our conclusions did not depend on national, in-
dustry, and other contextual factors involved in the particular case we examined. 
At the same time, we believe that we proved that this avenue of research was a 
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promising way to investigate the complex relationships between a company and 
its stakeholders. 
6.3. Implications and conclusions 
Even with the above limitations, our results yielded several conclusions. The 
most important was that social reputations vary. It is often said that CSR leads to 
better relationships with a variety of stakeholders (Barnett, 2007), but our study 
suggests that each particular category of stakeholder will be sensitive to different 
aspects of the CSR policies of the same company. A reputation for environmental 
concern does not always imply a reputation for being responsive to consumers. 
Our results also suggested that trust can account for the success (or the 
failure) of a socially responsible company in the marketplace. In particular, so-
cially oriented companies can achieve competitive advantage in those areas 
where trust is crucial in determining consumer choices, provided that the com-
panies have the social reputation expected to accompany it (in this case, a repu-
tation for respecting consumers’ rights and for satisfying their needs). 
Our findings indicated that investment in social reputation (of any kind) 
must be complemented by investments in product lines where a company’s spe-
cific kind of social reputation is relevant and appreciated by the particular stake-
holders involved. The findings supported the hypothesis that retailers could lev-
erage their social reputation, based on greater attention to consumer needs, 
when they sell Fair Trade products or other trust-intensive products. Other so-
cially labelled products such as organic food (Zadek et al., 1998) could be sub-
jected to the same strategy. 
The role of retailers as a driving force in the CSR field warrants special 
mention, in that their intermediate positions between manufacturing companies 
and consumers frequently enable them to influence the decisions of both parties 
(Tencati, 2002). Retailers are often well positioned to create new relationship 
forms in distribution channels. In particular, more sustainable patterns of con-
sumption and production seem to require innovation instead of traditional ap-
proaches based on competition and zero- or even negative-sum games. Retailers 
can support cooperation and collaborative networks because of their crucial posi-
tion in the supply chain, if they are committed to sustainability principles and 
actively cooperate with the other players. 
Finally, our study confirmed the suggestions by other authors (Schuler and 
Cording, 2006) that searching for a direct link between CSR performance and 
financial performance may be impossible. Several contingencies are likely to in-
tervene (Waddock & Graves, 1997). We proved that trust plays a significant role 
as a mediating variable. This result is consistent with the findings reported in the 
meta-analytic study of Orlitzky et al. (2003), who suggest that reputation is an 
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important general mediator in the CSP–CFP (Corporate Financial Performance) 
relationship. Whether the same role characterizes other intangible assets such as 
image, brand-equity, and the other concepts developed in the marketing litera-
ture is yet to be studied.4 
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Chapter 4 
The Impact of Corporate Social 
Responsibility Associations on Trust in 
Organic Products Marketed by Mainstream 
Retailers: a Study of Italian Consumers1 
1. Introduction 
The market for organic products is still a niche but consumer interest is increas-
ing. FIBL & IFOAN (2016) report that 43.7 million hectares of farmland were 
cultivated according to organic standards at the end of 2014 (an increase of 11.5 
million hectares compared to 2007) and that international sales of organic prod-
ucts climbed to 60.7 billion euros in the same year (an increase of almost 27 bil-
lion euros compared to 2007). Consumer demand for organic products is con-
centrated in Europe and North America, which generated about 90 percent of 
the global revenues in 2014. 
Until the 1980s, organic products were sold mainly by local cooperatives or 
small specialty stores, or directly by farmers. When the consumer demand rose, 
the retailers specializing in organics expanded their operations, adopting large-
scale distribution structures. At the same time, mainstream retailer interest in 
this new niche market translated into patronage. During the 1990s, major gro-
cery retail chains began to sell organic products – especially fruit, vegetables, 
meat and dairy foods (Jonas & Roosen, 2005). These products became widely 
available in supermarkets and hypermarkets both in leading European countries 
(Germany, France, Italy and the UK, which collectively contribute more than two 
thirds percent of the organic revenues from Europe) and in North America, 
where large retailers such as Wal-Mart or Subway began to offer, gradually at 
first, a diverse range of organics (Sahota, 2008). As customers began to notice                                                         
1 Co-authored with Francesco Perrini (Bocconi University), Sandro Castaldo (Bocconi 
University), and Antonio Tencati (Università degli Studi di Brescia). A version of this 
article was published on Business Strategy and the Environment, vol. 19, pp. 512–
526, 2010. This updated version has been slightly edited to reflect new research that 
appeared after publication. 
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them in supermarkets and hypermarkets, retailers diversified further by adding 
private-label products to their inventory, increasing consumption by adding 
competitive prices among these products (Bentley, 2009). Many of these private 
labels are now marketed under group names, such as ‘O Organics’ by Safeway in 
the US, ‘Grünes Land’ by Metro in Germany or ‘Bio-logici’ by Coop in Italy. 
The entry of mainstream retailers into an initially exclusive niche aroused 
an unanticipated amount of antagonism. Although some supporters of organic 
products think that popular mainstream retailers benefit the market by adding 
value, diversifying the consumer pool and attracting more farmers to organic 
methods, others fear that such proliferation will lower market standards by com-
promising the requirements that qualify a product as organic, bringing sub-
standard producers into the market or pressuring existing organic farmers to 
lower prices and thus to lower their standards (Warner, 2005, 2006). Critics 
were especially suspicious of mainstream retailers not previously known for their 
‘green conscience’ or other social awareness. For example, when Wal-Mart dou-
bled its organic inventory in 2006, farmers and environmentalists criticized the 
prospective ‘corporatization’ of organic food (Gogoi, 2006). 
Grounding these fears in part is consumers’ inability to ascertain that a 
product is organic – that it is farmed and processed according to the organic 
standards. Consumers cannot directly verify that pesticides or other synthetic 
inputs have not been used in the organics they purchase (McDonald & Oates, 
2006). For this reason, it is generally agreed that ‘organic’ is a credence attribute, 
the type of attribute that consumers cannot detect even after consumption 
(Karstens & Belz, 2006; Nuttavuthisit & Thøgersen, 2016). When a product is 
characterized by credence attributes, the consumers must rely on the producer, 
the seller or independent third parties for information about these attributes. In 
the case of organic products, the most important guarantee that they are actually 
obtained according to the expected standards is the organic label that accompa-
nies the product and indicates that the producer has been certified (IFOAM, 
2016). The certification process involves inspection of producer compliance with 
the relevant guidelines. Different organic labels are used worldwide as guaran-
tees – EU’s ‘Organic Farming’ and ‘USDA Organic’ in the US, for example. 
Organic labels fall under the larger category of ‘ethical’ or ‘sustainable’ la-
bels, all of which indicate that a product possesses certain socially or environ-
mentally desirable traits that consumers seek but cannot verify directly (Grunert, 
Hieke, & Wills, 2014). The labels supported by such third-party certifications 
transform the credence attribute into a quasi-search attribute and, therefore, are 
an important tool to avoid information asymmetries concerning environmental 
products, fair trade products and other products with socially desirable traits 
(Sammer & Wüstenhagen, 2006). However, labels must be noticed, understood, 
trusted and valued before consumers can use them in their decision-making pro-
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cesses. While many ethical labels have earned wide popularity, not all of them 
have reached out widely or effectively enough. To our knowledge, there has been 
no large-scale study of the impact of organic labels on consumers but, in a relat-
ed case, a 2006 study in the European Union on Flower eco-label products re-
vealed that only 11 percent of 24 000 respondents in 25 member states correctly 
recognized the label as standing for ecological products and services; another 41 
percent associated it with ‘green energy’, ‘safe products’ or other inaccuracies; 
finally, 48 percent were entirely ignorant of the meaning of the label (Commis-
sion of the European Communities, 2007). 
Such incomplete consumer awareness of ethical labels implied that addi-
tional devices, such as the brand names of the producer or the retailer, might be 
useful to widen the market for organic products. Focusing on retailers, we argue 
that corporate social responsibility (CSR) associations – that is, the associations 
that consumers hold on the activities of a firm with respect to its perceived socie-
tal obligations (Brown & Dacin, 1997) – are important determinants of consumer 
trust in the organics sold by a retailer under its own private label. 
While the literature has explored many ways in which CSR influences con-
sumers (Luo & Bhattacharya, 2006), the relationship between CSR and consum-
er trust is a relatively recent research focus. Pivato, Misani, & Tencati (2008) 
have shown that CSR activities can create consumer trust. Castaldo, Perrini, Mis-
ani, & Tencati (2009) investigated the link of consumer perception that a firm is 
socially oriented with consumer intention to buy that firm’s products. The pre-
sent study related the interaction between consumer trust in organic products 
and trust in a retailer’s private-label products and then demonstrated how CSR 
associations can influence both categories of trust. To this end, we distinguished 
two dimensions of the retailer’s CSR-related activities: the ‘consumer dimension’ 
(the retailer’s respect for consumer rights and interests), which attracts consum-
ers to trust this retailer’s products, and the ‘environmental dimension’ (the re-
tailer’s respect for the natural environment), which earns consumer trust that the 
organically labelled products on the retailer’s shelves conform to organic stand-
ards. 
To test our model, we surveyed a sample of Italian purchasers of organic 
yogurt. The purchasers were randomly selected among the customers of COOP, a 
major Italian retailer and one of the leaders of the Italian organic market. 
2. The organic food purchasers 
According to the FAO/WHO Codex Alimentarius, organic farming is ‘a holistic 
production management system, which promotes and enhances agro-ecosystem 
health, including biodiversity, biological cycles, and soil biological activity’ (FAO 
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& WHO, 2016). What distinguishes organic from ordinary farming is its avoid-
ance of synthetic inputs (pesticides, synthetic fertilizers, veterinary drugs, genet-
ically modified seeds and breeds, additives etc.) and its practices that preserve 
soil fertility and eliminate pests and diseases. 
The literature (Pedersen & Neergaard, 2006; Onyango, Hallman, & Bel-
lows, 2007) indicates that purchasers of organic food are relatively young, high 
income and well educated, that they are women more often than men and that 
they have children. Organic farming responds to some frequent concerns about 
food production, also as a consequence of recent food-scares (Hamzaoui Essous-
si & Zahaf, 2008). Two kinds of expected benefit motivate the purchase of organ-
ic food (Bellows, Onyango, Diamond, & Hallman, 2008; Kareklas, Carlson, & 
Muehling, 2014): 
– private benefits – organic food is believed to be more health-promoting, 
safer, better tasting, and richer in nutrients than conventional food; 
– public benefits – organic food is believed to be better for the environ-
ment and animal welfare than conventional food. 
Surveys reveal a gap between how many consumers are interested in buy-
ing organic products and how many buy them. Bellows et al. (2008) reported 
that only 27% of those who claimed to prefer organic production methods actual-
ly bought organic. This attitude–behaviour gap may be attributable in part to a 
motivation to appear conscientious and aware (the so-called ‘social desirability 
bias’: Fisher, 1993), distorting responses to ‘normative’ questions that refer to 
‘ethical’ purchases. Gaps between the professed beliefs of consumers and their 
actual behaviours have often been found in surveys about green consumption in 
general (Pickett-Baker & Ozaki, 2008). Bonini & Oppenheim (2008) reported on 
a McKinsey survey that found that 87% of consumers worry about the environ-
mental and social impacts of their purchases, but only 33% buy green products. 
Yet other transaction barriers deter even consumers seriously interested in 
buying organic food (Tsakiridou, Boutsouki, Zotos, & Mattas, 2008): 
1. The premium price of organics, attributable to the high production 
costs and the relatively inefficient distribution chain that characterize 
the organic farming system (Kihlberg & Risvik, 2007). 
2. The limited availability of organics on the market, attributable not only 
to limited production but also to the relatively sparse distribution even 
in the most advanced countries, where organics are less common than 
their traditional counterparts in quantity, variants and number of out-
lets (Lea & Worsley, 2005). 
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3. Uncertainties about the enforcement of organic standards, which lead 
some consumers to doubt sellers’ claims that products are organic, to 
wonder whether ‘organic’ labels are authentic, or to doubt various claims 
made for organic products (Padel & Foster, 2005). 
To enter the organic market, mainstream retail chains worked to lower the 
first two barriers. Through economies of scale in the procurement and in distri-
bution processes, these chains lowered the price of organics to a level that, while 
still premium, is accessible to many more consumers than the limited group that 
is willing to pay hefty prices. The vast networks of retail chains, conveniently lo-
cated in the major urban areas, have extended the reach of organics to all con-
sumers each time they go food shopping. 
Less clear is the capacity of retail chains to lower the third barrier. Main-
stream retailers can be accused of greed, of exploiting organic products as a lu-
crative niche for high-end consumers and therefore lacking the motivation to ac-
curately enforce organic standards. This credibility gap combines with an infor-
mation gap that benefits the retailer, because consumers cannot check the origin 
of organic products. 
Nelson (1970) introduced a distinction between two classes of products: 
search goods, which have characteristics that are discoverable by customers prior 
to purchase, and experience goods, which have characteristics that can be ob-
served by the customer only after purchase or consumption. Darby & Karni 
(1973) added a third class, credence goods, which have attributes that customers 
cannot detect even after purchase or consumption. Without accurate information 
about these categories, markets for credence goods turn into lemon markets 
(Akerlof, 1970): when information is partial or only partially credible, the result-
ing market is smaller than the welfare-maximizing level it could achieve through 
perfect information (Feddersen & Gilligan, 2001). 
Organic products are credence goods because consumers cannot immedi-
ately verify any of the (private or public) benefits they expect, with the possible 
exception of appetizing taste. Therefore, more credible signals are needed to 
boost consumer trust. The main signal used to guarantee the organic origin of a 
product is the organic label in its various versions or denominations across the 
world. The organic label certifies that a product has been produced, stored, pro-
cessed, handled and marketed according to a given set of technical standards. 
The label is administered by a competent body that organizes inspections to 
check product compliance with these standards. There are many such competent 
bodies worldwide, most of them private, but public schemes dominate the largest 
organic markets. In Europe, in 1991 the EU adopted the Council Regulation EEC 
2092/91 of organic methods and created the EU ‘Organic Farming’ label, which 
is administered locally by the member states. This regulation was replaced by 
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Council Regulation (EC) No 834/2007, which went into force on 1 January 2009 
together with Regulation (EC) 889/2008, which specified the rules of implemen-
tation of the label. The United States introduced a unified federal definition of 
organic methods in 2002 (which ended a state-based system of organic labels) 
and launched a ‘USDA Organic’ label, administered by the United States De-
partment of Agriculture, whose most recent guidelines for organic agriculture, 
marketing, and industry date to 2013. 
Organic labels are crucial to growth of the consumer demand but, in any 
case, they require a cognitive effort by consumers. The literature has identified a 
number of weaknesses in the current organic labelling system. One problem is 
that organic labelling, its definitions and its meanings have evolved continuously 
over the years, and as a consequence, they can confuse or frustrate many con-
sumers (Conner & Christy, 2004; Bellows et al., 2008). Another problem is that 
‘organic’ is only one of many sustainability criteria currently offered to consum-
ers. Sadowski (2007: 9) pinpointed the problem: “A recent trip to Whole Foods 
[the US specialty chain for genuine foods and beverages] found the following la-
bels: natural, organic, fair trade, locally grown, Whole TradeTM, non-GMO, MSC 
certified and Animal Compassionate”. 
A systematic survey of consumer knowledge and use of organic labels is 
still lacking, but the scant available evidence suggests that not all consumers are 
aware of organic labels. In the sample of Italian organic purchasers we surveyed 
for the present study, only 43.2% of the respondents said that they sought out the 
UE’s Organic Farming label before purchasing an organic product, and only 
19.7% were able to describe the label. In another example, a focus group reported 
on by Padel & Foster (2005), showed that English consumers are largely unfa-
miliar with such labels and know little about the organic certification system. 
The mere fact that many organic products on the market are still uncertified fur-
ther indicates that consumers do not identify organics with the label and that 
their confidence that the product is actually organic is partially built on other 
sources of trust, including word of mouth or the brand of the product. 
This incomplete effectiveness of the organic label means that both produc-
ers (in the case of branded organic food) and retailers (in the case of private-label 
organic food) can work to increase consumer confidence in the organic products. 
The scepticism of consumers will diminish if they believe that the producer or 
the retailer is able and willing to monitor its organic suppliers and ensure that 
the organic standards are respected. If, on the contrary, the producer or the re-
tailer is not considered trustworthy, the organic products it sells could encounter 
resistance from consumers. In this paper we focus on retailers. The following 
section explains why the associations held by consumers about a retailer are an 
important determinant of consumer trust in its private-label organics. 
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3. Determinants and consequences of trust 
Trust has been defined as the trustor’s expectation that the trustee is willing to 
keep promises and fulfil obligations (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). The 
concept of trust, which has acquired importance in both marketing and man-
agement research (Schoorman et al. 2007; Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012), has proved 
valuable in analysing situations where the trustor is vulnerable. Indeed, trust can 
also be defined as a willingness to be vulnerable to another party, and a typical 
aspect of trust is that it allows for risk-taking in a relationship (Mayer et al., 
1995). Therefore, trust is needed where other control systems are lacking 
(Schoorman et al., 2007). Many classifications of trust have been proposed in the 
literature. One of the most common is based on the antecedents of trust (Lewicki 
and Bunker, 1996; Child, 2001). Calculative trust is founded on economic con-
venience: The trustor believes that the trustee has a personal interest in fulfilling 
the promise, or the trustor is convinced that the trustee will want to avoid the 
diminished reputation or other costs that the trustor can inflict in case of defec-
tion (Shapiro, Sheppard, & Cheraskin, 1992). Cognitive trust is based on the trus-
tor’s specific knowledge of the traits, past behaviour or competencies of the trus-
tee (the trustor recognizes that the trustee has the ability and the predisposition 
to carry out the demanded activities in a satisfactory way). Value-based trust de-
pends on identification: the trustee recognizes values compatible with those of 
the trustor and expects that the trustor will adhere to these values; such trust 
usually develops in the more advanced stages of a relationship, when the parties 
know each other and have established a high level of interdependence (Castaldo, 
2007). 
It has also been shown that trust can be transferred from one source to an-
other (Strub & Priest, 1976). For example, a buyer may trust a salesperson be-
cause of the buyer’s positive past experience with the firm the salesperson repre-
sents; or a customer may trust a new product because of trust in its brand 
(Doney & Cannon, 1997). 
Three targets of trust exist for private-label organic products: 
– the retailer’s private label; 
– the organic products as a category; 
– the single private-label organic product. 
Multiple sources of consumer trust can exist in each of these targets, an 
important one of which is given by the CSR associations held by consumers 
about the retailer. 
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3.1. CSR & trust 
Corporate social responsibility (CSR) is defined as ‘a concept whereby companies 
integrate social and environmental concerns in their business operations and in 
their interaction with their stakeholders on a voluntary basis’ (Commission of the 
European Communities, 2001). There is a widespread belief, both in the litera-
ture and in business practice, that CSR is based not only on ethics, but also on 
enlightened self-interest (Smith, 2003; Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). The 
underlying assumption is that stakeholder perceptions of a firm’s socially re-
sponsible behaviour will result in preference of that firm over competitors, lead-
ing to its improved financial performance. Focusing on consumers, socially re-
sponsible firms should be able to develop a distinctive market image and to at-
tract and retain customers. 
Brown & Dacin (1997) introduced the concept of ‘CSR associations’, show-
ing that they impact product associations (the traits that consumers attribute to a 
product). Since then, a growing amount of research has attempted to demon-
strate that CSR affects a variety of customer-related outcomes, such as custom-
er–company identification (Sen & Bhattacharya, 2001), customer donations 
(Lichtenstein, Drumwright, & Braig, 2004), customer attitudes (Berens, van Riel, 
& van Bruggen, 2005), consumer satisfaction (Hsu, 2012), a company’s identity 
attractiveness to consumers (Marin & Ruiz, 2007) and consumer perceptions of 
the quality of products (Siegel & Vitaliano, 2007). 
There are conceptual reasons to believe that CSR can also affect consumer 
trust. Bhattacharya, Korschun, & Sen (2009) mention CSR among the factors 
that can improve the quality of the relationship between a firm and its custom-
ers: by providing benefits to stakeholders through its CSR activities, a firm indi-
cates that it cares about the individual and will not act opportunistically toward 
him or her. Besides, some of the antecedents of trust that the literature specifies, 
such as a firm’s honesty and goodwill (Barber, 1983; Blomqvist, 1997), clearly 
overlap with CSR. 
CSR associations are a perceptual construct and must be kept separate 
from the actual social performance of a firm. While research on consumer reac-
tions to CSR often presumes consumer awareness of the CSR activities of the in-
vestigated firms, the evidence suggests that the ability of consumers to accurately 
identify these activities is low (Sen, Bhattacharya, & Korschun, 2006; Pomering 
& Dolnicar, 2008). As a consequence, firms that invest in ‘greenwashing’ (Lyon & 
Montgomery, 2015) can gain positive CSR associations from consumers, while 
firms with obscure investments in CSR may be unable to acquire a more justifia-
ble amount of recognition on the market. Turning to retailers’ concerns, many of 
their consumers will be unaware of activities merely described in sustainability 
reports, or even in the media, and will primarily react to specific marketing ef-
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forts (such as cause-related marketing initiatives) or to programs in which cus-
tomers are personally involved (Du, Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2011). The following 
discussion explores how consumer perceptions, no matter how they are formed, 
are linked to their purchase decisions, leaving for the future the issue of how ac-
tual social performance is translated into consumer perceptions. 
To study how CSR influences trust, it is also necessary to recognize that 
CSR is a multi-dimensional concept – any involved firm has to deal with many 
different issues. Maignan & Ferrell (2004) argued that individuals react to CSR-
based initiatives according to how well they benefit personally from the firm’s 
engagement in CSR activities. A firm that is attentive to labour rights may appear 
socially responsible to human rights activists, but it will be considered socially 
irresponsible by environmentalists if it performs poorly in areas such as climate 
change (Strike, Gao, & Bansal, 2006). 
Consumers, like any stakeholder group, will primarily observe the firm’s 
behaviour toward them. This dimension of a firm’s behaviour can be called ‘con-
sumer CSR’, definable as the commitment of a firm to respecting consumer 
rights and interests. We argue that a retailer that excels in consumer CSR will 
attract trust in its private-label products. The first reason is cognitive: the per-
ception that the retailer is benevolent, genuinely interested in consumer welfare 
and motivated to seek joint gain will inspire consumer trust (Doney & Cannon, 
1997). A second reason is calculative: consumers will believe that retailers with a 
strong CSR reputation for treating them well would lose this good reputation by 
exploiting them. Therefore, our first hypothesis is the following. 
Hypothesis 1. The perceived consumer CSR profile of a retailer correlates 
positively with trust in the retailer’s private-label products. 
A second dimension of CSR, which we shall call ‘environmental CSR’, can 
be defined as commitment by a firm to respect and protect the natural environ-
ment. A firm that is environmentally responsible will try to prevent pollution, re-
duce environmental damage their products may cause and in general be sustain-
able (First & Khetriwal, 2010). We assume that a retailer that is strong in the ar-
ea of environmental CSR and attaches its private label to organic products will 
elicit consumer trust in its organic products as a category. This type of trust is 
cognitive: When consumers perceive that the behaviour of a retailer is environ-
mentally friendly, endorsing organic products by putting its own name on them, 
they will believe that the associated labels are true to their promises. As a conse-
quence, our second hypothesis is the following. 
Hypothesis 2. The perceived environmental CSR profile of a retailer corre-
lates positively with consumer trust in organic products. 
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The various private-label organic products are the items that the consum-
ers find on a retailer’s shelves and that are the real objects of purchase. Trust is 
transferred from a better-known source to a target that is associated with this 
source but is less known (Doney & Cannon, 1997). Usually, consumers will have 
no independent sources of information about the single products; therefore, we 
expect that consumer trust both in the private label and in organic products will 
be transferred to trust in each private-label organic product. Our third and 
fourth hypotheses are the following. 
Hypothesis 3. Consumer trust in a retailer’s private-label products corre-
lates positively with consumer trust in the private-label organic products. 
Hypothesis 4. Consumer trust in organic products correlates positively 
with trust in the private-label organic products. 
3.2. Trust and customer intentions 
The success of a retailer in marketing its own private-label organic products is 
measured by two consumer responses: (1) consumer brand loyalty, which trans-
lates into preference for the retailer’s private-label organics over organics with 
other labels; (2) consumer willingness to pay a premium price, because organic 
food is sold at a premium higher than comparable non-organic products. 
The literature (Singh & Sirdeshmukh, 2000; Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001) 
has shown that trust is an antecedent of consumer loyalty. Therefore, we assume 
that consumer trust will translate into an intention to purchase a product. This 
intention should determine brand loyalty as a response. We follow the standard 
definition of brand loyalty as the tendency to be loyal to a focal brand, which is 
demonstrated by the intention to buy the brand as a primary choice (Oliver, 
1999). Our fifth hypothesis is the following. 
Hypothesis 5. Consumer trust in the private-label organic products corre-
lates positively with brand loyalty. 
The impact of trust on consumer willingness to pay a premium price is also 
well documented (Chaudhuri & Holbrook, 2001). We assume that trust that the 
product conforms with organic standards (and therefore will provide the ex-
pected private and public benefits to consumers) will convince consumers that 
the product is worth the premium. Krystallis & Chryssohoidis (2005) found, in 
fact, that willingness to pay a premium price for organic food depends on trust in 
the organic food certification process and in the sellers of organic food. Our final 
hypothesis is the following. 
Chapter 4   |   131  
  
Hypothesis 6. Consumer trust in private-label organic products correlates 
positively with consumer willingness to pay a premium price. 
4. Methods and analysis 
4.1. Survey design 
To test our hypotheses empirically, we conducted a study on the private-label or-
ganic products marketed by COOP, a major Italian retailer. Our study took place 
between May and July 2006. At the time of the study, Italy was the first producer 
in Europe of organic products, with 1,150,253 hectares (9% of the total Italian 
agricultural area), ahead of Spain (998,323 hectares) and Germany (865,336 
hectares). Italy was also the third-ranking European market for sales (1.9 billion 
euros), tracking Germany (5.3 billion euros) and the United Kingdom (2.6 billion 
euros) and equalling France (also 1.9 billion euros) (Willer & Klicher, 2009). Per 
capita consumption of organic products in Italy was 32 euros yearly, slightly 
more than the European average of 29 euros (Padel et al., 2008). However, the 
consumption rate of organic products in Italy was relatively low compared with 
those of some other European countries (e.g. Switzerland with an average of 102 
euros or Germany with 56 euros) because in Italy for a long time organic prod-
ucts were sold with huge mark-ups and the public benefits of buying organics 
were emphasized over the private ones; even though the mark-ups were signifi-
cantly lower at the time and the sellers were stressing the flavour and health val-
ue of organics, the initial negative image had proved hard to correct and many 
Italian consumers were still thinking that organic products were neither tasty nor 
affordable (Geissler, 2006). 
In Europe, mainstream retail chains accounted for a large part of the total 
sales of organic products, with market shares that in the major countries varied 
between 75% in the UK and 41% in Germany (ISMEA, 2008). In Italy, the share 
of mainstream retailers stopped at 25%, consistent with lower market penetra-
tion of retail chains in the overall consumer market. Specialty stores absorbed 
55% of the organic market; direct selling, restaurants, agritourism and other mi-
nor distribution channels earned the remaining 20% (Brunori, 2009). Private-
label organic products represented 70% of organic sales of mainstream retailers 
and 3% of private-label sales overall (ISMEA, 2008). 
We chose to focus our survey on a single retailer, measuring the consum-
ers’ perception that it was more or less socially responsible, in order to exclude 
variation in unobservable traits of different retailers that could affect consumer 
trust. The chosen retailer was COOP, a group of cooperatives formed by nine 
large regional members especially operating in the north and centre of the coun-
try, which is the leading retail chain in Italy. In 2007, COOP had a turnover of 
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12,167 million euros and operated 1,394 stores with a total sales area of 1,616,607 
sqm (ANCC-COOP, 2008). The first reason for choosing COOP was that in the 
1980s it was first among Italian retail chains to publicize the need to reduce the 
amount of pesticide use on fruits and vegetables and to introduce sustainable 
farming and natural breeding in the meat department. At the time, COOP carried 
a full range of organic products under the private-label ‘Bio-logici COOP’ – which 
means both ‘organic’ and ‘logically organic’ (Geissler, 2006). A second reason 
was COOP’s long-standing engagement in CSR activities. COOP adopted its first 
code of conduct for its suppliers in the mid-1990s, and in 1998 was the first Eu-
ropean organization to obtain the SA8000 certification for ethical sourcing and 
among the first ten in the world. Food and non-food products were purchased 
from 431 suppliers, carefully selected on the basis of SA8000 requirements and 
monitored with the collaboration of third-party agencies (ANCC-COOP, 2008; 
Tencati & Zsolnai, 2009). 
4.2. Data collection and sample 
A sample of customers of a COOP store in downtown Milan were given a ques-
tionnaire administered by interviewers hired by a market research firm. Milan 
was at the heart of the northwest, the Italian geographical area with the highest 
organic purchasing intensity, accounting for 44.1% of overall sales of organics in 
Italy (ISMEA, 2009). 
To ensure valid findings, customers working in advertising, market re-
search firms, and supermarkets were excluded from the survey. Second, only 
those who claimed that they regularly consumed dairy products (milk, yogurt, 
cheese etc.) were interviewed. Calder et al. (1981) have shown that a maximally 
homogenous sample (such as yogurt consumers) is valuable for theory valida-
tion. The reason for choosing dairy products was twofold. First, they were im-
portant in the diet of Italian consumers, who usually eated milk, cheese and yo-
gurt every day; quality, freshness, hygiene, proper packaging and storage were 
basic requirements that consumers tended to assume. Second, organic dairy 
products were the best-selling organic category in Italy (19.8% of the total sales 
of organics in 2008: ISMEA, 2009). 
To exclude variation in unobservable traits among different dairies, we fo-
cused the survey on a single product: yogurt sold under the retailer’s organic pri-
vate label ‘Bio-logici COOP’. Yogurt ranked third among the best-selling pack-
aged organic products in Italy, with a 7.0% share of the organic market (ISMEA, 
2009). The interviewers intercepted customers when they came out of the COOP 
store located in the mall. A card with the logo of the product was given to cus-
tomers and questions were asked to verify that they knew organic products and 
were able to identify them. If they recognized the logo, the interviewers asked 
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them to fill out our questionnaire. Elimination of incomplete responses left 183 
questionnaires. The respondents’ average age was 48 years (minimum 18, maxi-
mum 74, with a stronger presence in the 55–64 year range); 67.8% were women 
and 32.2% were men (the disproportion reflects the major role Italian women 
play as housewives devoted to shopping for their families). 32.2% were college 
graduates, 52.5% had a high school diploma, 14.2% attended primary or second-
ary school and 1.1% had no education at all. The sample showed high store loyal-
ty both in terms of quantity of shopping expeditions (82.0% affirmed that they 
had shopped at the COOP store for at least five years) and frequency (32.2% went 
shopping in the store two/three times per week; another 34.4% once a week; 
9.8% shopped at the store every single day). As we said, only 43.2% of the sample 
recognized the EU Organic Farming label, and only 19.7% said they paid atten-
tion to the label when buying an organic product. Respondents revealed that they 
spent on average 31.2% of their budget on dairy organic products. 
4.3. Questionnaire 
To measure the constructs used in our hypotheses, we used scales developed in 
the CSR literature and in the marketing literature, with some integrations and 
adaptations linked to the nature of the survey. The scales used are listed in Table 
1. To measure consumer associations with CSR, we used a scale developed by 
Castaldo & Perrini (2004) in a study investigating three major dimensions of 
CSR: 
– the environmental dimension (how much a company is considered sen-
sitive to ecological issues); 
– the consumer dimension (how much a company tries to satisfy consum-
er needs and protects their rights and interests); 
– the employee dimension (how much a company guarantees equality of 
economic treatment, avoids discrimination, practices good health and 
safety policies etc.). 
In line with our hypotheses, we used the scales that Castaldo & Perrini 
(2004) obtained for the environmental and consumer dimensions. 
To measure trust, we started with the scale presented by Chaudhuri & 
Holbrook (2001) and integrated it with items derived by Wong & Sohal (2002) 
and Kennedy et al. (2001). To measure brand loyalty, we used the three-item 
scale proposed by Yoo & Donthu (2001). Finally, consumer willingness to pay a 
premium price was measured by adapting the scale by Chaudhuri & Holbrook 
(2001). 
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TABLE 1. Measurement properties 
CONSTRUCTS DESCRIPTION AND SOURCE ITEMS FACTOR 
LOADINGS 
1. Consumer 
CSR 
Respondents reported their opin-
ions about the CSR activities of CO-
OP with regard to the protection of 
consumers. Scale: 1 = strongly disa-
gree; 7 = strongly agree. Source: 
Castaldo & Perrini (2004). 
X satisfies consumers’ needs 
X checks carefully the origin 
of products 
X protects consumers’ rights 
 
AVE: 66.94%. 
.88 
.76 
 
.81 
2. 
Environmental 
CSR 
Respondents reported their opin-
ions about the CSR activities of CO-
OP with regard to the protection of 
the natural environment. Scale: 1 = 
strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree. Source: Castaldo & Perrini 
(2004). 
X cares for the natural envi-
ronment 
X is attentive to recycling of 
materials 
X is sensitive to ecological 
issues 
 
AVE: 73.66% 
.82 
.82 
 
.93 
 
3. Trust in 
COOP private-
label products 
Respondents reported their trust in 
the ‘Bio-Logici COOP’ yogurt. Scale: 
1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree. Source: Chaudhuri and 
Holbrook (2001) with slight modifi-
cations from Wong & Sohal (2002), 
and Kennedy, Ferrel, & LeClair 
(2001). 
You can count on X 
I trust X 
Customers can always rely 
on X   
X keep their promises 
 
AVE: 82.91%. 
.93 
.95 
.87 
.89 
 
4. Trust in 
organic 
products 
Respondents reported their trust in 
organic products in general. Scale: 1 
= strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree. Source: Chaudhuri and 
Holbrook (2001) with slight modifi-
cations from Wong & Sohal (2002), 
and Kennedy et al. (2001). 
You can count on X 
I trust X 
Customers can always rely 
on X   
X keep their promises 
 
AVE: 90.73%. 
.95 
.95 
.96 
.95 
 
 
5. Trust in the 
group ‘Bio-
logici COOP’ 
Respondents reported their trust in 
the organic line ‘Bio-logici COOP’. 
Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = 
strongly agree. Source: Chaudhuri & 
Holbrook (2001) with slight modifi-
cations from Wong & Sohal (2002), 
and Kennedy et al. (2001). 
You can count on X 
I trust X 
Customers can always rely 
on X   
X keep their promises 
 
AVE: 87.05% 
.95 
.94 
.96 
.88 
6. Brand 
loyalty 
Respondents reported their loyalty 
to the ‘Bio-Logici COOP’ yogurt. 
Scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = 
strongly agree. Source: Yoo & Don-
thu (2001), with adaptations.  
I will not buy other brands if 
X is available at the store 
I consider myself to be loyal 
to X 
X is always my first choice 
 
AVE: 70.19%. 
.72 
 
.93 
.85 
7. Willingness 
to pay a 
premium price 
Respondents reported their willing-
ness to buy a premium price for the 
‘Bio-Logici COOP’ yogurt. Scale: 1 = 
strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree. Source:  Chauduri & 
Holbrook’s (2001), with adapta-
tions. 
Buying X seems smart to me 
even if they cost more 
I’m ready to pay a higher 
price for X  
I’d still buy X if other brands 
reduced their prices 
 
AVE:  70.48%. 
.92 
 
.94 
.62 
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4.4. Statistical analysis 
The data were analysed by means of structural equation modelling (SEM), a sta-
tistical technique that enables the simultaneous estimation of multiple regres-
sion equations in a single framework, encompassing all the relationships among 
the variables in a model. Among its various applications, SEM can be used as a 
confirmatory technique where the model is specified on the basis of the hypothe-
ses that the analysis is attempting to test. In a structural model two different 
kinds of variable are used: exogenous variables, which are directly measured, 
and endogenous variables, which regress on a group of exogenous variables and 
correspond to the theoretical constructs used in the hypotheses. Endogenous 
variables are ‘latent’; that is, they are not measured directly but are estimated in 
the model from measured variables they regress on, or ‘indicators’ (Bollen & 
Long, 1993). Figure 1 represents the structural model that we tested, where the 
paths are specified in conformity with the six hypotheses proposed. The items of 
the corresponding scales serve as indicators. 
SEM is based on a measurement model that shows the relationships be-
tween each latent variable and its indicators. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) 
is used to specify the measurement model and test whether its fit is adequate. We 
ran CFA using LISREL 8.72 (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993). The measurement mod-
el had seven latent variables and 24 indicators. CFA (χ2 = 439.42, df = 214, p < 
0.01) achieved an adequate fit as assessed by the comparative fit index (CFI = 
0.98), root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA = 0.066) and standard-
ized root mean square residual (SRMSR = 0.047). Except for one indicator, all 
the items loadings exceeded the suggested 0.70 (Bagozzi & Baumgartner, 1994), 
with the exceptions being 0.62. Average variance extracted (AVE) for all con-
structs exceeded the recommended 0.50 (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). Results are 
shown in Table 1. 
Following Fornell and Larcker (1981), we also assessed discriminant validi-
ty to verify that all constructs correlated more with their own indicators than 
with any of the other constructs. The most common test is to check whether the 
confidence interval around the correlation between any two latent constructs 
does not include unity. None of the confidence intervals reached unity. The cor-
relation matrix of the constructs is shown in Table 2, along with descriptive sta-
tistics. 
LISREL 8.72 was used again to run the analysis of the structural model, to 
assess it against the recommended fit measures and to estimate the significance, 
the sign and the size of the relationships to be tested. Residuals were allowed to 
correlate. All fit indexes of our model (χ2 = 454.45, df = 233, p < 0.01) were rea-
sonably good. 
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– The RMSEA (root mean square error of approximation) is an index of 
absolute fi t that takes into account the error of approximation in the 
population; usually, values less than 0.08 are considered a fair fit (Ba-
gozzi & Yi, 1988). The RMSEA of our model was 0.072. 
– The GFI (goodness of fit index) measures how much of the actual input 
matrix is predicted by the estimated model. Usually, values above 0.80 
indicate reasonable model fit (Browne & Cudeck, 1992). The GFI of our 
model was 0.84. 
– The CFI (comparative fit index) assesses which of two or more compet-
ing models provides a better fit to the data. Values above 0.95 indicate a 
good fit (Bentler, 1992). The CFI of our model was 0.98. 
TABLE 2. Means, standard deviations, and correlations 
Variable Mean s.d. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
1. Consumer CSR 5.76 1.12 (.88)       
2. Environmental CSR 5.74 1.03 .84 (.90)      
3. Trust in COOP private-
label products 
6.11 .87 .75* .78* (.94)     
4. Trust in organic products 5.26 1.22 .51 .41 .39 (.97)    
5. Trust in ‘Bio-logici COOP’ 
yogurt 
5.74 1.04 .64* .56 .60* .77* (.96)   
6. Brand loyalty 3.50 1.78 .24 .13 .24 .40 .45 (.86)  
7. Willingness to pay a 
premium price 
4.65 1.61 .44 .32 .38 .45 .59* .70* (.85) 
 
N = 183. Cronbach’s alpha coefficients are on the diagonal in 
parentheses 
* p ≤ .05 
 
        
The model provides strong support for our hypotheses (see Figure 1). All of 
the coefficients of the model are significant and have the expected signs. There-
fore, (a) consumer perceptions that the retailer is socially responsible impact 
positively on trust toward organic products in general (environmental CSR: β = 
0.48, p < 0.05) and on trust in the retailer’s private labels (consumer CSR: β = 
0.81, p < 0.05), (b) consumer trust in private-label organic products rises when 
consumer trust in organic products in general and consumer trust in the retail-
er’s private labels rises (β = 0.37 and 0.62 respectively, p < 0.05) and (c) brand 
loyalty and willingness to pay a premium price rise when consumer trust in pri-
vate-label organic products rise (β = 0.46 and 0.59 respectively, p < 0.05). 
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FIGURE 1. Hypothesized structural model 
 
Standardized estimates are shown. n = 183.  
* p ≤ .05 
5. Discussion and conclusions 
The purpose of this study was to investigate the determinants of consumer atti-
tudes toward organic products sold by retailers under their private labels. The 
starting point was that credibility and trust are of special importance in the mar-
ket for sustainable products in general (Belz, 2006), and especially when these 
products are marketed by mainstream retailers. Furthermore, organic products 
are credence goods: consumers cannot directly verify that these products are ob-
tained according to ‘organic’ production methods. Certified organic labels are the 
primary guarantee to consumers, but the retailer can use the relationship it has 
established with its customers to complement or supplement these labels as a 
source of trust. Among the many possible determinants of trust, we tried to iso-
late the specific contribution of consumer perceptions that a retailer is socially 
responsible. We surveyed a sample of customers of COOP interested in buying 
organic products by means of a questionnaire focused on yogurt sold by COOP 
under its own private label ‘Bio-logici.’ The results supported the hypothesis that 
when consumers believe that a retailer is committed to respecting their rights 
and the environment they are more likely to trust the organic products marketed 
by that retailer under its private label. The results also showed that consumer 
trust translates into brand loyalty and a willingness to pay a premium price. 
The results imply that retailers can improve consumer trust in their pri-
vate-label organic products, not that the absolute level of trust in retailers is 
high. Our results are compatible with the current evidence that consumers buy 
food in the stores of mainstream retailers mainly because of convenience and 
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lower prices, not because they consider supermarkets the most trusted outlet for 
organic products (Padel & Foster, 2005). Indeed, one of the direct implications 
of our study is that mainstream retailers should try to improve their social and 
environmental performance, and communicate their efforts to the public, if they 
want to enlarge their presence in the organic market. 
Like all empirical research, our study is limited in several ways. First, our 
constructs relied on consumer perceptions about the CSR activities of the retailer 
we studied; these perceptions do not necessarily coincide with the actual corpo-
rate social performance. Therefore, it is possible that consumer perceptions are 
distorted by contextual factors that are difficult to measure. Bhattacharya et al. 
(2009) contended that a distinction should be drawn between objective 
measures of the CSR activities of a firm and the perceptions held by stakehold-
ers. While large-scale initiatives will have the exposure necessary to lead to posi-
tive stakeholder evaluations, this result is hardly guaranteed; therefore, retailers 
skilled at communicating their CSR initiatives can foster a better consumer opin-
ion than retailers operating on a smaller scale or less effective in communicating 
their actions. 
Second, our data were collected in Italy, so it is questionable whether our 
findings apply to other countries. As we noticed, there is variance among coun-
tries in the distribution models of organic products and in the labels adopted. Al-
so, behavioral patterns of organic consumers are different in different countries; 
for example, Zanoli & Naspetti (2002) reported that Italian organic consumers 
seem to be distinctively concerned with food quality and tastiness, which are only 
some of the potential benefits of organic food. Replications of the study in differ-
ent countries as well as cross-cultural comparisons are needed. 
Third, our study is about a single retailer and a single product. While this 
choice allowed us to exclude variations in unobservable traits of different retail-
ers and products, wider industry studies are necessary to validate our conclu-
sions. 
Fourth, since our study is cross-sectional, causation should be interpreted 
with caution. Longitudinal studies, while difficult to carry out, would be wel-
comed. 
Fifth, the technique we used to collect interviews raises the question of 
whether interviewees were able and willing to articulate their actual preferences. 
Even though the questionnaire was designed to check for the consistency of the 
answers, individuals may be biased toward verbally expressing pro-social atti-
tudes. CSR often generates an ‘attitude–behavior gap’: consumers express will-
ingness to make ethical purchases, but they do not follow through when they ac-
tually go shopping (Boulstridge & Carrigan, 2000). Common method biases are 
also possible (Podsakoff et al., 2003). Experimental settings may be a means to 
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overcome the attitude–behavior gap, although they create problems of external 
validity (Hiscox & Smyth, 2007). 
Sixth, our study is exploratory in nature, because the sample is not repre-
sentative of the entire Italian population and was selected on the basis of the re-
spondents’ self-reported habit of purchasing organic products, which is not the 
same as verifiable and actual behavior. 
Even with these limitations, our results yield some important conclusions. 
Socially oriented retailers can achieve competitive advantage in those areas 
where trust is crucial in determining consumer choices. Organic food is one of 
these areas, and retailers with negative social reputations will probably be unable 
to replicate the success of rivals with a better CSR profile, because this negative 
social reputation will make it difficult for them to convince consumers to trust 
the organic products they put on their shelves and to elicit the desired consumer 
responses (brand loyalty and willingness to pay a premium price). Socially ori-
ented retailers can also succeed in enlarging the market for organics: by building 
trust, these retailers could transform positive opinions of organic food into    ac-
tual purchasing even where barriers are present, and also change the opinions of 
the currently large number of consumers who do not believe in organic food. 
Finally, our study has implications at the level of public policy, because it 
shows that consumers perceive retailers as a guarantee about the origin of the 
products; therefore, certification schemes such as the UE and USDA organic la-
bels could improve public trust and recognition of organic food by involving so-
cially responsible retailers as partners in the program.2 
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Chapter 5 
Convergent and Divergent 
Corporate Social Responsibility1 
1. Introduction 
During recent years corporate social responsibility (CSR) has come to be accept-
ed as central to modern economy. This growth in importance of CSR has been 
accompanied by a proliferation of new concepts and definitions of the responsi-
bilities of firms, but here I follow the simple notion of CSR formulated by Davis 
(1973: 312): “the firm’s considerations of, and response to, issues beyond the 
narrow economic, technical, and legal requirements of the firm to accomplish 
social [and environmental] benefits along with the traditional economic gains 
which the firm seeks”. 
It has long been clear that CSR has strategic implications for firms adopt-
ing it (Eccles, Ioannou, & Serafeim, 2014). When Milton Friedman launched its 
oft-quoted attack against CSR (Friedman, 1970), one of his arguments was that 
managers disguise as a moral duty what in reality is often a set of practices that 
create value for the firm. In the subsequent decades, the idea that a business case 
exists for being socially responsible has been a stimulus that has pushed firms to 
embrace CSR, along with increased societal expectations and stakeholder pres-
sures (McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006). 
In their review of the research on the link between CSR and the financial 
performance of firms, Margolis, Elfenbein, & Walsh (2007) identified two main 
theoretical accounts of how CSR is expected to pay off. In one account, CSR was 
conceptualised as a resource that generates benefits or reduces costs. The bene-
fits might come from the heightened efforts by employees who reacted to being 
treated well, or by the innovative products that the firm developed in collabora-
tion with non-market partners. The decreased costs included the avoidance of 
penalties and the efficiency gains from reduced pollution and waste. Examples of                                                         
1 A version of this article was published as a chapter of the book edited by C. Louche, 
S. O. Idowu, & W. L. Filho, Innovative CSR: From Risk Management to Value Crea-
tion, Greenleaf Publishing, 2010, pp. 62–83. This updated version has been slightly 
edited to reflect new research that appeared after publication. 
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this account are Hart (1995), where the resource-based-view (RBV) of the firm 
was applied to environmental responsibility, or McWilliams & Siegel (2001), 
where firms invested in CSR to add ‘social’ features to their products. In the sec-
ond theoretical account, it was the appearance of doing good that generated de-
mand or commitment by stakeholders to the stock, the products, or the jobs of-
fered by the firm. Even though this appearance was supposed to be based on ac-
tual CSR practices, followers of this account theorised that appearance improves 
financial performance independently of the possible effects of these practices on 
the products or the processes of the firm. Examples of this account were Siegel & 
Vitaliano (2007), where CSR was presented as a type of advertising that makes 
experience goods more appealing to consumers, or Mackey, Mackey, & Barney 
(2007), where the market value of firms was modelled as a function of the inves-
tor demand for CSR. 
Scholars have also tried to determine empirically whether the business case 
holds. Three major meta-analyses have been conducted on these studies (Margo-
lis & Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt, & Rynes, 2003; Margolis et al., 2007), all 
of them concluding that the link exists but is relatively small. The third of these 
meta-analyses obtained a mean r of only 0.132, and found that the association 
varied greatly across categories of social performance. Moreover, questions 
about the causal direction of the association were still substantially unresolved. 
The authors of this meta-analysis concluded that scholars should concentrate 
less on looking for a direct measurable link between social and financial out-
comes and more on the conditions that allowed some firms (and not necessarily 
all of them) to create value through CSR. In the words of Barnett (2007: 795), the 
suggested direction for research is to “make the business case firm specific, not 
universal”. 
In order to understand whether and when firms earn financial returns 
from CSR, the strategic implications of being socially responsible need to be 
spelled out. It is a central tenet of the strategic management literature that 
above-average financial returns are obtained only by the firms that enjoy a sus-
tainable competitive advantage. In turn, a competitive advantage depends on be-
ing different (and better) than rivals in satisfying customer needs, through better 
quality, reduced costs or niche products and services (Porter, 1985). The compet-
itive advantage is sustainable when a firm succeeds in achieving and preserving a 
unique position, based on a distinctive set of resources (Barney, 1991). 
Therefore, the first requirement for a firm that aims to get a financial re-
turn from CSR is to differentiate itself from rivals in its CSR practices, develop-
ing innovative and non-imitable solutions. Porter and Kramer (2006: 88) stated 
this requirement very clearly: “[Strategy] is about choosing a unique position—
doing things differently from competitors in a way that lowers costs or better 
serves a particular set of consumer needs. These principles apply to a company’s 
Chapter 5   |   147  
  
relationship to society as readily as to its relationship with customers and rivals”. 
Reinhardt (1988) underscored that a firm investing in environmental protection 
or other CSR-based strategies obtains above-average returns only if the firm can 
prevent rivals from replicating these strategies. 
As a consequence, we should see the firms that engage in CSR trying to dif-
ferentiate themselves from rivals. The evidence points in the opposite direction: 
it seems that only a small number of firms, such as Ben & Jerry’s or The Body 
Shop, actively differentiate their CSR practices from those of their rivals. In gen-
eral, competition on the basis of CSR appears to be rare (Aguilera, Rupp, Wil-
liams, & Ganapathi, 2007). Most socially responsible firms seem content to ad-
here to codes of conduct, standards and other practices that have many adopters 
and cannot guarantee a unique position. One way to synthesise this evidence is 
to distinguish two types of CSR. 
1. Convergent CSR. Firms adopt practices that have already been adopted 
by rivals in the industry, or are within their reach, or collaborate with 
these rivals (and with stakeholders) to develop new practices that will be 
open to other adopters. 
2. Divergent CSR. Firms try to use social performance to obtain competi-
tive advantage; these firms want to be unique in their CSR practices and 
build barriers to imitation by rivals in order to protect the profits they 
expect from their position. 
While divergent CSR can be seen as an attempt by firms to harvest the fi-
nancial promises of being socially responsible, convergent CSR is in need of ex-
planation. If the CSR practices of a firm are convergent, the firm is not trying to 
achieve a competitive advantage but it is pursuing some other objective. 
In this chapter I try to answer this question: why do a large number of so-
cially responsible firms engage in convergent CSR instead of exploring unique 
ways to deal with stakeholders? In some cases managers may prefer convergent 
CSR because they want to respect ethical principles or are forced to be socially 
responsible by external coercion, and do not see CSR as a source of competitive 
advantage. But in other cases, which will be the focus of the chapter, convergent 
CSR can be strategically motivated: managers believe in the business case but 
they choose to share the benefits from CSR with rivals in the industry. In particu-
lar, I will describe six causes at the industry level that are able to produce con-
vergent CSR; these causes appeal both to institutional factors and to organisa-
tional agency (Greenwood, Díaz, Li, & Lorente, 2010). Then I compare the dis-
tinction between divergent and convergent CSR with other typologies that have 
been proposed in the literature. I show that the distinction has an impact on the 
societal benefits of CSR, since divergent and convergent CSR practices are asso-
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ciated with different private incentives to invest in social innovation. I also sug-
gest that the widespread adoption of convergent CSR practices helps to explain 
why studies have not found a stronger link between the social and the financial 
performance of firms, since firms that adopt a convergent CSR approach are un-
likely to obtain extra returns. In the conclusions, I outline the implications for 
future research and for management. 
2. Why does convergent CSR exist? 
When compared with the pile of studies on the empirical link between social and 
financial performance, the literature on the strategic implications of CSR is rela-
tively thin. However, a number of scholars have provided suggestions about how 
a framework for the strategic management of CSR could be built. For example, 
Hillman & Keim (2001) hypothesized that socially responsible firms could 
achieve competitive advantage through relational interactions with primary 
stakeholders. Relational interactions involve investments by both parties, in-
clude a time dimension, are sensitive to reputation and are enhanced by fair 
dealing and principled behaviour. In contrast, the transactional interactions 
(which operate at arm’s length) can be easily duplicated and thus offer little po-
tential for competitive advantage. 
Tetrault Sirsly & Lamertz (2008) argued that socially responsible firms can 
build unique capabilities in the domains of environmental assessment, stake-
holder management and social issues management. These capabilities are not 
easily imitable by rivals and allow these firms to launch ‘strategic CSR initia-
tives’. A firm that excels in the assessment of the environment may be able to de-
tect shifts in stakeholder interests, changes in the regulatory setting, technologi-
cal developments, or new CSR niches before its rivals and take immediate action 
to pre-empt them. If a firm is strong in managing stakeholders, it can achieve a 
central position in the stakeholder network and gain the reputation of a leader in 
the field; this position will pre-empt the effectiveness of similar responses by ri-
vals because they will be judged to be mere followers. When the firm capabilities 
are in the domain of the management of social issues, the firm will be better than 
its rivals in diagnosing the issues and anticipating the implications for business; 
as a result, the firm will implement relevant initiatives before rivals and obtain 
reputation credits for identifying the importance of the issue. In the same spirit, 
Harrison, Bosse, & Phillips (2010) theorized that stakeholder satisfaction is con-
ducive to stakeholder sharing of nuanced information with the firm, generating 
competitive advantages through causal ambiguity and path dependence in stake-
holder relationships.  
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All the attempts at pre-empting rivals or at capturing other types of first-
mover advantage described by Tetrault Sirsly & Lamertz (2008) presuppose di-
vergent CSR: that is, an approach in which a firm tries to build a unique position. 
Relatedly, Mena & Chabowski (2015) showed that CSR is more likely to improve 
financial performance when it is responsive to stakeholder needs and focus on 
innovation, while imitative CSR do not let firms differentiate and may negatively 
impact performance. 
However, convergent CSR seems more common among socially responsi-
ble firms. Waddock (2008) portrayed a ‘CSR infrastructure’ that includes NGOs, 
investors, public agencies, philanthropists, certification bodies, consultants, and 
other profit and non-profit institutions. Through pressures, dialogue or soft 
regulation, this CSR infrastructure tries to redefine the rules of the modern 
economy and to foster change in the practices of firms. Convergent CSR coin-
cides largely with the choice by a firm to adopt a practice recommended by the 
CSR infrastructure or, alternatively, to ally with it and other firms to negotiate 
new practices that will subsequently be shared with other potential adopters. 
In contrast, a firm that engages in divergent CSR develops its own practic-
es, or uses the recommended practices as mere starting points for building its 
own specific initiatives. By ‘practices’, I refer strictly to business processes and 
activities that have a direct impact on stakeholders or social issues. I exclude re-
porting, which is a means to communicate to stakeholders the practices a firm is 
following and the outcomes it is obtaining. The reason for excluding reporting 
from the practices I will be concerned with is that divergence in social or envi-
ronmental reporting schemes would obviously be costly for the audience of the 
reports. Conflicting reporting schemes make cross-company or cross-industry 
comparisons impossible or time-expensive; converging on de facto standards 
such as GRI (Global Reporting Initiative) permits socially responsible firms to 
make their communications more transparent and easily readable (Burritt & 
Schaltegger, 2010). 
Most of the practices on which socially responsible firms converge fall into 
four groups, outlined below. 
Codes of conduct and principles. They provide guidance to firms about 
how to conduct business responsibly. While some firms have written their own 
specific codes or principles (this is a case of divergent CSR), most of the firms 
adhere to codes and principles that have been developed by international organi-
sations, industry associations or other parts of the CSR infrastructure. Examples 
are the United Nations Global Compact (a scheme for advancing ten responsibil-
ity principles in the areas of human rights, environment, labour and anti-
corruption) or the OECD Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises (a set of rec-
ommendations for firms operating in global markets). 
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Certified managerial standards (CMS). They are more detailed than codes 
or principles and define exact technical requirements or management practices. 
CMS are written by a standard setter and are usually assisted by a certification 
process that allows firms to be officially recognised as adherents after they accept 
monitoring by accredited third-party certifiers. Examples are EMAS (Eco-
Management and Audit Scheme, a standard for environmental management cre-
ated by the European Union, which grants an official EMAS logo to certified par-
ticipants) or ISO 14001 (an international management standard that helps firms 
minimise their impact on the environment; complying firms are awarded a ISO 
14001 certificate after being audited by an accredited external body). 
Ethical labels. They are applied on the product or its package to make 
known to consumers that the product meets certain social or environmental 
standards. Examples are the Fairtrade certification (which identifies products 
that meet environmental, labour and developmental standards established by 
FLO International, as certified by a system of auditors overseen by FLO Interna-
tional’s certification body) and Forest Stewardship Council (a multi-stakeholder 
coalition that manages a standard to ensure that forests are managed sustainably 
and grants adherents an FSC Certification Label). For both CMS and ethical la-
bels, the convergent CSR approach is followed by the firms that adhere to the 
standard or request the label without going beyond the recommended practices. 
The divergent CSR approach is compatible with adopting a standard or a label, 
but it involves attempts by firms to differentiate themselves from rivals.  
Alliances or coalitions. Alliances or coalitions of firms (with the possible 
inclusion of stakeholders) develop practices to share data, information, 
knowledge, experiences and other resources. The purpose of these initiatives is to 
improve the social performance of all the participants. While alliances or coali-
tions allow firms to address collectively serious issues, the best that each partici-
pant can expect from these initiatives is to align itself with the best practices of 
the industry. The best-known example is the Responsible Care programme, a 
voluntary international initiative of the chemical industry with the aim of im-
proving the health, safety and environmental performance of members (King & 
Lenox, 2000). Another example is the CO2 emissions data collection programme 
launched by the World Steel Association, which aims at identifying technical 
benchmarks and allows transfers of technology among steel-makers to revamp 
and improve the energy efficiency of outdated plants (World Steel Association, 
2015).  
While codes of conduct and principles, CMS, ethical labels, and industry al-
liances and coalitions for improving social performance are praiseworthy, usually 
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they do not allow a participating firm to be unique. In fact the aim of these initia-
tives is the opposite: spreading sets of recommended practices among the firms 
in an industry or in a group. Therefore, a firm that adopts these practices proba-
bly does not hope to obtain a competitive advantage, unless it is deluded into 
thinking it can outperform its rivals without differentiating itself from them. 
Thus, the question is: why do many socially responsible firms converge on 
shared CSR practices instead of trying to be unique and achieve competitive ad-
vantage? It is possible that some of them are coerced into CSR by external pres-
sures (Delmas and Toffel, 2008), in which case they may want to minimise ef-
forts and limit themselves to adhere to the initiatives sponsored by the CSR in-
frastructure. Other firms may be led to CSR by the altruistic preferences of their 
managers or their shareholders (Baron, 2001) and adopt the practices that they 
think satisfy some fundamental ethical requirements; since these firms do not 
conceive CSR as an avenue to competitive advantage, there is no immediate rea-
son they should want to differentiate their CSR practices from their rivals. 
Both external coercion and altruistic considerations can be a powerful mo-
tivation for firms to engage in CSR, but in many cases convergent CSR can also 
be strategically motivated. The literature on strategic management acknowledges 
that in some situations firms should not differentiate too much from rivals and 
converge instead on intermediate levels of strategic similarity (Deephouse, 
1999). One reason for limiting differentiation has been advanced in institutional 
theory, where it is suggested that firms resort to mimicry in order to preserve le-
gitimacy. This is the first possible cause of convergent CSR that I analyse in the 
next section (‘Institutional isomorphism’). The subsequent causes are deduced 
from various streams of research that have dealt with strategic firm interactions 
in industries: studies on imitation (‘Environmental uncertainty’, ‘Rivalry mitiga-
tion’), on competition (‘Low barriers to imitation’), and on collaboration (‘Econ-
omies of scale’, ‘Reputation interdependences’). The resulting six-cause list is not 
intended as exhaustive, but is presented as a demonstration of the variety of stra-
tegic reasons that can push socially responsible firms to converge in their CSR 
practices. 
3. Causes of convergence in CSR activities 
3.1. Institutional isomorphism 
Institutional theory (Meyer & Rowan, 1977; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983) asserts 
that the choices of firms are constrained by pressures coming from institutions 
such as public regulators, interest groups, public opinion and so on. These pres-
sures take the form of expectations of the firms’ activities. A central concept in 
institutional theory is legitimacy, which is the generalised social perception that 
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the actions of an organisation are appropriate, given a system of beliefs and 
norms (Suchman, 1995). Firms need legitimacy in order to attain their ends; 
therefore, firms will try to be isomorphic to these beliefs and norms. 
The consequences of institutional theory for CSR are straightforward: firms 
engage in CSR to be seen as legitimate. Recently, many scholars have focused on 
how institutions shape CSR (e.g. Campbell, 2007; Teerlak, 2007; Matten & 
Moon, 2008). In this framework, convergent CSR can be explained as homoge-
neity owing to the fact that firms in an industry are exposed to approximately the 
same institutional pressures (Bansal, 2005). Institutional theory includes three 
mechanisms that may force firms to adapt to their institutional environment 
(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983); all of them seem to contribute to pushing firms to 
converge on CSR practices. 
1. Coercive isomorphism. Direct prescriptions (such as rules and norms) 
supported by economic or social sanctions; as we have seen, principles, 
codes of conduct and standards are used by institutions to specify pre-
scriptions in the areas of CSR 
2. Mimetic isomorphism. The attempts by organisations to model them-
selves on other organisations perceived as legitimate; the mechanism is 
different from information cascades or bandwagons (which I will exam-
ine below) because it is activated by a quest for social approval, not by 
lack of information or by risk-avoiding. In the areas of CSR, mimetic 
isomorphism explains why firms with excellent social performance and 
solid reputation become role models in their industries and attract imi-
tation by rivals seeking legitimacy 
3. Normative isomorphism. Ideas spread by professions, educational insti-
tutions and authoritative observers. These ideas are presented as the 
right way of doing things and over time they come to be taken for grant-
ed. In the areas of CSR, normative isomorphism is evident where some 
practices achieve the status of ‘non-choice behaviour’, such as the ban on 
forced labour. 
While early versions of institutional theory presented firms as passively 
conforming to the institutional environment, the so-called ‘new institutional the-
ory’ allows them some room in deciding how to react to institutional pressures 
(Oliver, 1991; Greenwood et al., 2010). This is why I am treating institutional 
isomorphism as a different cause of convergent CSR from mere external coer-
cion. The new institutional theory emphasises that firms in general can avoid, 
defy, manipulate or try to reach compromises on the institutional requests they 
receive. Correspondingly, socially responsible firms can try to negotiate the prac-
tices that are recommended by the institutional environment and bargain with 
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stakeholders in order to arrive at balanced solutions. In these bargaining efforts, 
firms in the same industry will have an incentive to join forces to increase their 
contractual power (Dhalla & Oliver, 2013). This mechanism can be a further 
driver of convergence. Studies have shown that often the bargaining process is 
started by powerful stakeholders that put an issue on the public agenda and re-
quest changes in the behaviour of firms; after an initial resistance, firms form co-
alitions and try to negotiate the requests and define the exact content of the prac-
tices to be adopted. An example is Bartley (2007), which describes the historical 
origins of Forest Stewardship Council and shows that the process leading to the 
new standard was started by timber boycotts by Friends of the Earth and other 
environmentalist groups. Subsequently, Austria and governments of other Euro-
pean countries imposed restrictions on the import of tropical timber; then, these 
governments and private foundations such as the Ford Foundation and Pew 
Charitable Trust financed and supported the creation of FSC. Eventually the tim-
ber industry accepted negotiations, entered FSC and participated in writing the 
standard for the sustainable management of forests. 
3.2. Environmental uncertainty 
Research on the diffusion of innovations shows that the adoption of managerial 
practices in a population of firms often follows a two-stage model: a first group of 
early innovators adopts the practice because of its intrinsic perceived benefits; a 
second group of latecomers adopts it because they imitate the first group (Abra-
hamson & Rosenkopf 1993). Various mechanisms explain why the second group 
imitates the first. One is information cascades (Bikhchandani, Hirshleifer, & 
Welch, 1992). Information cascades happen because choices made by individuals 
reveal useful information to observers. Suppose that a group of people wants to 
decide whether to invest in real estate or in stocks. The first two persons to speak 
have favoured investment in real estate, but the third person’s private infor-
mation suggests to her that investing in stocks is better; even in this case, she 
may think the first two persons had good reasons for their choice. If she discards 
her own information and follows their lead, she is in a cascade; the cascade will 
grow stronger and stronger if subsequent persons follow suit (Sunstein, 2008). 
Researchers have used information cascades to explain stock market bubbles, 
fads in fashion, waves in mergers and acquisitions, and other self-sustaining 
phenomena. 
A second mechanism is bandwagons: firms adopt a practice because of the 
sheer number of rivals that have already adopted it. While information cascades 
derive from information externalities, bandwagons are the result of risk-
avoiding. Abrahamson & Rosenkopf (1993) described two kinds of pressure that 
can start bandwagons: institutional pressures, which happen when non-adopters 
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fear the risk of looking different from the growing number of peers that are 
adopting the practice; and competitive pressures, where non-adopters fear the 
risk of finding themselves at a loss if the practice gives advantages to the early 
adopters. 
Institutional pressures are a source of institutional isomorphism, which I 
discussed above. Here I focus on information cascades and bandwagons driven 
by competitive pressures. As argued by Lieberman & Asaba (2006), both mecha-
nisms are more frequent when the environment is uncertain and managers can-
not confidently foresee the consequences of actions. In such environments, man-
agers will be more receptive to information revealed by others and more sensitive 
to the risks of deviating from the consensus. 
Environmental uncertainty characterises many areas of CSR. What is ethi-
cal or unethical in corporate behaviour is often ambiguous and subject to the va-
garies of media scrutiny and political interpretations; whether or not a given 
practice will satisfy stakeholder requests is not always predictable; accidents can 
change the public perceptions of a firm in unexpected ways. Therefore, responsi-
ble firms may be tempted to seek safety in numbers and emulate the practices 
adopted by their rivals. For example, consider a firm that finds out that a suppli-
er in Indonesia employs 14-year-old workers. It is ethically debatable what the 
firm should do: on one hand, asking the supplier to fire the teenage workers 
would mean wiping out their incomes and forcing them to find probably worse 
jobs elsewhere; on the other, keeping them in the factory would mean profiting 
from child labour (Frank, 2008). The safest solution for the firm is to look at its 
rivals’ behaviour and fire or keep the teenage workers according to the labour 
standards usually followed in that region by the industry. 
3.3. Rivalry mitigation 
Like in other business areas, there may be an optimal level of social performance 
beyond which the economic benefits of investments in CSR are surpassed by 
costs (McWilliams & Siegel, 2001). Rivalry among firms that compete for stake-
holder favour risks leading rivals beyond this optimal level of CSR. The problem 
is similar to price competition. Lowering prices lets a firm attract customers and 
enlarge market share but it may initiate a price war at the end of which all the 
rivals lose. Since firms are aware of this risk, they try to avoid price wars and 
converge on a collusive equilibrium; for the same reasons, they may want to 
avoid costly ‘CSR wars’. 
Tit-for-tat strategies are a typical way of avoiding wars (Lieberman & Asaba 
2006): by matching the moves of rivals, a firm signals that it is ready to use the 
same lever. The signal tells the rivals that the benefits of further actions will be 
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eroded by competition. In this way, imitation is helpful in discouraging rivalry 
and enforcing implicit collusion. 
It is not easy to find direct evidence of rivalry mitigation in the areas of 
CSR, but there is firm behaviour that can be interpreted as signals to rivals to 
avoid aggressive competition on CSR. For example, Fairtrade is currently only a 
niche in the coffee market but, were it to become a ‘non-choice’ requirement for 
the firms importing coffee from developing countries, it could raise the prices 
paid to local producers and damage the profitability of the industry. Large multi-
nationals such as Nestlé would suffer the most from such developments. One 
could expect these multinationals to ostracise Fairtrade; instead, Nestlé entered 
the niche by launching its own Fairtrade-certified coffee, Partners’ Blend, in the 
UK (Dawar & Mitchell 2006). It can be reasonably speculated that this move 
serves, among other purposes, to signal that Nestlé is able to compete in the 
niche and to discourage rivals that may think of investing aggressively in the 
Fairtrade market. More direct evidence of rivalry mitigation was provided by 
Bansal & Roth (2000), who argued that firms could be limited in their efforts to 
practise environmental protection by the fear of ‘persecution’ by peers for going 
beyond industry standards. 
3.4. Low barriers to imitation 
When a socially responsible firm adopts a practice that can have positive impacts 
on its relationships with stakeholders, rivals can imitate that practice in order to 
harvest the same benefits (Banerjee, 2008). In this case imitation is not driven 
by uncertainty: rivals predict a probable positive reaction by stakeholders to the 
practice and act on this prediction. 
In a competitive industry, any practice with clear benefits gets replicated by 
rivals unless there are barriers to imitation, such as property rights, causal ambi-
guity and so on. (Barney, 1991). Therefore, convergent CSR can be the conse-
quence of the fact that many CSR practices may not be protected from imitation. 
CSR practices are typically highly transparent, with little causal ambiguity 
(McWilliams et al. 2006). For a firm, telling stakeholders what it does is an es-
sential part of being responsible (Vogel, 2008): patent protection or ‘secret for-
mulas’ are not usually an option for CSR practices. Moreover, sometimes disclo-
sure itself is a way of being socially responsible, as in the case of firms that dis-
close nutritional information of food (Ye, Cronin, & Peloza, 2015), a practice that 
is not protected by any barrier to imitation if it rewards the firm in terms of 
goodwill and reputation. 
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3.5. Economies of scale 
If we assume that socially responsible firms want to be beneficial to society, con-
vergent CSR can be motivated by the need for them to achieve the scale required 
to address some issues effectively. There are economies of scale in CSR when the 
marginal contribution of a firm’s effort in a given cause increases with the num-
ber of firms that contribute to it, or with the total amount of resources they are 
investing. When there are these economies, a socially responsible firm may pre-
fer to coordinate its efforts with its peers in order to maximise the outcome. For 
example, in August 2008 a coalition formed by major US retail and clothing pro-
ducers called on the Uzbekistan government to take action against the use of 
child labour in the country’s cotton industry. Participants included the National 
Retail Federation, the American Apparel and Footwear Association, and the As-
sociation of Importers of Textiles and Apparel; individual firms in the US and 
UK, including Gap, Marks & Spencer, Target and Tesco, are also contributing to 
the initiative. Of course, each of these firms could have decided unilaterally to 
avoid sourcing from Uzbekistan (this would have been a case of divergent CSR), 
but concerted action is clearly a more effective way to obtain the desired changes 
in other countries plagued by the use of child labour (Business Respect, 2008). 
A more recent example is provided by the reactions of firms to the tragic 
collapse of the Rana Plaza building in Bangladesh; the building, which housed 
garment factories working as sub-contractors for major global apparel firms, 
killed 1,132 workers and injured about 2,500 others (Young & Makhija, 2014). 
Many apparel firms (including a majority that was not involved in the accident 
but used other suppliers in Bangladesh) signed agreements to improve safety and 
working conditions in Bangladesh’s garment factories, based on the awareness 
that only a multi-firm coordinated effort could be immediately effective in im-
proving the situation and filling the holes left open by local authorities. However, 
the agreements were two (the Bangladesh Accord on Fire and Building Safety 
and the Alliance for Bangladesh), each with its respective group of participants, 
mainly due to different legal implications for US and European firms. This divi-
sion of firms in two camps seems unfortunate because it limits the scale that 
each agreement can reach in its efforts. 
3.6. Reputation interdependences 
Stakeholder theory (Freeman, 1984) focuses on the relationships between stake-
holders and a single firm. Nonetheless, sometimes stakeholders form opinions 
and take action against groups of firms. In this case, the fate of a firm depends 
not only on its own CSR practices, but also on the practices of its peers: if they 
behave irresponsibly, they can attract stakeholder reactions against the whole 
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industry. A firm in such an industry could be punished even when its individual 
social performance is faultless. Where there are such interdependences among 
firms, divergent CSR can be futile: a socially responsible firm will sustain all the 
costs of investing in CSR but risk being ‘tarred with the same brush’ as its irre-
sponsible peers. 
One source of interdependences is reputation externalities. In general, 
reputation is important when observers are not fully informed about a firm’s 
‘type’ (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). Observers try to judge the type of a firm on the 
basis of the available signals. The literature on reputation has usually assumed 
that observers look at information that directly concerns the particular firm to be 
judged; scholars have acknowledged that observers may also look at information 
about other firms, if they think these firms are similar to the focal firm in the rel-
evant respects (Barnett & Hoffman, 2008). Reputation externalities arise when 
the observable traits of firm A are used by observers to infer the type of firm B. 
Reputation externalities are frequent in CSR, because stakeholders are of-
ten unable to observe the actual social performance of a firm (King, Lenox, & 
Barnett, 2002). Therefore, they will try to determine the ‘social responsibility 
type’ of a firm (that is, whether the firm is socially responsible or not) on the ba-
sis of clues, which include the observable performance of the peers of that firm. 
As a matter of fact, the reputations of many industries have been hurt by the 
‘sins’ of single members. The Union Carbide disaster in Bhopal damaged the 
reputation of the whole chemical industry; the Three Mile Island accident creat-
ed public suspicion about all nuclear energy plants; the Exxon Valdez oil spill 
was bad publicity for the other major oil companies. 
To avoid reputation externalities, socially responsible firms can try to de-
velop a unique reputation, distancing themselves from rivals; another option is 
to exert pressure and help peers to improve their performances, ensuring that 
good CSR practices are shared across the industry (King et al., 2002). Firms that 
have the most to lose from damage to the industry’s reputation will take a lead-
ing role in the process. These may be the firms with large specific investments in 
the industry or the most publicly visible ones, which are the preferred targets of 
stakeholder backlash (Spar & La Mure, 2003). 
Another source of interdependences is common sanctions: stakeholder in-
terventions against an industry because of the irresponsible behaviour of single 
members. In particular, public regulation is a sanction that is feared by indus-
tries. Reputation externalities can originate common sanctions, because the ac-
cidents of single members can lead stakeholders to believe that all the firms in 
the industry are the same and deserve punishment or regulation. But common 
sanctions can be inflicted even when the stakeholders are aware of differences in 
behaviour among the firms: it is the intrinsic nature of laws and regulation that 
forces public authorities or other agencies to intervene against the firms as a 
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group. Again, socially responsible firms that want to avoid common sanctions 
have a vested interest in helping sub-performing peers to improve their practic-
es. 
Both reputation externalities and the fear of common sanctions can push 
firms to converge on a shared set of practices. These practices will be enforced at 
the industry level through codes of conduct, standards or other forms of private 
regulation. These initiatives will also allow firms to avoid the risk of finding 
themselves at a cost disadvantage, because a private regulation scheme forces all 
the industry peers to sustain the same investments. 
This process involves explicit cooperation among firms and therefore it dif-
fers from the type of convergence predicted by institutional isomorphism. The 
practices will be defined by the firms, not by the stakeholders. For example, both 
reputation externalities and regulatory risk are evident in the efforts of the dia-
mond industry to solve the issue of ‘conflict diamonds’. The issue was brought up 
by NGOs at the end of the 1990s, when some African paramilitary groups began 
to extract rough diamonds to finance their violent operations against legitimate 
governments. After being cut and polished, these diamonds would enter the 
normal distribution channels. The NGOs directed their campaign mainly against 
De Beers, the most visible player in the industry. As a matter of fact, De Beers did 
not import diamonds from conflict regions and had introduced a certificate of 
origin to ensure that its diamonds were not from these regions. Anyway, the 
campaign risked destroying the reputation of products—diamonds and the relat-
ed jewellery—that depend on symbolic values; conflict diamonds are also called 
‘blood diamonds’, which is probably not good advertising for an engagement 
ring. Instead of ignoring the NGOs’ campaign or trying to distance itself further 
from rivals that purchased diamonds from illegal traffickers, De Beers choose to 
use its structural power to push for a political solution to the conflict diamonds 
issue (Kantz, 2007). De Beers persuaded the South African government to con-
vene a workshop on conflict diamonds in 2000 in Kimberley. De Beers also fi-
nanced the creation of the World Diamond Council, an institution that repre-
sented the industry at the workshop and in the subsequent negotiations with Af-
rican governments and NGOs. In 2003, the negotiations gave birth to the Kim-
berley Process Certification Scheme, an industry programme that includes a code 
of conduct, a system of detailed records for all the trades of rough diamonds, 
third-party monitoring, and warranties on the sale of cut and polished diamonds 
to guarantee that they have been purchased from legitimate sources. 
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4. Consequences of convergent CSR 
The distinction between convergent and divergent CSR refers to how socially re-
sponsible firms shape their practices in respect of their rivals. While there is a 
large literature on the antecedents of the CSR policies of firms, this literature has 
concentrated on internal factors (such as organisational culture or ethical cli-
mate; e.g. Crilly, Schneider, & Zollo, 2008) or factors external to the competitive 
context (institutional pressures at the national or the transnational level; e.g. Io-
annou & Serafeim, 2012). In this chapter, I suggest that the actual and predicted 
behaviour of industry rivals is also an antecedent of the CSR practices of firms, 
because one of the most important choices that a responsible firm has to make is 
whether it wants to be like its peers (convergent CSR) or to differentiate itself 
from them (divergent CSR). 
The six causes of convergent CSR that I presented are not exhaustive. Be-
sides, more than one of these causes can concur to activate particular instances 
of convergence. For example, both fear of reputation externalities and institu-
tional pressures coming from NGOs have clearly contributed to De Beers’ deci-
sion to support the Kimberley Process. The aim of the chapter was not to analyse 
when, in what forms, or under what conditions convergent CSR happens, but to 
show that there are multiple and cogent reasons for socially responsible firms to 
renounce developing their own ways to deal with stakeholder issues. 
The convergent/divergent CSR distinction differs from two other distinc-
tions that have been recently introduced in the CSR literature and that apparent-
ly deal with similar problems. Matten & Moon (2008) distinguished between ex-
plicit and implicit CSR. Explicit CSR is deliberate: firms engaging in this type of 
CSR may be under pressure from stakeholders or may collaborate with them, but 
pursue CSR objectives through their own discretional decisions. These firms ex-
plicitly use the language of CSR (or ‘responsibility’, ‘sustainability’ and the like) 
in communicating their policies to the public. In contrast, implicit CSR is com-
pulsory: firms engage in it because they are embedded in a system of formal and 
informal institutions that represent the concerns of society. Firms that engage in 
implicit CSR do not even consider the possibility of rejecting these concerns; they 
do not try to build individual versions of the requirements expressed by institu-
tions; they do not communicate their actions to the public under the label of 
‘CSR’ (or, again, of related concepts). According to Matten & Moon (2008), ex-
plicit and implicit CSR are, respectively, representative of the US and European 
social traditions. 
Implicit CSR overlaps with convergent CSR, because firms engaging in im-
plicit CSR renounce any attempt to differentiate their actions from those of other 
firms. However, we have seen that institutional pressures are only one of the 
causes that push firms to converge on the same practices; convergent CSR due to 
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rivalry mitigation or reputation externalities is the result of strategic thinking 
and deliberate actions, which belong to explicit CSR in Matten and Moon’s dis-
tinction. Therefore, convergent CSR covers much more ground than implicit 
CSR.  
Moreover, implicit CSR can result in divergent practices. Even if a firm ac-
cepts the institutional pressures as non-negotiable, there can be room for firm-
specific adaptations. Many responsible firms build their particular connections 
to society over time and, while lacking an explicit commitment to CSR, they de-
velop idiosyncratic cultures and peculiar projects. For example, US firm General 
Mills is known for focusing its CSR programmes on issues of early childhood ed-
ucation and hunger and nutrition wellness in Minneapolis (Minnesota), where 
the firm is headquartered. General Mills’ approach is local, low profile and dif-
ferent from the explicit CSR agenda of other large US firms; at the same time, 
General Mills’ CSR approach is divergent, because the firm looks at solutions in 
tune with the special needs of the community, not at general best practices 
(Guthrie & Durand, 2008). 
In summary, the implicit/explicit CSR distinction is useful in analysing 
how firms conceive of their responsibilities to society, what forms their decision 
processes take, and how policies are communicated to the public, but it has little 
to say about whether a firm will have a distinctive set of practices or align itself 
with its rivals. 
Porter & Kramer (2006) distinguished between responsive and strategic 
CSR. Firms adopt responsive CSR when their only objective is to mitigate the ad-
verse societal effects of their business operations and improve relationships with 
stakeholders. Firms that follow the responsive CSR approach address generic so-
cial issues that are not directly related to their business (such as poverty in de-
veloping countries where the firms do not have operations) or, if they intervene 
in their own value chain, their purpose is only to reduce harm. Firms adopt stra-
tegic CSR when they want to achieve unique positions and look for business op-
portunities that create value (for themselves and for society). These firms do not 
stop at mitigating harm, but try to transform the value chain in ways that con-
tribute to competitive advantage; alternatively, they invest in social causes that 
are directly relevant to their competitive arena and could add to the profitability 
of the industry in the long term. 
While it is tempting to assimilate responsive CSR into convergent CSR, and 
strategic CSR into divergent CSR, the two distinctions are different. The main 
reason is that Porter and Kramer’s distinction reduces strategic behaviour to the 
quest for uniqueness, whereas responsible firms can be strategically motivated 
(that is, their intent can be to do more than mitigate harm) but choose not to be 
unique. An example is given by the firms that fear reputation externalities or 
common sanctions and help rivals to improve their CSR practices: these firms 
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want to contribute to industry profitability and therefore their behaviour counts 
as strategic CSR in Kramer and Porter’s distinction; at the same time, they re-
nounce being unique (which is convergent CSR). A firm can even avoid adopting 
an efficient practice that could lead to competitive advantage precisely because it 
would be beyond the reach of its industry peers and risk disbanding a private 
regulatory scheme. Responsive CSR can also be divergent, because firms that fo-
cus on mitigating harm or addressing general social issues can look for an indi-
vidual way to do so and diverge from rivals (General Mills is, again, a pertinent 
example). 
The distinction between convergent and divergent CSR has implications 
both at the societal and at the firm level. At the societal level, the implications are 
about the contribution of firms to social innovation. At first sight, divergent CSR 
seems more promising, since firms that adopt divergent CSR try to create new 
ways of satisfying stakeholder needs. In the convergent CSR approach, the pri-
vate incentives for social innovations are lower, because firms do not expect to 
obtain extra returns from their practices and may want to minimise costs by 
adopting well-established solutions. Moreover, convergent CSR can stifle compe-
tition, as is the case where rivalry mitigation is the primary motivation. However, 
in other cases convergent CSR can facilitate social innovation, especially when it 
takes the form of industry collaborations (such as in the case of the new universal 
charger for mobile handsets), or when it allows cross-firm fertilisation of ideas 
through exchange of knowledge between peers (or within broader coalitions in-
volving firms and stakeholders). 
The social actors may need to appreciate the different private incentives as-
sociated with divergent and convergent CSR. While governments and NGOs tend 
to applaud the adoption of standards or codes of conduct by firms, the lack of 
proper incentives to innovate associated with certain forms of convergent CSR 
can damage society’s best interests in the long term. Policy-makers should con-
sider whether the active promotion of divergent CSR, even through antitrust 
measures, would not sometimes be preferable to industry self-regulation and 
other forms of convergent CSR. The current debate about how to address climate 
change is an example of the tension between the two approaches: on one side 
there are entrepreneurs that invoke public support for research on new energy 
sources or carbon-absorbing technologies, which could disrupt markets and cre-
ate huge opportunities for private profits; on the other side there are incumbents 
that invoke gradualism and favour collective industry improvements that do not 
alter the competitive status quo. 
At the same time, divergent CSR has its own problems. When firms follow 
this approach they expect a competitive advantage; thus, they will focus their in-
novation efforts on outcomes that they can appropriate, for example through dis-
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tinctive product brands. These firms could not invest enough in innovations that 
add to social welfare but cannot be protected from imitation. 
At the firm level, the convergent/divergent CSR distinction helps to explain 
the shortage of conclusive empirical evidence for the business case for CSR. An 
extensive literature has tried to ascertain a measurable link between the social 
performance of firms and their financial performance. As we have seen, the re-
sults have been partially unsatisfactory: the link seems to be weaker than ex-
pected (Margolis et al., 2007). Some scholars have hypothesised, and tried to 
prove empirically, that CSR impacts positively on financial performance only in 
certain circumstances. For example, Hillman & Keim (2001) suggested that the 
CSR activities that are concerned with the management of stakeholders have a 
positive correlation with financial performance, while the CSR activities that ad-
dress generic social issues have a negative impact. Barnett & Salomon (2006) 
showed that certain issues (relationships with employees, relationships with the 
community, protection of natural environment) seem to be more instrumental to 
a firm’s success than others. Hull & Rothenberg (2008) provided evidence that 
CSR activities are more likely to improve the financial performance of the firms 
operating in low-differentiation industries and of the firms that invest the least 
money in R&D. 
Divergent and convergent CSR practices are two types of CSR that could 
impact differently on the bottom line; while (successful) divergent CSR can lead 
to competitive advantage and extra returns, convergent CSR does not allow firms 
to outperform their peers and should have no effect on stock performance or 
profit differentials. Studies about the link between social and financial perfor-
mance could arrive at clearer results if they focused on firms with divergent CSR 
approaches. 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter I tried to answer the question: why do many firms that make cost-
ly investments in CSR choose to converge on practices that cannot create com-
petitive advantage? Such a convergence is difficult to reconcile with the widely 
shared idea that there is a business case for CSR, since profits require that a firm 
differentiate itself from rivals. I identified six different causes for this conver-
gence and suggested that the CSR policies of firms are shaped not only by institu-
tional factors or by internal culture, as is largely acknowledged in the literature, 
but also by strategic reasoning: firms compare their policies with those of their 
rivals in the industry. This means that, while the benefits associated with the 
business case (such as reduced transaction costs or improved reputation) are re-
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al, firms may be forced to share them with their rivals or simply find it more 
prudent not to compete on CSR. 
In trying to explain why many firms adopt convergent CSR practices, I take 
part in the line of enquiry suggested, among others, by Aguilera et al. (2007: 
837), which is to find out “what catalyzes organisations to engage in increasingly 
robust CSR initiatives and consequently impact social change” and, correlatively, 
what can block organisations from engaging in such robust CSR initiatives. 
While divergent CSR does not necessarily equal ‘robust CSR’, the convergence in 
CSR practices has the potential to weaken innovation and to push firms to limit 
their investments. 
While the six causes are conceptually independent, it is necessary to formu-
late criteria to discriminate empirically among them. Some criteria have been 
mentioned in the chapter: for example, looking at the player who starts a given 
initiative helps separate processes due to institutional isomorphism (guided by 
stakeholders) from processes due to reputation externalities or fear of common 
sanctions (guided by firms). Research is required to formulate other criteria and 
to test the different empirical predictions. 
The effects of convergent and divergent CSR on social innovation are also 
in need of research. Here I stopped at the suggestion that convergent CSR can 
stifle innovation and that firms applying divergent CSR can selectively look at 
opportunities for social innovation that are appropriable, discarding others that 
could possibly have greater beneficial impacts on society. Research should ana-
lyse the different outcomes of the two types of approach in more detail and take 
into consideration situational factors, such as the particular social issue to be ad-
dressed, the state of industry rivalry, the traits of the institutional environment 
and so on. 
Finally, the convergent/divergent distinction has managerial implications, 
because firms need to establish what type of CSR best fits their needs. Many of 
the advantages that supporters of CSR tend to associate with being socially re-
sponsible, such as the ability to attract and retain customers, are probably asso-
ciated only with divergent CSR. The choice between the two types of CSR should 
depend on conditions such as the firm’s resources and the expected moves of ri-
vals. Divergent CSR in today’s firms is relatively rare, which suggests that these 
conditions may be restrictive, but continuous changes in the global economy, 
technologies and the institutional environment could open up opportunities to 
be seized. 
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Chapter 6 
Corporate Social Responsibility 
and Implicit Contracts  
1. Introduction 
Stakeholder theory has frequently advanced the view that a firm is a nexus of ex-
plicit and implicit claims, where explicit claims consist in laws and explicit con-
tracts, while implicit claims stem from implicit contracts between the firm and 
stakeholders (Hill & Jones, 1992; Klein, Mahoney, McGahan, & Pitelis, 2012). 
The defining characteristic of implicit contracts is that they cannot be enforced in 
courts (Cornell & Shapiro, 1987). This view is normatively used to criticize the 
shareholder primacy approach, in which the shareholders are the only proper 
claimants on the residual income of the firm (Zingales, 2000). Moreover, stake-
holder theory emphasizes that firms use implicit contracts to establish value-
creating relationships with stakeholders, because these contracts encourage 
stakeholders to make relationship-specific investments (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Klein, Crawford, & Alchian, 1978) and provide effort (Helper & Henderson, 
2014) in situations in which explicit contracts would be inefficient. 
An implication of this view is to present Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) and cognate forms of stakeholder management as fulfilling certain implicit 
contracts with stakeholders (Bosse et al., 2009; McGuire et al., 1988). CSR in 
particular is conceived as a firm’s voluntary effort to assume responsibility for 
social and environmental issues beyond what is mandated by laws (McWilliams 
& Siegel, 2001). The implicit-contract perspective opens the road to a ‘win-win’ 
argument in which CSR satisfies stakeholder needs that have no legal force but 
are protected by implicit contracts that generate rents for the firm (Harrison et 
al., 2010). 
In this chapter I suggest that this view is flawed, because the requisite for 
entering and maintaining implicit contracts is being trustworthy (Baker, 
Gibbons, & Murphy, 2002; Gibbons & Henderson, 2012), which does not coin-
cide with being socially responsible. Stakeholders appropriate part of the rents 
produced by the implicit contracts; so, stakeholders are interested to contribute 
to the relationship as long as they trust the firm to adhere to the agreement. The 
168   |   CSR, Stakeholder Trust, and Organizational Outcomes  
 
importance of trustworthiness has two consequences. First, CSR can facilitate 
firms in entering implicit contracts by improving the trustworthiness of the firm 
in the eyes of stakeholders. Second, CSR is often not required to enter implicit 
contracts, because it can be superseded by alternative ways of demonstrating 
trustworthiness. 
In developing this position, I try to move beyond the economic interpreta-
tion of implicit contracts (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012), which reduces the 
trustworthiness of the firm to the expectation that the firm will find it beneficial 
to honour the contract. In this interpretation, stakeholders have calculative trust 
(Williamson, 1993), i.e., a rational assessment of the conditions that may drive 
the firm to fulfil promises. This interpretation is too narrow, because decades of 
trust research point at the existence of other types of trust that are founded on 
personal ties and social rules, rather than calculation (Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). 
Moreover, calculative trust is actually more typical of arm’s-length relationships 
than the open-ended relationships that usually harbour implicit contracts 
(Poppo, Zhou, & Li, 2016). While the theoretical premises of the economic inter-
pretation of implicit contracts and of the trust literature are often different, I try 
to show that these views can be usefully combined. By drawing from both, I pro-
vide a list of three (non-exhaustive) reasons why stakeholders expect a firm to 
honour agreements: the relationship is valuable to the firm; the firm is benevo-
lent toward the stakeholders; the firm has integrity. 
In this chapter, I contribute to research on organizational outcomes of CSR 
by arguing that CSR facilitates implicit contracts. CSR presents stakeholders with 
activities that improve perceptions of a firm’s intention and purposes. First, CSR 
signals a firm’s long-term orientation, similar to R&D investment, because the 
benefits of CSR require time to materialize (Eccles et al., 2014). Long-term orien-
tation in turn increases the value of implicit contracts for the firm, making more 
probable that it honours them. Second, CSR demonstrates benevolence, because 
the open-ended nature of the relationship allows stakeholders to experience the 
degree of care and concern that the firm has for them. Finally, CSR supports 
stakeholder attributions of integrity, because it implies that a firm wants to adopt 
principled behaviour. Both benevolence and integrity are trustworthiness dimen-
sions that, again, increase the likelihood that the firm honours implicit contracts. 
For all these reasons, stakeholders will consider socially responsible firms trust-
worthy parties with which to agree these contracts. 
Another contribution of this chapter is to the literature on the antecedents 
of CSR (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). CSR adds to factors that determine the amount 
of rent that a firm is expected to extract from implicit contracts, which remains a 
determinant of the firm’s willingness to fulfil promises. Under the premise that 
CSR is costly, because it absorbs resources that could serve other purposes (in-
cluding managerial attention), I argue that the degree of adoption of CSR is di-
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rectly related to industry- and firm-level variables that make implicit contracts 
important to a firm’s strategies, and inversely related to the strength of overrid-
ing factors that make a firm trustworthy in implicit contracts. Based on this rea-
soning, I analyse five areas in which rates of CSR adoption should be higher or 
lower, providing empirical predictions about antecedents of CSR. These are 
speculative predictions that showcase the empirical content of the implicit-
contract perspective; future research is needed for proper theorizing and testing. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. In section 2, I pre-
sent the economic interpretation of implicit contracts and explain how the notion 
of trustworthiness used in this interpretation can be enriched by a realistic con-
sideration of the sources of trust identified in the literature. In section 3, I dis-
cuss the place of implicit contracts within stakeholder theory and how firms can 
use CSR to increase their trustworthiness and, as a consequence, facilitate im-
plicit contracts. In section 4, I identify and examine the areas in which the im-
plicit-contract perspective explains variance in CSR adoption. Section 5 con-
cludes.  
2. Theoretical background 
2.1. Implicit contracts and trustworthiness 
Implicit contracts have been defined as “arrangements that are not legally bind-
ing but that give both sides incentives to maintain the relationship” (Okun, 
1981). These contracts are “invisible handshakes” (Okun, 1980) that are ground-
ed in mutual understanding between the parties of what they expect from each 
other. Implicit contracts are very common both within the firm (e.g. between 
managers and employees) and in business relationships (e.g. between a firm and 
its suppliers). Typically, implicit contracts arise in transactions that are in some 
way open-ended, rather than in spot-market exchanges that expire immediately. 
Open-ended relationships – that is, continued or repeated – are exposed to fu-
ture contingencies that may change the payoffs of the parties and impinge on 
their willingness to honour obligations. Complete contracting of future contin-
gencies, which are often hard to describe in advance, is notoriously costly. This is 
where implicit contracts offer a flexible and convenient alternative for governing 
the relationship without having to formally specify future contingencies. 
Implicit contracts have been important in economic research of labour 
markets, based on the observation that firms fulfil certain broad commitments to 
their workforce even in absence of formal contractual obligations (Azariadis, 
1975). For example, employment and wages exhibit low volatility during business 
cycles, contrary to what one would predict if sheer forces of supply and demand 
ruled labour markets. Low volatility implies that workers do not get significant 
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wage raises when the cycle is positive and firms tend not to cut wages or lay off 
workers when the cycle is negative. These phenomena make sense if the explicit 
wage contract between firms and workers is sided by a further accommodation 
that workers will moderate their wage requests during positive cycles in ex-
change for wage and job security during negative cycles. While implicit, such an 
agreement can be well understood and counted upon by employers and unions, 
and give rise to conflict in case either party infringes on it. Implicit contracts in 
labour markets usually characterize long-term work relationships that are the 
opposite of recent forms of “precariat” (Standing, 2011), which are based on 
mere arm’s-length formal selling of work.  
Macaulay (1963) was the first to present anedoctical evidence of the perva-
siveness of informal and good-faith agreements in business. The widespread ac-
ceptance of implicit contracts can be puzzling when considering that they cannot 
be enforced in courts. Actually, a defining characteristic of these contracts is that 
parties can default on them without going bankrupt (Cornell & Shapiro, 1987). 
Implicit contracts are essentially promises: each party must trust the other to de-
liver on the contract without being legally required to do so. Godley (2013) re-
ports how U.S. manufacturer Singer created a market for domestic sewing ma-
chines in Europe at the end of the 19th century by promising customers an after-
sale service that was necessary for maintaining the machines but was not written 
in a formal product warranty. The reason was that Singer did not want to be le-
gally forced to provide assistance to European customers if the market failed to 
develop. Singer needed to make after-sale service contingent on a future state 
(achieving a sufficient number of customers), which, however, was difficult to 
contract. Merely promising to provide service bypassed the problem. The implicit 
service contract was grounded in the customer’s general understanding that 
Singer could disappear at any time, but was also interested in word-of-mouth 
publicity and in growing its business. A part of Singer’s success in convincing 
customers was due to its innovative selling system, in which thousands of sales 
staff visited households, establishing face-to-face relationships with customers 
and providing both the pre-sale demonstration and the after-sale service. The 
other part was that customers were allowed to pay in instalments, which were 
collected by the sales staff, giving customers some bargaining power, since they 
could block payments if the machines were not serviced.  
This example shows that implicit contracts do not necessarily have to be 
tacit. Verbal promises or even actual handshakes are implicit contracts as far as 
they do no create legally enforceable obligations. This is why some prefer to 
speak of ‘self-enforcing contracts’ (Telser, 1980), emphasizing that parties en-
force the contract themselves without going to courts, or ‘relational contracts’ 
(Baker et al., 2002), emphasizing that the contract rests on a protracted relation-
ship between the parties. However, these are different labels for the same under-
Chapter 6   |   171  
  
lying definition. So, here I will stick to the original term, ‘implicit contract’, 
which prevails in the stakeholder theory literature (e.g., Klein et al., 2012) that I 
will address later. 
The economic interpretation of implicit contracts has been that parties 
honour the terms of the agreement as long as it is beneficial for them to do so 
(Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). First, fulfilling the promises keeps a productive 
relationship alive. Second, those who fulfil promises develop a reputation for 
trustworthiness and are able to enter new implicit contracts, with the same party 
or others (Kreps, 1990). This logic can be modelled as a repeated cooperative 
game in which the implicit contract yields streams of income for the parties, orig-
inating from on-going or future business activities. The stream, after being dis-
counted at a given rate (reflecting inter-temporal preferences of each party), de-
fines the value of the relationship. At each stage of the game, parties will deliver 
on the contract if their respective value of the relationship is larger than their 
immediate payoffs of reneging on it. The model has many testable implications, 
for example that large firms are more likely than small firms to adhere to implicit 
contracts, because large firms have bigger streams of income to lose if they harm 
their own reputation (Klein et al., 1978).  
However, the economic interpretation reduces the trustworthiness of a par-
ty to the expectation that the party will find advantageous to honour the contract. 
In the trust literature, this expectation is called calculative trust (Williamson, 
1993), deterrence-based trust (Rousseau et al., 1998), or cognitive trust 
(McAllister, 1995). Decades of trust research indicate that other types of trust ex-
ist which are not founded on calculation but on personal ties and social rules 
(Fulmer & Gelfand, 2012). So-called affective trust (McAllister, 1995) stems from 
the positive emotions of the trustor generated by the relationship with the trus-
tee; this type of trust makes the trustor especially prone to engage in relation-
ships when control systems (such as legal enforcement) are absent and in general 
to venture beyond what is permitted by available information (Johnson & 
Grayson, 2005). Affective trust develops over time and so is likely to affect the 
long-term relationships that harbour implicit contracts. In fact, cognitive trust is 
more typical of short-term or exchange-oriented transactions (Poppo et al., 
2016). 
Gibbons & Henderson (2012) suggest that implicit contracts may also be 
supported by social trust, which is the propensity to trust others by individuals 
who share a given culture or certain institutions. In an atmosphere of social 
trust, implicit contracts are facilitated by a sense of mutual respect and a consen-
sus on principles of fair play. Social trust might explain why firms from some 
countries (such as Germany and Japan) seem to find it easier to build long-term 
relationships with employees and suppliers that are riddled with implicit con-
tracts (Dore, 1983; Hall & Soskice, 2001; Smitka, 1991). 
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Finally, it is implausible that parties always have detailed information 
about how valuable the relationship is to the other party (Halac, 2012). The value 
of the relationship depends on factors that can be largely unknown, such as the 
other party’s plans, business opportunities, and whether the reputation costs of 
reneging on the contract are large enough to prevent exit. For example, workers 
may find it difficult to predict whether the employer, in face of increased compe-
tition and cost pressures, will find it convenient to honour implicit contracts or 
shut the factory down and offshore production. Moreover, the value of the rela-
tionship is highly sensitive to discount rates (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012): the 
other party might be a ‘patient’ type (low discount rate), who is interested in 
staying on the market and entering new implicit contracts in the future, or an 
‘impatient’ type (high discount rate), who looks for a quick payoff and is open to 
short-term opportunistic behaviour. The type of the party is hard to assess, espe-
cially at the beginning of the relationship, e.g. when customers were meeting 
Singer’s sales staff in the first foray of the firm in Europe. The general lack of de-
tailed information on the value of the relationship for the other party suggests 
that non-calculative forms of trust, involving some ‘leap of faith’ (Möllering, 
2001), will be often needed to initiate and uphold implicit contracts. 
2.2. Benefits of implicit contracts in relationships with stakeholders  
Implicit contracts allow firms to engage in value-creating relationships (with 
employees, suppliers, customers, and other stakeholders) that would be less effi-
cient if governed through market transactions or formal long-term agreements. A 
first benefit of implicit contracts is to encourage relationship-specific invest-
ments by stakeholders (Dyer & Singh, 1998; Klein et al., 1978). An investment is 
relationship-specific when the stakeholder cannot redeploy it to an alternative 
use without bearing substantial costs (Williamson, 1985). Typical examples in-
clude employees who learn skills that are tailored to the processes of the firm, 
suppliers who build specialized equipment to provide custom-made components 
for the customer, or customers who buy durable goods that require assistance by 
the producer. The size of relationship-specific investments varies with the tech-
nological characteristics of industries and the strategies of firms; however, it is 
widely acknowledged that large amounts of relationship-specific investments are 
at stake in firms (Klein et al., 2012). 
Relationship-specific investments create rents, because specialized re-
sources are usually more productive than generic resources. After stakeholders 
make the investment, the firm may recur to opportunism to appropriate the 
whole rent, because stakeholders cannot threaten to exit the relationship without 
losing the investment (Klein et al., 1978). Therefore, long-term contracts specify-
ing how the rent is to be divided between the parties are needed ex ante to pro-
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mote relationship-specific investments by stakeholders (Williamson, 1985). Ex-
plicit contracts can play this role, but they are inferior to implicit contracts when 
the conditions to be specified are too complex. For example, employees who in-
vest effort to learn specialized skills need to be assured that the firm will not lay 
them off, as long as they do a good job. Similarly, buyers of durable products ex-
pect adequate assistance at a reasonable cost. What constitutes a ‘good job’, ‘ade-
quate assistance’, or ‘reasonable cost’ is generally too nebulous and state-
contingent to be written down in an explicit contract (Cornell & Shapiro, 1987). 
Implicit contracts allow parties to leave these terms unspecified and use mutual 
understanding and direct knowledge of the situation to establish whether or to 
which extent the agreement is being respected (Baker et al., 2002; Dyer & Singh, 
1998). Additionally, implicit contracts give parties the flexibility to adjust their 
conceptions of appropriate execution in response to new information or changes 
in relevant circumstances (Uzzi, 1997). Therefore, it is not surprising that implic-
it contracts are often the preferred way of managing complex long-term relation-
ships, while explicit contracts are left for situations fraught with distrust. For ex-
ample, Gillan, Hartzell, & Parrino (2009) shows that only a minority of the CEOs 
of S&P 500 firms have comprehensive formal employee agreements; such 
agreements becomes more common when it is less likely that the relationship is 
sustainable. 
Second, implicit contracts can be used to elicit stakeholder effort when the 
required actions cannot be specified ex ante or verified ex post (Dyer & Singh, 
1998; Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). In the Toyota production system, workers 
are expected to identify quality issues and pull an andon cord to ask for real-time 
help, and if necessary to pull the cord twice to stop the production line. It is not 
possible to specify exactly the cases in which the cord must be pulled; the system 
depends on the workers’ ability to evaluate when an issue is serious enough to 
require intervention (Helper & Henderson, 2014). Relatedly, the firm cannot re-
ward workers who pull the cord with monetary incentives, which might lead to 
abuses. Instead, the system is based on an implicit contract in which the firm 
asks workers to take responsibility for quality and reward them with lifetime 
employment. Here relationship-specific investments are absent and the implicit 
contract does not aim at protecting stakeholders from opportunism, but at moti-
vating them to situationally complex behaviour that rests on tacit knowledge or 
expert judgement. Stakeholders are in a position to enforce the contract by simp-
ly withdrawing the effort. These implicit contracts are pervasive in work envi-
ronments and may arise in any other relationship in which parties interact re-
peatedly, develop common understandings and expect each other to act accord-
ing to shared priorities (Poppo et al., 2016; Saparito, Chen, & Sapienza, 2004). 
To summarize, many implicit contracts are ways of using trust and rela-
tional knowledge to promote investments and efforts by stakeholders, as an al-
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ternative to legal enforcement of costly, rigid, and sometimes impossible explicit 
contracts that should detail the endless contingencies that may intervene in a re-
lationship. Firms that find it difficult to recur to implicit contracts can be at seri-
ous competitive disadvantage, because stakeholders will avoid relationship-
specific investments, ask to negotiate costly explicit long-term contracts, or ex-
pect to be paid a premium for making the investment under market transactions 
that expose them to the risk of opportunism by the firm. Additionally, these 
firms may face lower effort by stakeholders, or have to pay them higher compen-
sation to obtain the same degree of motivation as firms that use implicit con-
tracts. 
The literature has emphasized that implicit contracts are difficult to build 
and maintain and that firms are widely heterogeneous in their ability to do so 
(Barney & Hansen, 1994; Dyer & Singh, 1998). Apart from size and other firm 
characteristics that impact on the value of the relationship (Klein et al., 1978), 
managers differ in their understanding of which implicit contracts are valuable, 
their skills in communicating the contracts effectively to stakeholders, and their 
ability to change the terms of the contracts when needed without giving the im-
pression that they are betraying old agreements (Baker et al., 2002; Gibbons & 
Henderson, 2012; Halac, 2012). In the next section, I suggest that firms may also 
enhance their access to implicit contracts by becoming trustworthy in ways that 
exceed mere calculative trust. In particular, I will look at how CSR activities may 
influence stakeholder perceptions of a firm’s purposes and intentions, contrib-
uting to the credibility of the firm when using implicit contracts. 
3. The role of Corporate Social Responsibility in implicit contracts 
3.1. The firm as a nexus of explicit and implicit claims 
Firms have been presented as nexuses of explicit and implicit claims (Baker, 
Gibbons, & Murphy, 2001; Hill & Jones, 1992; Kim & Mahoney, 2010; Klein et 
al., 2012; Shleifer & Summers, 1988; Zingales, 2000). Explicit claims are intend-
ed to include laws and explicit private contracts, both of them being assisted by 
court enforcement. Implicit claims are stakeholder expectations without legal 
force but with a legitimate basis for deserving consideration. While implicit con-
tracts in general could provide such a basis, stakeholder theorists focus on rela-
tionship-specific investments made by stakeholders under implicit contracts as 
the immediate foundation of implicit claims (Klein et al., 2012). The ‘stake’ itself 
is defined as the amount of relationship-specific resources that stakeholders have 
invested in a firm (Hill & Jones, 1992). 
Stakeholder theorists suggest that firms must satisfy both explicit and im-
plicit claims, in contrast to the canonical property-rights view that treats share-
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holders as the only proper claimants on the residual income of the firm (Klein et 
al., 2012). This suggestion comes in (at least) two flavours, normative and in-
strumental (Donaldson & Preston, 1995). Normatively, firms must satisfy implic-
it claims to compensate stakeholders for making value-creating relationship-
specific investments under mutually understood anticipations of reciprocity. For 
such stakeholders as local communities or society at large, which is the claimant 
for human rights, environmental protection or other global issues, implicit 
claims stem from broad social contracts that commit firms to address fundamen-
tal societal demands in exchange for access to natural, social, or political re-
sources (Donaldson & Dunfee, 1994). Instrumentally, fulfilling implicit claims 
allow firms to build value-creating relationships with stakeholders, as examined 
in the previous section. Moreover, it prevents stakeholders from making their 
claims explicit (e.g., governments could pass new regulation in response to cor-
porate misbehaviour), exit the relationship, or damage the firm’s reputation by 
using voice (Hill & Jones, 1992). 
When stakeholder theorists adopt the implicit-contract perspective, they 
describe CSR activities and analogous forms of ‘managing for stakeholders’ 
(Harrison et al., 2010) as ways of fulfilling the stakeholder claims. Low levels of 
CSR coincide with an inability by the firm to honour implicit contracts (McGuire 
et al., 1988) or a failure to address the anticipations of reciprocity by stakehold-
ers who contribute investments and effort in absence of legal enforcement (Bosse 
et al., 2009). CSR activities that do not aim at honouring implicit contracts are 
presented as irrelevant to a firm’s value creation objectives. For example, 
Hillman & Keim (2001) theorize (and find evidence) that a firm’s participation in 
social issues that are not related to primary stakeholders (shareholders, custom-
ers, suppliers, employees, local communities, and the natural environment), who 
are those exchanging resources with the firm, do not provide a basis for value 
creation; such social issues might be avoiding nuclear energy or not engaging in 
gambling, tobacco, and other ‘sin’ industries. Alternatively, firms that establish 
stakeholder relationships that go beyond mere honouring of contracts are viewed 
as instances of collectivistic organizational identities (Brickson, 2005) or com-
munal sharing relational models (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2016). 
I suggest that CSR, even when it is not directed to honour implicit con-
tracts, significantly contributes to the capacity of firms to recur to them. The crit-
ical role of CSR in implicit contracts becomes clearer after acknowledging that 
these contracts are grounded in types of trust that are not always calculative.  
3.2. Value of the relationship, benevolence, and integrity  
Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman (1995) introduced ability, benevolence, and integri-
ty as the three main dimensions of the trustworthiness of a referent. Ability con-
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sists in the skills that allow a referent to perform as promised. Benevolence is the 
referent’s particularized attachment to the trustor, based on specific care and 
concern that do not necessarily extend to other parties. Integrity is defined as the 
extent that the referent is honest, fair, or adheres to values approved by the trus-
tor. Ability is the ‘can-do’ component of trust; benevolence and integrity define 
the ‘will-do’ component that decides whether the referent will fulfil the trustor’s 
expectation, on top of self-interest for doing so (Colquitt et al., 2007). Trust liter-
ature generally accepts these dimensions as a parsimonious and encompassing 
set of the relevant features of the trustee (Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). 
Let us assume that stakeholders believe that the firm has the ability to per-
form as desired. Then, by combining the value of the relationship for the firm 
and will-do trustworthiness attributions, there are at least three reasons why 
stakeholders could trust the firm to fulfil the implicit contract. 
1. It is in the best interest of the firm to honour the contract (the relation-
ship is valuable to the firm). 
2. The firm has special care and concern for them (the firm has benevo-
lence). 
3. The firm has promised (the firm has integrity). 
Given certain projected streams of income from stakeholder relationships, 
a firm will honour implicit contracts to the degree that it is patient, because low 
discount rates make future benefits of continued relationships look larger than 
immediate payoffs of defection. Patience consists in the long-term orientation of 
the firm, that is, an organizational attitude or deliberate enterprise strategy to 
sacrifice immediate gains (Crilly, 2013). A documented lack of long-term orienta-
tion damages a firm’s capacity to engage in implicit contracts, because stake-
holders will think that the firm gives a low value to continued relationships. 
When in 1984 General Motors (GM) wanted to change the union contract to in-
troduce teams and implement Japanese-style lean production in factories, the 
firm’s tradition of focusing on short-term financial results made unions reluctant 
to sign the agreement (Helper & Henderson, 2014). The change aimed at relax-
ing the previous explicit contract to facilitate a production system based on less 
codified actions and rewards, governed by implicit contracts. Given that GM’s 
was not credibly committed to long-term results, unions assumed that GM was 
introducing lean production only to speed up production and put greater pres-
sure on shop-floor workers. 
Benevolence means that the firm integrates the welfare of (certain) stake-
holders in its objective function. When the stakeholders are convinced that a firm 
is benevolent to them, it is more likely that they agree implicit contracts, provid-
ing relationship-specific resources and effort. Again, in 1984 GM had a story of 
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adversarial relationship with workers and had infringed on implicit contracts 
when shutting down factories in Flint (Michigan), which heavily depended on 
GM for jobs. This lack of care for workers must be contrasted with the non-layoff 
commitment of Toyota in its U.S. factories of the same period; when the plants 
were running under capacity, Toyota would send workers to training classes and 
place them into the teams that designed the production processes of new cars 
(Helper & Henderson, 2014). Southwest Airlines is also well known for its ‘Em-
ployees Come First’ policy that includes a commitment to give them a stable 
work environment. Southwest has been one of the few airlines that refrained 
from reducing workforce in the aftermath of September 11 (Conlin, 2001) or dur-
ing the recessions of 2008 and 2009 (Bridoux & Stoelhorst, 2014). This com-
mitment can lead employees to attribute benevolence to the firm, which could 
explain Southwest’s persistent excellence in quality of service (Prince & Simon, 
2015), which mirrors employees’ effort.   
Implicit contracts are always ethically coloured, since they are promises, 
which are universally seen as morally binding (Scanlon, 1990). When promises 
are broken, the victims feel offended, even if the promises were not explicit 
(Butler, Giuliano, & Guiso, 2016). The fact that implicit contracts do not specify 
the obligations of parties emphasizes the importance of good faith and reciproci-
ty in interpreting whether the parties are honouring the contract (Bosse et al., 
2009; Granovetter, 1985). Thus, a firm’s perceived integrity provides a reason to 
stakeholders for expecting that the firm will want to fulfil implicit contracts. 
While the trust literature has understood integrity as largely co-extensive with 
ethical behaviour, implicit contracts invoke a more limited sense of integrity, i.e. 
keeping one’s word. This sense is closer to a philosophical tradition that relates 
integrity to agents’ respect of centrally important commitments, rather than to 
moral virtues. Bernard Williams (1973; 1981) showed that integrity is in deep 
opposition to consequentialist reasoning and requires agents to act on their con-
victions even when they clash with personal or collective benefit. Respecting 
promises out of integrity is also different than David Hume’s view that moral 
admiration for keeping one’s word is artificial and derives from the social ad-
vantages of exchanging promises (Anscombe, 1978). 
In the context of organizational trust, a firm’s perceived integrity provides 
a basis to stakeholders for expecting that implicit contracts will be honoured in 
absence of economic interest. Conversely, the perception that a firm does not re-
spect commitments will make stakeholders desist from entering implicit con-
tracts with it or worry about the execution of contracts already in place. 
Volkswagen’s emission scandal in 2015 revealed that the firm was lying to cus-
tomers about its cars’ emissions and had cheated regulators, violating basic 
business commitments. Almost immediately, concerns started to spread about 
the security of jobs in Volkswagen, which were protected by time-honoured im-
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plicit contracts between the firm, the unions, and the local authorities. 
Volkswagen’s controlling families had to reassure the public that they supported 
“the guaranteeing of jobs” (Vasagar, Milne, & Jackson, 2015). These concerns in-
dicate that, after the scandal exposed Volkswagen’s lack of integrity, it would 
have not come as a surprise to see the firm pass the buck onto workers. Actually, 
observers noted that the scandal had put Volkswagen in a position to breach 
their commitment to employees that had become too costly, and obtain crucial 
efficiency gains in operations, since the firm did not have a reputation to defend 
anymore (McGee & Campbell, 2016). 
3.3. How CSR facilitates implicit contracts  
No generally accepted definition of CSR exists, but there is a broad consensus 
that socially responsible firms are those that extend their decision making be-
yond the immediate maximization of profits to satisfy stakeholder needs and ex-
pectations of appropriate business behaviour (Carroll, 1999; Wood, 1991). Social-
ly responsible firms integrate social and environmental issues in their strategies, 
and use their resources, capabilities, and power in ways that respect the interests 
and the values of all involved constituencies. CSR is an attempt at re-orienting 
business in the direction of societal welfare in presence of frequent association of 
firms with social ills (Lange & Washburn, 2012) or recurring narratives in which 
firms are depicted as amoral and ready to cheat (Harris & Wicks, 2010). There-
fore, firms that succeed in presenting themselves as socially responsible can dis-
tance themselves from their less responsible peers and elicit positive stakeholder 
attributions. Research has shown that stakeholders indeed associate the per-
ceived social responsibility of a firm to a higher degree of trustworthiness 
(Homburg et al., 2013; Lin, 2010a; Luo & Bhattacharya, 2009; Stanaland et al., 
2011). In turn, trustworthiness should facilitate firms in entering implicit con-
tracts; however, the role of CSR is different in each of the three reasons for trust-
ing the firm to honour these contracts. 
CSR and value of relationship. Stakeholders are often uncertain as to 
whether the firm is a patient type that values a continued relationship or an im-
patient type that aims at quick payoffs. Since impatient firms will try to disguise 
themselves as patient to enter implicit contracts, firms that are actually patient 
must signal their type to stakeholders. A way for firms to demonstrate patience is 
to engage in activities that are profitable only in the long term, such as R&D in-
vestment, entry in new markets at an immature stage, or building resources with 
no clear short-term worth (Wang & Bansal, 2012). CSR can serve the same pur-
pose because its benefits are long-term (Eccles et al., 2014). Organizational out-
comes of CSR depend on positive relationships with stakeholders, which take 
Chapter 6   |   179  
  
time to build (Barnett, 2007), or the development of such intangible resources as 
reputation and legitimacy, which require consistency over time: “efforts at quick-
ly building an image as an upstanding corporate citizen generally fail” (Fombrun, 
Gardberg, & Barnett, 2000: 102). Even the social and environmental issues to be 
addressed by firms are often long-term (e.g., climate change or labour rights in 
developing countries) and require a corresponding enduring effort. Therefore, 
firms that invest in CSR display an intention to stay around all the time needed 
to reap the results of their policies. This long-term orientation implies that a so-
cially responsible firm will want to honour implicit contracts. 
Stakeholders are more likely to presume a long-term orientation when the 
CSR activities of the firm are not directed at fulfilling an existing implicit con-
tract, because stakeholders will not know whether the firm is patient or is cur-
rently drawing large streams of income from the relationship. For example, a 
firm that ranks as one of the ‘best companies to work for’ may have an enlight-
ened long-term commitment to employees, but it may also be trying to retain 
valuable human capital in a competitive job market. In general, CSR activities 
that are perceived as driven by a firm’s self-interest will not be considered good 
predictors of future firm behaviour, because self-interest depends on circum-
stances that change (Poppo et al., 2008). Moreover, trust is more likely to devel-
op when an action is attributed to internal factors, such as the values of the trus-
tee, rather than external situations, such as business opportunities (Malhotra & 
Murnighan, 2002; Tomlinson & Mayer, 2009). As a consequence, participation 
to social issues without direct connections to primary stakeholders (Hillman & 
Keim, 2001) or philanthropic expenditures on themes that are extraneous to a 
firm’s business, which seem of little strategic value, may help a firm enter implic-
it contracts, if these CSR activities are linked to lasting values or permanent ob-
jectives of society. 
CSR and benevolence. Implicit contracts arise in open-ended relationships 
that give stakeholders the opportunity to experience the degree of care the firm 
has for them. CSR activities can drive attributions of benevolence when these ac-
tivities deliver what certain stakeholders perceive (not always accurately) as spe-
cial treatment, e.g., human resources practices that indicate respect, fairness, 
and a genuine concern for the wellbeing of employees, high product safety stand-
ards that demonstrate attention to customers, or volunteering initiatives that 
imply an interest in participating in the life of local communities. This is first-
hand information that stakeholders gather through repeated interaction with the 
firm or its products, a circumstance that is conducive to affective trust 
(McAllister, 1995). Moreover, human inclinations to personalism lead us to in-
terpret the impact that others have on us as done on purpose (Jones & Davis, 
1965). Therefore, stakeholders who experience positive treatment will be inclined 
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to attribute benevolence to a socially responsible firm even when the CSR poli-
cies of that firm extend to multiple stakeholder categories. CSR approaches that 
are specifically based on responsiveness to stakeholder needs (Mena & 
Chabowski, 2015) or directly engage stakeholders, such as cause-related market-
ing or employee volunteerism (Caligiuri et al., 2013; Robinson et al., 2012), may 
further reinforce personalism and benevolence attributions. Stakeholder percep-
tions that the CSR activities are driven by the firm’s self-interest will tend to 
block benevolence attributions, because benevolence manifests in taking risks or 
making sacrifices for the benefit of the trustor. 
CSR and integrity. Integrity is important because “one could collect plenty 
of evidence indicating that managers are quite capable of ignoring social con-
cerns and breaching trust when doing so is in their own interest” (Holmstrom, 
1988: 58). Assuming responsibility for social concerns means accepting basic 
rules of respect for the interests and values of others. Therefore, adopting CSR 
implies a firm’s commitment to stakeholders, which support attributions of in-
tegrity. A firm’s integrity relates to organizational procedures, internal culture, 
leadership style, and other mechanisms at the firm level that lead to ethical deci-
sion-making and honest behaviour by firm members (Trevino, Weaver, & 
Reynolds, 2006). Direct experiences by a stakeholder with a firm are not suffi-
cient to evaluate its integrity, because integrity is revealed by how the firm treats 
all stakeholders, and not only the stakeholder in question. Internal stakeholders, 
in particular employees, are in a vantage point to observe how the firm deals with 
a variety of organizations and individuals (Jones & Skarlicki, 2012), but other-
wise stakeholders have to rely on second-hand information. For example, em-
ployees will not personally know how the firm manages labour issues in develop-
ing countries. The credibility of second-hand CSR information may be disputed 
because firms are interested in providing biased accounts (Lyon & Montgomery, 
2015) and in publicizing adoption when it is only ceremonial (Lim & Tsutsui, 
2011). Therefore, stakeholders elaborate on the information and arrive at integri-
ty attributions only after making sense of the firm’s activities. Again, the inter-
pretation of the motives behind these activities – more normatively or more in-
strumentally oriented – is likely to figure prominently in the attribution process 
(Donia & Tetrault Sirsly, 2016). 
To summarize, CSR activities can signal that a firm has a long-term orien-
tation and cause stakeholder attributions of benevolence and integrity, although 
the characteristics of the firm, the activities, the issues being addressed, and the 
nature of the information available to stakeholders will act as boundary condi-
tions on the production of these outcomes. Given that CSR has the potential to 
impact on the three major reasons to trust a firm when entering implicit con-
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tracts, a further question to ask is how CSR interacts with other variables that 
enter stakeholder calculations about the value of the relationship for the firm. 
Calculative and affective types of trust might be either complements or substi-
tutes in facilitating implicit contracts (Gibbons & Henderson, 2012). As I exam-
ine in the next section, this question has important implications about the degree 
to which firms will want to engage in CSR in different situations. 
4. Implicit contracts as antecedents of CSR adoption 
Firms vary in the degree to which they adopt CSR. Literature has explored a 
number of antecedents of CSR, ranging from institutional pressures to firm mis-
sion and values (Aguinis & Glavas, 2012). An implicit-contract perspective sug-
gests that, given that CSR facilitates implicit contracts, the degree of adoption of 
CSR by a firm should be directly related to circumstances that make implicit con-
tracts valuable, and inversely related to the strength of other factors that help the 
firm enter implicit contracts without adopting CSR. In the following, I identify a 
number of (non-exhaustive) areas in which the implicit contract perspective can 
explain variance in CSR adoption by firms. The discussion rests on two assump-
tions. First, I assume that CSR is costly, because it absorbs resources that firms 
could deploy to other purposes, including managerial attention (Bansal, Jiang, & 
Jung, 2015). Moreover, even when CSR is merely ceremonial, it exposes firms to 
backlash when stakeholders discover that adoption has been less than substan-
tial (Crane, 2000). As a consequence, in an implicit-contract perspective, a firm 
will restrain CSR adoption when better substitutes are available. Second, I as-
sume that CSR is not the only means to demonstrate integrity and benevolence. 
For example, integrity can be upheld by an ethical committee at the board level, 
which is a typical CSR policy, but also by well-oiled internal audit procedures 
that are part of a firm’s business as usual. Similarly, benevolence can manifest in 
tacit no-layoff commitments that do not appear in formal CSR statements or sus-
tainability reports. 
Importance of implicit contracts in different industries. Industries vary in 
terms of the amount of relationship-specific capital invested by stakeholders, de-
pending on technologies and on characteristics of products and services. Indus-
tries also differ in the degree to which knowledge is codified rather than tacit, 
and to which the performance of workers, suppliers or other stakeholders is easy 
to measure rather than ambiguous. These differences at the industry level are as-
sociated with different propensities of firms to embrace relational approaches to 
stakeholders (Dyer & Singh, 1998). So, it seems reasonable to assume that higher 
CSR adoption might be observed in industries in which such relational ap-
proaches are more common, because firms in these industries could find it criti-
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cal to recur to implicit contracts and, as a consequence, use CSR to become 
trustworthy in the eyes of stakeholders. 
Research about industry-level determinants of CSR is relatively underde-
veloped (Short, McKenny, Ketchen, Snow, & Hult, 2016), but Siegel & Vitaliano 
(2007) provide some evidence that firms that sell experience goods are more so-
cially responsible than those that sell search goods. This evidence is in line with 
the prediction that industries that depend on relational approaches exhibit high-
er adoption of CSR. Experience goods must be consumed before the customer 
can determine their value (e.g., healthcare); search goods can be evaluated be-
fore purchase (e.g., apparel). Experience goods are promises, because customers 
have no legal protection against frustrating quality that stays within an accepta-
ble range. Even when the first impression is positive, the costumer who makes 
repeat purchases must trust the producer to provide the same quality as before. 
Therefore, customer loyalty to experience goods is an implicit contract with the 
producer; firms in industries that produce these goods might be especially inter-
ested in being socially responsible to demonstrate that they deserve this loyalty. 
Importance of implicit contracts in a firm’s strategy. The example of 
Toyota and GM shows that firms in the same industry vary in the degree to which 
they rely on implicit contracts. Firms that rely more might exhibit higher levels 
of CSR than those that rely less, because they are more interested in the trust-
worthiness-enhancing properties of CSR. In particular, one could expect a more 
intensive use of CSR activities that specifically aims at improving a firm’s trust-
worthiness, and not simply of those activities that fulfil extant implicit contracts. 
Luxury brands provide an illustration. These brands give customers a value 
that goes beyond the intrinsic quality of products, conveying exclusivity and 
prestige. CSR has no obvious associations with luxury; actually, the altruistic 
values of CSR seem to harm the self-enhancement concept (dominance over 
people) that is intrinsic to luxury brands (Torelli, Monga, & Kaikati, 2012). How-
ever, a luxury brand implicitly promises customers to preserve the intangible 
value of the product, by maintaining high standards and avoiding actions that 
may dilute the brand, such as cheap brand extensions. So, a long-term orienta-
tion is important to convince customers to pay the extra-price applied to these 
products. The decades-long history of brands like Chanel or Gucci witnesses this 
orientation, while younger luxury firms need to build credibility and might use 
CSR to this end. An example is the emergent Italian luxury brand Brunello Cuci-
nelli, which combines € 3,000 cashmere sweaters with what the founder defines 
a ‘humanistic capitalism’ approach (Bloomberg, 2015). This approach includes 
generous employee benefits, wages that are 20 percent higher than the Italian 
average, support to culture, and a large philanthropic program to restore the an-
cient buildings of the town where the firm is headquartered. CSR activities paral-
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lel Brunello Cucinelli’s policy to avoid brand extensions in eyewear or fragrances, 
which are commonplace even for the leading luxury brands in the same industry. 
These pieces of evidence are suggestive of an effort by the firm to present itself to 
customers as a ‘patient’ type that will honour the implicit contract of luxury 
goods. 
Other signals of the value of relationship. Other things being equal, the 
implicit-contract perspective suggests that large firms should be less socially re-
sponsible than small firms, because as previously noticed large firms draw larger 
streams of income from implicit contracts (Klein et al., 1978). These streams in-
crease the value of the relationship and make CSR relatively superfluous if the 
firm wants to demonstrate trustworthiness. However, one should also consider 
that large firms have financial resources that make it relatively easy for them to 
exit implicit contracts, e.g. to lay off experienced workers and hire talents away 
from smaller competitors. Therefore, large firms can be suspected of being prone 
to opportunism; these suspects might provide a reason for these firms to adopt 
CSR to reveal benevolence and integrity. A further complication is that large 
firms are visible targets that attract external pressures that may force them to 
adopt CSR (Bartley & Child, 2014). 
A firm’s profitability can also be a signal of the value of relationship, even 
though its relationship with implicit contracts seems complex. On one hand, 
profitability concurs with firm size in providing resources that can be used to 
breach implicit contracts, creating a motive for investing in CSR to reassure 
stakeholders. This is an alternative account of the positive link between profita-
bility and CSR that has been constantly found in research and is usually ex-
plained as the effect of slack resources (Bansal, Gao, & Qureshi, 2014). On the 
other hand, profitability signals that the firm is gaining from its implicit con-
tracts and, therefore, it is not interested in breaching them, de-emphasizing the 
need to invest in CSR. 
I previously observed that firm age signals long-term orientation and 
makes CSR less necessary, while young firms suffer from a liability of newness 
that they may try to mitigate through CSR (Wang & Bansal, 2012). Any other 
firm characteristic or decision that demonstrates long-term orientation should 
reduce the value of CSR and be inversely related to its adoption, but the effect 
can be confounded by concurrent mechanisms that go in the opposite direction. 
For example, family ownership is usually associated to a long-term orientation; 
however, family owners can derive affective value (so-called socioemotional 
wealth) from good relationships with stakeholders (Berrone et al., 2010). Prelim-
inary support for the implicit-contract perspective comes from evidence that in-
dicates that family firms are more socially responsible than non-family firms to-
ward external stakeholders, but they seem to neglect internal stakeholders, such 
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as employees, who are more likely to be involved in implicit contracts (Cruz, 
Larraza-Kintana, Garcés-Galdeano, & Berrone, 2014). 
Having a highly salient stakeholder. Some firms depend on a particular 
stakeholder category, such as powerful suppliers with exclusive technologies, 
employees in professional or IT firms, or local governments in the extractive in-
dustry. When the relationship with these stakeholders is shaped by implicit con-
tracts, a firm might choose to focus on demonstrating benevolence to these 
stakeholders, while displaying integrity or long-term orientation is less im-
portant. This situation could lead to lower CSR adoption with regard to other 
stakeholder categories. It is presumable that CSR activities related to salient 
stakeholders will be intensified or not according to the type of efforts necessary 
to please them; for example, one could expect that salience of government leads 
firm to engage in corporate political activity (Lawton, McGuire, & Rajwani, 2013) 
rather than CSR.  
Having high integrity. A firm with a strong reputation for integrity might 
have a small need to demonstrate benevolence or long-term orientation. The re-
sult could be reduced CSR adoption, given that integrity can manifest in coherent 
and transparent behaviour that does not necessarily rest on CSR activities. Indi-
rect evidence that integrity could correlate inversely with CSR has been found in 
non-profit organizations, which are commonly associated to principled behav-
iour, and for which CSR does not seem to contribute to trustworthiness (Lin-Hi, 
Hörisch, & Blumberg, 2014). CSR adoption by a firm can even raise disbelief and 
harm attributions of integrity, if stakeholders see adoption as insincere 
(Vanhamme & Grobben, 2009). 
5. Conclusion 
An extensive literature has showed that implicit contracts allow firms to create 
value by encouraging relationship-specific investment and motivating effort by 
stakeholders. Implicit contracts are commonly used both within the firm and in 
business relationships, due to complexities of contracting all future contingen-
cies. Since implicit contracts are hard to build, they allow firms to achieve com-
petitive advantages over rivals that have an inferior capacity to recur to these 
contracts. Implicit contracts give stakeholder theory a way to propose a view of 
the firm – the nexus of explicit and implicit claims – that supports both norma-
tive and instrumental implications about CSR or other stakeholder management 
activities. 
In this chapter, however, I contended that this view does not take in due 
regard the mechanisms through which firms build trustworthiness. These mech-
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anisms cover both calculative dimensions, related to the value of the relationship 
for the firm, and affective dimensions related to a firm’s integrity and benevo-
lence. As a consequence, the role of CSR emerges as both larger and smaller than 
previously theorized. Larger, because CSR contributes to implicit contracts not 
only by fulfilling them, but also by signalling a firm’s long-term orientation and 
its benevolence and integrity. Smaller, because alternative ways of being trust-
worthy can supersede CSR. For example, sheer firm profitability may reveal that 
the firm is extracting rents from implicit contracts and will not renege on them. 
If stakeholders are also doing so, not many of them will withdraw from the rela-
tionship only because the CSR performance of the firm is somewhat inadequate. 
This logic has immediate application in investigating the antecedents of CSR 
adoption: I described five areas in which the interplay between CSR, industry 
characteristics, firm strategies, and different sources of firm trustworthiness can 
explain variance in CSR adoption. 
This chapter also responds to a call by Gibbons & Henderson (2012) for 
further research to understand whether calculative and other forms of trust are 
complements or substitutes in sustaining implicit contracts. In all the areas that I 
described, I hinted at substitution effects between CSR and other facilitators of 
implicit contracts. However, some complementarity is also possible. Consistency 
between factors (e.g., between adopting a long-term orientation and showing in-
tegrity) and among different domains of CSR may contribute to positive recep-
tion of firm’s efforts (Oikonomou et al., 2014; Wang & Choi, 2013). Moreover, 
stakeholders are aware that single factors may fail; so multiple layers of protec-
tion have value. For example, a firm’s benevolence to stakeholders may be cham-
pioned by managers who are then removed by a hostile takeover (Shleifer & 
Summers, 1988), something that gives weight to a concurrent long-term orienta-
tion of the firm that the new owners may find useful to preserve. 
Although all the areas discussed in the previous section are amenable to 
testing, there is much to be done empirically to prove the validity of the theories 
that I presented in this chapter. A first general issue is that firms engage in a va-
riety of activities that are beneficial to stakeholders, but a large part of them con-
stitutes informal CSR (Matten & Moon, 2008) and do not appear in the ratings 
that researchers generally use to measure the CSR performance of a firm 
(Chatterji et al., 2016). Therefore, the external validity of these ratings is to be 
disputed, especially if one wants to study CSR as a form of substantial pro-social 
or pro-stakeholder behaviour, and not as a list of recommended practices. Relat-
edly, empirical research often treats CSR as it were a trait of character of the 
firm: stakeholders decide whether a firm is socially responsible or not, and then 
produce some outcome of interest. This assumption may be acceptable as long as 
the firm is evaluated as an entity, e.g. when the outcome is firm legitimacy 
(Delmas & Toffel, 2008) or reputation (Wang & Berens, 2015). But an outcome 
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like trust is situation-specific, because stakeholders will trust the firm to adopt a 
certain action in certain conditions. Correspondingly, trust will relate to certain 
CSR activities that stakeholders experience, observe, and to which they attach 
meanings within the complex relationship they have with the firm. A proper test-
ing of the theory advanced here requires a careful definition of what activities are 
expected to generate which reactions, given a general framework of trustworthi-
ness in implicit contracts. 
Further research is necessary to integrate the determinants of trustworthi-
ness in implicit contracts in a model of trust production that takes into account 
stakeholder scepticism of the true motives behind CSR actions (Mazutis & 
Slawinski, 2014) and credibility issues of the CSR information produced by firms 
(Cho et al., 2015). I provided such a model in chapter 2, but an application here 
would preliminarily require to define the particular attributions and expectations 
of stakeholders when participating in implicit contracts (e.g. in the tradition of 
the psychological contracts research: Rousseau, 1995). So, my hope is that this 
chapter may lay the ground for further theoretical and empirical research on im-
plicit contracts between firms and stakeholders. Given how pervasive implicit 
contracts are in business (and in everyday life), such research is likely to have 
numerous implications for our understanding of how organizations can produc-
tively contribute to society. 
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 Conclusion  
1. Introduction 
This thesis investigated stakeholder trust and Corporate Social Responsibility 
(CSR) in six related chapters. The general research question that I addressed 
was: When and how does CSR lead to increased stakeholder trust and positive 
organizational outcomes for the adopting firms? This question is important be-
cause a growing number of firms are declaring adoption of CSR. Socially respon-
sible firms are expected to take into account societal definitions of appropriate 
business behaviour and extend their decision making beyond the short-term 
maximization of shareholder value (Carroll, 1999; Wood, 1991). However, these 
firms do not want to abandon their constitutive orientation to profit. Whether 
this orientation is compatible with societal welfare or not depends on the organi-
zational outcomes of CSR, that is, on the positive consequences that the firms 
themselves can draw from adopting CSR. According to some scholars, these out-
comes are large enough to provide strong private incentives to invest in CSR, 
supporting a ‘business case’ for fixing social ills (Kurucz et al., 2008). Others are 
convinced that the organizational outcomes are not large enough to promote 
more than ceremonial adoption of CSR and must be complemented by a firm’s 
genuine sympathy for the needs of society (Vogel, 2005). 
My focus has been on the factors that drive the production of organization-
al outcomes. These drivers are essential for understanding the conditions in 
which firms may adopt CSR (Schreck et al., 2013). A fundamental premise of this 
thesis is that organizational outcomes rest on how stakeholders react to CSR ac-
tivities. Although this premise is long standing in stakeholder theory (Laplume et 
al., 2008), much work has still to be done to unravel the complexities of stake-
holder reactions. My main contribution in this thesis is to improve our under-
standing of how CSR activities influence stakeholders and stimulate responses 
that are useful to organizations.  
Among the organizational outcomes of CSR, stakeholder trust occupies a 
special position. First, trust is a necessary ingredient of any business transaction. 
Each party has to believe that the other will honour the agreement; lack of trust 
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may lead stakeholders to withdraw from the relationship or moderate their 
commitment. Second, trust is a precondition of all other organizational out-
comes. CSR may signal that the firm is benevolent or has integrity, which are 
crucial dimensions that make a firm trustworthy (Mayer et al., 1995). However, 
the signal is credible only if the stakeholders are convinced that the firm is not 
fabricating or embellishing information; moreover, the signal has value only if 
stakeholders identify a true prosocial orientation of the firm, and not instrumen-
tal reasons that could change in the future. Paradoxically, this means that CSR 
activities create stakeholder trust (or other organizational outcomes) only if 
stakeholders already trust the firm to be socially responsible (Bachmann et al., 
2015). 
Research reveals that CSR actually increases a firm’s trustworthiness in the 
eyes of the stakeholders (e.g., Bhattacharya, Korschun, & Sen, 2009; Du, 
Bhattacharya, & Sen, 2011), indicating that mechanisms exist that allow stake-
holders to develop trust and sidestep the paradox. Nevertheless, the nature and 
modus operandi of these mechanisms are still largely unclear, which provided 
the motivation for studying trust in this thesis. After reviewing the extant litera-
ture on the organizational outcomes of CSR (Chapter 1), I explored three related 
themes: 
a) How the motives that stakeholders attribute to firms influence the cred-
ibility of CSR activities and the perceived trustworthiness of the firm 
(Chapter 2). 
b) How trust mediates the link between CSR activities and organizational 
outcomes (Chapters 3 and 4). 
c) How firms use CSR to pursue strategic objectives and to establish value-
creating relationships with stakeholders (Chapters 5 and 6).  
The perspective that I adopted is descriptive, in the words of Donaldson & 
Preston (1995). I presented the behaviour of firms as purposeful and deliberate. I 
assumed that firms are mostly aware of the organizational outcomes that CSR 
can produce. Therefore, firms include organizational outcomes in decisions 
about whether and how to engage in CSR. However, I evaded the idea that firms 
treat CSR as business as usual. I emphasized that organizational outcomes are 
highly uncertain, have an ethical dimension, depend on long-term effects, and on 
the specifics of complex and sometimes emotional relationships with stakehold-
ers. In the following section, I summarize the contributions I made in the six 
chapters. In the final section, I draw the main implications and provide sugges-
tions for future research. 
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2. Summary of the contributions 
In Chapter 1, I reviewed the literature on the organizational outcomes of CSR. To 
collect a relevant sample of contributions, I conducted a literature search of ten 
major management journals, three well-known specialty journals in the area of 
business ethics and social issues and management, two leading journals in or-
ganizational behaviour, and another two in marketing. The search covered the 
period from January 2000 to December 2015 (including forthcoming articles 
from the in-press sections of these journals and a list of impactful articles pub-
lished in other journals that I identified through cross-referencing). The final 
sample consisted in 160 articles published in 26 different journals. The break-
down of the articles by year showed than more than half of them had been pub-
lished after January 2012, indicating a growing interest in the topic. I created a 
formalized codebook to code the articles.  
This review made many contributions. First, it covered several articles that 
appeared in recent years and were not included in previous syntheses of the lit-
erature (e.g. Aguinis & Glavas, 2012; Laplume et al., 2008). Second, the litera-
ture search was broader in scope than reviews that had considered only specific 
organizational outcomes (e.g. customers, Peloza & Shang, 2011; nonmarket 
strategies, Mellahi, Frynas, Sun, & Siegel, 2016). Third, the review provided a 
novel categorization of the organizational outcomes of CSR, based on the differ-
ent roles that stakeholders may play with respect to CSR; this categorization al-
lowed a better integration of research than existing distinctions based on stake-
holder categories (such as internal vs. external). 
To identify stakeholder roles, I relied on Wood & Jones (1995), who ob-
served that stakeholders serve at least three roles: a) they set expectations about 
the firm’s behaviour, b) they experience the effects of this behaviour, c) they 
evaluate the behaviour, e.g. they compare it to expectations. I used the partition 
to categorize the articles according to the role played by stakeholders in the 
mechanisms that drove the organizational outcomes. The partition also allowed 
me to classify the theoretical rationales underlying the mechanisms. 
The review showed that, for the expectation role, research has mainly fo-
cused on two organizational outcomes that depend on a firm’s conformity to 
norms: legitimacy (which involves support from a firm’s institutional environ-
ment) and deontic response (which involves positive individual stakeholder reac-
tions to ethically-oriented behaviour). For the experience role, research has con-
nected CSR to the development of firm assets and capabilities, and to improved 
satisfaction, reciprocity, and other positive attitudes by individual stakeholders 
who personally contribute or directly participate in CSR initiatives. For the eval-
uation role, contributions have focused on reputation, moral capital, and trust, 
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which are broad and multi-level outcomes with comprehensive impacts on a 
firm’s business. 
I also developed an integrative framework of the organizational outcomes 
of CSR. The framework identified the processes that link CSR activities to stake-
holder response; the processes vary with the stakeholder role and the type of 
cognitive work in which stakeholders engage (interpretation, perception, 
judgement). I used this framework to spot gaps in the literature and provide 
guidance for further research in this area. Among the gaps of immediate interest 
for this thesis, a dearth of research emerged about the information asymmetries 
between stakeholders and firms. Although it is generally acknowledged that 
dramatic differences exist between actual and perceived CSR, very little is known 
about how stakeholders use the available clues to form perceptions of the CSR 
profile of a firm. Moreover, the review showed that stakeholder attributions of 
motives to a firm’s CSR activities are essential in eliciting stakeholder response. 
Trust seems to depend on motives as well, but research has produced contradic-
tory results as to whether different types of motives are more or less conducive to 
trust. 
In Chapter 2, I introduced a new model of how stakeholder motive attribu-
tions drive the development of stakeholder trust. Stakeholders are generally 
sceptical of the intentions of firms and suspect that the true motives behind CSR 
are not those stated by managers, but aim at avoiding social penalties or project-
ing facades. I followed Ellen et al. (2006) in distinguishing among egoistic-
driven, values-driven, stakeholder-driven, and strategic-driven motives. Previous 
research is particularly confusing with regard to strategic-driven motives, be-
cause different studies have found stakeholders to respond positively, negatively, 
and neutrally to them. Furthermore, studies have given only limited attention to 
how motive attributions influence stakeholder beliefs about the credibility of the 
information provided by a firm about its own CSR activities. 
The model that I introduced describes the development of stakeholder 
trust as a two-stage process. In the first stage, stakeholders attribute a motive to 
the CSR activity stated by the firm and evaluate the credibility of the infor-
mation, based on the attributed motive and other elements (e.g., likeability of the 
source or circumstantial evidence). In the second stage, if the CSR activity is con-
sidered real, stakeholders make trustworthiness ascriptions to the firm; these as-
criptions are shaped by the motive that stakeholders attribute to the firm. This 
model contributed to the literature on trust development, which has not yet sep-
arated issues of firm credibility from issues of trustworthiness. 
In developing the model, I started with the widely accepted definition of 
trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the actions of another party 
based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action im-
portant to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor and control the other 
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party” (Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995: 712). I also adopted the so-called ABI 
framework, which identifies ability, benevolence, and integrity as the dimen-
sions that make a referent trustworthy. The literature has acknowledged that 
CSR may demonstrate that a firm complies with ethical principles (integrity) and 
it has special care and concern for particular stakeholders (benevolence). This is 
the general logic for arguing that CSR contributes to stakeholder trust. However, 
this logic becomes problematic when stakeholders do not observe or experience 
CSR activities, but depend on second-hand CSR information. In the chapter, I 
presented a list of reasons why second-hand CSR information can be a relatively 
weak basis for trust development. For example, the institutional structures that 
should make sure that CSR information is accurate are still embryonic in virtual-
ly every country; many CSR activities are not costly enough to constitute strong 
signals; categorization processes could lead stakeholders to stereotyping of firms, 
deactivating positive information.  
The model I built treats stakeholder trust based on second-hand infor-
mation as a type of initial trust (McKnight et al., 1998). I rooted the model in at-
tribution theory, which tries to explain how individuals attribute causes to oth-
ers’ actions (Kelley & Michela, 1980). This theory implies that stakeholders in-
terpret CSR activities simplistically, without making justice to the mixed motives 
that may move firms to engage in these activities. Based on these theoretical 
premises, I developed four propositions linking each of the motives defined by 
Ellen et al. (2006) to source credibility, which is the first stage of the model. I ar-
gued that stakeholders consider CSR information credible only when they attrib-
ute strategic-driven or values-driven motives to the firm. Then, I advanced four 
other propositions regarding the second stage, in which stakeholders ascribe be-
nevolence and integrity to the firm; the main point was that strategic-driven mo-
tives block these attributions but support calculative trust; only values-driven 
motives provide a proper basis for benevolence and integrity ascriptions. These 
propositions, which are in need of empirical testing, have important implica-
tions. First, they help solve previous contradictory results with regard to strate-
gic-driven motives. Second, the propositions imply that frank statements by 
firms that they expect to profit from CSR (I provided examples in the Introduc-
tion of this thesis) can reassure stakeholders that the firm’s engagement is sub-
stantial, but values-driven motives are essential if a firm wants to build deep and 
durable relationships with stakeholders. 
 In Chapter 3, I presented an empirical study on Fair Trade customers in 
Italy. The study was co-authored with colleagues S. Castaldo, F. Perrini, and A. 
Tencati at Bocconi University, and published on Journal of Business Ethics. The 
study was intended to test whether trust could act as a mediator between CSR 
and organizational outcomes at the consumer level, i.e. willingness to pay a pre-
mium price and brand loyalty. Testing a mediated relationship was highly inno-
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vative when the study was published (2009), because in that period scholars 
were looking for direct relationships between CSR and consumer outcomes, as-
suming that consumers preferred to buy products and services from ‘good com-
panies’ (firms with a reputation for being socially responsible), rather than ‘bad 
companies’ (firms that disregarded their social obligations). However, studies 
were failing to find convincing evidence for such a crude relationship. By focus-
ing on trust, our study intended to show that CSR was not of immediate value to 
customers, but it could improve the credibility of the products or services that 
the firm delivered. 
The context of the study consisted in Fair Trade products sold by main-
stream retail chains. The Fair Trade rules make sure that the grower or producer 
obtain a premium over the market price, along with other financial and opera-
tional support. Consumers finance this premium, because the final retail price of 
Fair Trade products is higher than comparable ‘unfair’ products. 
We choose Fair Trade products because they embodied positive ethical and 
social values that harmonized with general principles of social responsibility, but 
above all because they heavily depended on consumer trust. Fair Trade is a com-
plex system and most consumers are not aware of how it works and how effective 
it is in providing sustenance to local growers or producers. Uncertainties about 
the extent to which the premium price of Fair Trade products is transferred up in 
the value chain abound. Moreover, consumers have no means to verify that the 
Fair Trade label is applied to products that actually conform to the system. 
Therefore, consumers need to trust the seller that the promises of Fair Trade 
products are respected. 
Our hypotheses were that customer perceptions that a retailer was socially 
responsible were related to trustworthiness of that retailer in the eyes of custom-
ers; such trustworthiness was then transferred on the Fair Trade products sold 
by that retailer, eliciting brand loyalty and willingness to pay the premium price. 
We also expected that the effect compounded when the retailer was marketing 
Fair Trade products under its own private label. To test the hypotheses, we inter-
viewed 400 retail chain customers in Milan and Florence (Italy). Importantly, we 
took into account the inherent multidimensionality of CSR and measured only 
the ‘Consumer CSR’ dimension, i.e., the extent to which consumers perceived 
that the retailer wanted to satisfy their needs and protect their rights and inter-
ests. Our idea was that consumers responded more to how a firm treated them 
than to how it treated stakeholders in general. This was a novel methodological 
choice in a period in which studies mainly relied on general CSR scales. 
Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) indicated that the measurement model 
fitted data well and achieved discriminant validity. Then we built a structural 
equation model (SEM) that incorporated our hypotheses. Testing provided full 
support for all of them. This study provided fresh evidence that socially respon-
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sible firms could achieve competitive advantage in the marketplace through in-
creased trustworthiness, in particular for those products in which trust was cru-
cial in determining customer decision. Although we did not develop the point in 
the article, it was easy to connect our ‘Consumer CSR’ dimension to benevolence 
ascriptions of trustworthiness, because this dimension corresponded to specific 
care and concern for a stakeholder category.  
In Chapter 4, I presented another empirical study, co-authored with the 
same team of colleagues, and published in Business Strategy and Environment 
in 2010. The study was about organic products. It built on the previous study of 
Fair Trade and tried to generalize the mediating role of trust to credence goods, 
which have attributes that consumers cannot detect even after purchase or con-
sumption (Darby & Karni, 1973). Both Fair Trade and organic products are cre-
dence goods. The problem with organic products is that consumers are not able 
to personally ascertain that the products are farmed and processed following the 
official organic standards. When products have credence attributes, consumers 
must rely on information provided by producers, retailers, or third parties (e.g. 
certifying organizations). 
As in the previous study, we looked at retailers as vehicles of trust. Howev-
er, organic products are different than Fair Trade products in that consumers 
expect two kind of benefits: a) private benefits, because consumers believe that 
organic products are safer, richer in nutrients, and promote health; b) public 
benefits, because organic farming avoids pesticide, veterinary drugs, additives 
and other synthetic inputs that are bad for the environment. In contrast, Fair 
Trade customers only aim at public benefits (improved well-being of growers or 
producers). Therefore, we hypothesized that consumers of organic products were 
sensitive not only to the ‘Consumer CSR’ dimension, which is related to provision 
of private benefits, but also to an ‘Environmental CSR’ dimension, which is relat-
ed to provision of public benefits through a willingness of the retailer to protect 
the natural environment. Our reasoning was that the ‘Consumer CSR’ dimension 
should increase consumer trust in the products marketed by the retailer. Instead, 
the ‘Environmental CSR’ should increase consumer trust in organic products in 
general, because a retailer that is perceived to care for the natural environment 
and sell organic products will lead consumers to believe that these products are 
true to their promises. As before, we expected that trust ultimately translated in 
brand loyalty and consumer willingness to pay the premium price that is usually 
attached to organic products. 
The study consisted in 183 field interviews to customers of a COOP hyper-
market in Milan. Italy provided an appropriate setting for investigating demand 
for organic products, because it was the third-ranking European market in this 
product category (after Germany and United Kingdom) and had a higher per-
capita consumption of organic products than the European average. By focusing 
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the study on a single retailer, we excluded unobserved heterogeneity in charac-
teristics of different retailers that could influence consumer trust. We also ex-
cluded variation in unobservable reactions of customers to different categories of 
organic products, by concentrating the questionnaire on a single product, which 
was a yogurt sold under the Biologici COOP label. Thus, the only source of varia-
tion in our data was the consumer perception of the degree of COOP’s social re-
sponsibility.  
Again, we used CFA to verify that the fit of our scales was adequate and 
SEM to test our hypotheses. The resulting model provided strong support to 
them. These findings confirmed that CSR allows firms to increase their trustwor-
thiness in the eyes of customers, adding value to trust-intensive products and 
leading to positive consumer attitudes. The study implied that mainstream re-
tailers should improve their social and environmental performance, and com-
municate it to customers, if they wanted to expand their business in the growing 
niche of organic products. An important policy implication was that retailers 
could serve as an effective guarantee of the origin of organic products and com-
plement public certification schemes, such as the EU organic label. 
In Chapter 5, I moved to examining how firms can use CSR to pursue their 
strategic endeavours. This chapter was published in 2010 in a collection edited 
by C. Louche, S. O. Idowu, and W. L. Filho, Innovative CSR: From Risk Man-
agement to Value Creation (Greenleaf Publishing). Given that CSR produces or-
ganizational outcomes, one should expect that firms will adopt those CSR activi-
ties that maximize these outcomes, trust included. Therefore, following accepted 
strategic management theories, socially responsible firms should try to differen-
tiate themselves from their industry rivals and choose innovative and hard-to-
imitate activities. However, the evidence points in the opposite direction: most 
socially responsible firms seem content to adopt the same practices as their ri-
vals, apparently giving up any chance to build a unique position in front of socie-
ty. 
In this chapter, I advanced a distinction between two approaches, which I 
called ‘convergent CSR’ and ‘divergent CSR’.  In the first approach, firms adopt 
practices that have already been adopted by their rivals, or can be easily adopted 
by them, or collaborate with them to develop shared practices. In the second ap-
proach, firms try to be unique in their CSR practices and to build barriers that 
protect these practices from imitation. The widespread diffusion of codes of con-
duct, certified managerial standards, ethical labels, and various types of inter-
firm collaboration testify to the prevalence of the convergent approach. 
Convergent CSR can be the result of external pressures that coerce firms to 
adopt CSR reluctantly, such that they want to minimize effort and adhere to 
available recommended practices. It is also conceivable that firms adopt CSR to 
satisfy ethical principles and therefore do not feel compelled to differentiate their 
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behaviour from rivals that are respecting the same principles. The central contri-
bution of this chapter was in identifying a list of further strategic reasons (i.e., 
motivated by expected organizational outcomes) for choosing the convergent ap-
proach. I presented six non-exhaustive reasons, drawing from institutional theo-
ry and other streams of research that have explored strategic interaction among 
firms in industries. The reasons are: institutional isomorphism, environmental 
uncertainty, rivalry mitigation, low barriers to imitation, economies of scale, 
reputation interdependencies. For each of them, I described their theoretical ra-
tionale, provided illustrative examples, and explained why they could be strong 
enough to push whole industries toward convergent CSR. These reasons are con-
ceptually independent from each other but can overlap empirically; therefore, I 
proposed some criteria to discriminate among them in research. 
This chapter aimed at extending our understanding of the antecedents of 
CSR activities. The literature in this area has mainly concentrated on the varia-
bles that explain whether a firm adopts CSR or not, or the degree of effort by the 
adopting firm. The distinction between convergent and divergent approaches 
provides a foundation for investigating the intriguing topic of why firms adopt 
certain forms of CSR rather than others. As I explained in the chapter, this dis-
tinction has some advantages over other dichotomies proposed in the literature, 
such as ‘explicit’ vs ‘implicit’ CSR (Matten & Moon, 2008), or ‘strategic’ vs ‘re-
sponsive’ CSR (Porter & Kramer, 2006). In particular, it connects a firm’s deci-
sion making to its industry environment and could provide a better way of ana-
lysing the role of CSR in a firm’s strategies. 
In Chapter 6, I proposed an integrative view of CSR, stakeholder trust, and 
implicit contracts. Stakeholder theory has frequently advanced the concept that 
firms are nexuses of explicit and implicit claims, in opposition to the shareholder 
value approach. CSR and related forms of stakeholder management have been 
seen as ways of honouring implicit contracts with stakeholders. Moreover, im-
plicit contracts are believed to encourage relationship-specific investment and to 
motivate effort by stakeholders. Therefore, stakeholder theorists have often ar-
gued that firms may achieve competitive advantage through cooperative rela-
tionships with stakeholders, supported by CSR or other activities that satisfy 
stakeholder needs and nurture value-creating implicit contracts. 
I contended that this argument is flawed because implicit contracts do not 
rest on satisfying stakeholder needs, or on being socially responsible, but on 
trust. In section 3 of this chapter, I proposed that, since stakeholders appropriate 
a part of the rent produced by implicit contracts, they will not withdraw from the 
relationship or reduce effort as long as they believe that the firm wants to adhere 
to the agreement. As a consequence, CSR can facilitate a firm in entering and 
maintaining implicit contracts by increasing its trustworthiness, and not simply 
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by honouring existing contracts. However, when firms have alternative ways of 
demonstrating trustworthiness, CSR will not be needed at all. 
To build my integrative view, I started from the traditional economic inter-
pretation of implicit contracts, in which parties honour the agreement if and only 
if it is beneficial for them to do so. This interpretation assumes that implicit con-
tracts rest on calculative trust, which is disconfirmed by decades of trust research 
that show that trust can be founded on personal ties and social rules as well. 
Therefore, I proposed that there are at least three reasons why stakeholders (or 
other parties) can trust the firm to fulfil an implicit contract: a) it is in the best 
interest of the firm to do so (calculative trust), b) the firm has special care and 
concern for the stakeholder (benevolence), c) the firm has promised (integrity). I 
suggested that CSR can increase trustworthiness by contributing to all these rea-
sons, including calculative trust, because CSR may signal a firm’s long-term ori-
entation that increase the value of implicit contracts for the firm. This integrative 
view contributed to stakeholder theory by presenting a more realistic description 
of the many implicit contracts that link firms and stakeholders. 
Finally, I argued that an implicit-contract perspective has predictive value 
in explaining CSR adoption. This perspective has never been used yet to under-
stand CSR antecedents. The central idea is that, if CSR is sufficiently costly, then 
the adoption of CSR by a firm should vary directly with the circumstances that 
make implicit contracts valuable and inversely with the factors that allow firms 
to achieve trustworthiness in absence of CSR. To demonstrate how this idea can 
be operationalized and used in research, I identified five domains in which the 
implicit-contract perspective yields testable predictions about CSR adoption. 
These domains cover such variables as the characteristics of a firm’s products, a 
firm’s competitive strategies, its size, its age, its profitability, the salience of par-
ticular stakeholders, and a firm’s organizational identity. The predictions that I 
presented in this section were speculative in nature and only aimed to show that 
the implicit-contract perspective is rich in empirical content. Both proper theo-
rizing and empirical testing of these predictions are left for future research.  
3. Implications for future research 
The contributions that I offered in this thesis provided important answers to the 
original research question. I presented arguments and empirical findings that 
suggest that CSR leads to stakeholder trust and positive organizational outcomes 
for adopting firms when: 
a) Stakeholders attribute values-driven motives to the CSR activities of the 
firms (Chapters 1 and 2). 
b) Firms sell products that are trust-intensive (Chapters 3 and 4). 
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c) Firms engage in long-term relationships with stakeholders that are ac-
companied by implicit contracts (Chapters 5 and 6). 
These answers have many implications for research about CSR. Some of 
this research follows the default assumption that stakeholders respond favoura-
bly to a firm’s adoption of CSR. This assumption implies that stakeholders are 
naive (that is, they are not sceptical of a firm’s motives behind CSR adoption) 
and that they uniformly value a firm’s efforts in adopting CSR. Once one accepts 
that stakeholders may be sceptical of CSR adoption, it becomes important to un-
derstand the processes that drive stakeholders’ interpretation of a firm’s motives 
and the subsequent stakeholders’ responses to CSR. These processes have re-
ceived limited attention until now: CSR research has mostly looked at firms, e.g. 
at the antecedents of CSR adoption or at the financial benefits for firms of being 
socially responsible. Less research has been conducted on stakeholders, e.g. what 
they expect from firms, how they view them, and how they perceive and decode 
corporate behaviour in modern societies. As a matter of fact, even “stakeholder 
theory” deals much more with firms than with stakeholders; as shown by 
Laplume et al. (2008), the academic contributions on stakeholder actions and 
responses are dwarfed by those on firm actions and responses and the other 
ways in which firms define or manage stakeholders. In this respect, a focus on 
the processes that drive organizational outcomes of CSR is useful because it forc-
es researchers to explore the conceptual and physical spaces (the office, the fac-
tory, the marketplace, the natural environment) where firms and stakeholders 
meet and relationships are built, transformed, or destroyed. By connecting 
stakeholder responses to motive attributions (within the framework of attribu-
tion theory), I tried to expand our understanding of these relationships. Further 
research in this area is sorely needed. Without a better understanding of how 
stakeholders interpret and respond to CSR, policy makers would also be limited 
in their ability to select proper incentives for pushing firms to assume responsi-
bility for social and environmental issues. Research in this area should address 
both the psychological foundations of stakeholder theory (Aguinis & Glavas, 
2013) and the economic structure of firm-stakeholder relationships (Schreck et 
al., 2013). 
Moreover, stakeholders do not necessarily value CSR. Some of them may 
frame CSR as an ideological discourse aimed at extending corporate power in a 
time of weak national institutions. CSR initiatives can be seen as instrumental in 
the worst sense of the word, e.g. as ways of exploiting critical social causes for 
profit. Stakeholders may suspect that firms pass on them the underlying costs of 
CSR initiatives, through lower product quality or higher prices. It is even con-
ceivable that stakeholders are indifferent to CSR. As I emphasized in Chapter 4, 
there are both private (personal-level) and public (societal-level) benefits in 
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many CSR initiatives and stakeholders may act on the former rather than the lat-
ter. Empirical research has already found that consumers may attach a “sustain-
ability liability” to certain environmentally-friendly products (Luchs, Naylor, 
Irwin, & Raghunathan, 2010) but much work has still to be done with regard to 
other stakeholder categories and CSR initiatives.  
I tried to show that the organizational outcomes of CSR do not result from 
initiatives per se, but from complex relationships between firms and stakehold-
ers. CSR research often presents stakeholders as neutral audiences that try to 
evaluate impartially a firm’s behaviour. For example, this approach is evident in 
research that links CSR to a firm’s reputation or to its attractiveness for talented 
employees. However, stakeholders are not neutral, because they participate in 
relationships with firms. Research has started to investigate how stakeholder 
trust depends on characteristics of the relationship, e.g. deep vs. shallow rela-
tionships (Pirson & Malhotra, 2011). The aims pursued by stakeholders in the 
relationship also deserve consideration. Like firms, stakeholders can act instru-
mentally. A firm’s CSR adoption can be irrelevant to stakeholders when they are 
unsatisfied with the benefits they draw from the relationship. Conversely, in ab-
sence of CSR, the relationship may be cemented by both parties’ interest in coop-
erating. As Adam Smith noted, even robbers and murderers may have a society 
by simply abstaining from robbing and murdering each other (Gambetta, 1987). 
Research has shown that deontic responses (i.e. reaction to observed third-
party justice; Rupp, Shao, Thornton, & Skarlicki, 2013) exist but they are unlikely 
to extend to all stakeholder behaviour. Volkswagen cars sales were largely unaf-
fected by the emission scandal (Campbell, 2016), a sign that customers cared 
more about fuel and running costs than environmental protection. The fact that 
Volkswagen cheated government regulations to avoid impairing fuel-efficiency of 
cars could even be construed as loyalty to customers. The trust literature uses the 
construct of benevolence to capture the preferential treatment for a person or a 
group. In Chapter 6, I showed that CSR may express benevolence to certain 
stakeholders but, as the Volkswagen case illustrates, benevolence does not coin-
cide with CSR. Other dimensions of trustworthiness can be largely unrelated to 
CSR. For example, keeping one’s word is highly valued in organized crime; Ital-
ian mafiosi call themselves “uomini d’onore” (“honourable men”) and are charac-
teristically obsessed with betrayal (Gambetta, 1987). The trust literature usually 
subsumes keeping one’s word under the construct of integrity, giving it an ethical 
colouring that does not reflect the variety of situations in which one’s word can 
be kept. This was a tension in Chapter 6, where I tried to reduce integrity to the 
more limited sense of honouring promises. This chapter highlighted other ten-
sions between trustworthiness and CSR that need to be explored, in particular 
the interplay between trustworthiness and calculative considerations in stake-
holder behaviour. Research on strategic alliances and firm-supplier affiliations 
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has studied the determinants of trust in inter-organizational exchanges (Poppo, 
Zhou, & Ryu, 2008), highlighting that trust is accumulated through both a histo-
ry of interaction and a forward-looking calculus by parties. Therefore, there is 
ample room for transferring knowledge and concepts from the rich literature on 
trust in inter-organizational exchanges to the investigation of how trust is nur-
tured in firm-stakeholder relationships. 
Finally, this thesis casts light on a difficult problem of the instrumental 
view of CSR, i.e., that strategic-driven motives tend to inhibit trust, while values-
driven motives tend to inspire it. This means that firms that want to profit from 
CSR may be those least likely to succeed. The supporters of the instrumental 
view insist on the advantages of win-win logic, but they do not consider that it 
leaves stakeholders in the dark about which of the two ‘wins’ actually drives the 
CSR activities of the firm. Instead of cooperation, this logic can prompt scepti-
cism, as exemplified by the fiery academic resistance to Creating Shared Value, a 
popular win-win approach (cf. Crane, Palazzo, Spence, & Matten, 2014). Lack of 
trust can be an effective hindrance to instrumentally-inspired CSR initiatives. 
MNCs have been trying to link communities in developing countries in their own 
supply chain, an example of “inclusive business” that applies a win-win logic. 
Communities are expected to gain from accessing rich Western markets, while 
MNCs gain from accessing low-cost resources. Although the relationship is po-
tentially beneficial to both parties, it requires the communities to make specific 
investments in service of the relationship, such as reorienting farming methods 
according to MNCs’ specifications. These investments make economic sense only 
if communities can trust MNCs not to act opportunistically. A win-win logic is 
unlikely to build the necessary trust, because a firm driven by profit could move 
elsewhere as soon as better opportunities arise in other countries. It is not sur-
prising that many farmers avoid inclusive business projects and opt for selling 
their produce to traditional traders in local informal markets (Vorley, 2016). 
Both conceptual and empirical research is needed on how firms can integrate 
CSR in their strategies without undermining their capacity to build trust and 
contribute to society.  
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Summary 
This thesis investigates Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) and trust in six re-
lated chapters. The research question that I address is: When and how does CSR 
lead to increased stakeholder trust and positive organizational outcomes for the 
adopting firms? In trying to answer this question, I want to advance the under-
standing of how CSR leads to trust, which is a fundamental aspect of any busi-
ness transaction. 
CSR is typically associated with attributes of trustworthiness, and in par-
ticular benevolence and integrity. However, trust occupies a unique position 
among the organizational outcomes of CSR (e.g., increased reputation, employee 
motivation, or consumer demand), because it also seems to be a precondition of 
all of them. CSR involves the promise by a firm to respect certain values or 
stakeholders’ interests, but often stakeholders are not in the position to observe 
whether the CSR attributes claimed by a firm are real. When stakeholders do not 
directly know whether promises are kept, trust becomes important to how they 
respond to a firm’s adoption of CSR. Moreover, trust implies a circularity. On 
one hand, CSR should signal to stakeholders that the firm is trustworthy. On the 
other hand, the signal rests on CSR information that is provided by the firm it-
self. So, how can stakeholders trust a firm to be socially responsible if they do not 
already trust it to be so? 
Research has shown that CSR may actually increase a firm’s trustworthi-
ness in the eyes of stakeholders, indicating that mechanisms exist that allow 
stakeholders to develop trust and sidestep the circularity. Nevertheless, the na-
ture and modus operandi of these mechanisms are still largely unclear, which 
provided the motivation for studying trust in this thesis. 
Previous literature has traditionally linked the organizational outcomes of 
CSR to their role in supporting the ‘instrumental view’ of CSR, which suggests 
that the basic motivation for a firm to adopt CSR is financial. Opponents have 
argued that this view is problematic in many respects, which could lead one to 
discount the importance of organizational outcomes. However, studying the 
conditions under which CSR produces organizational outcomes is central to an 
understanding of how firms may relate to social and environmental issues, re-
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gardless of what view is adopted. Organizational outcomes are essential for a 
‘normative’ view of CSR because firms have a constitutive profit orientation, 
compete in markets, and are subject to incentives to be efficient and innovative. 
Organizational outcomes that do not cover their costs (failing to provide an in-
strumental basis for action) can still help firms achieve long-term viability and 
enter the moral calculus of which efforts can be asked from a profit-oriented or-
ganization. Organizational outcomes are crucial even in a ‘political’ perspective, 
because the benefits for a firm of filling institutional voids or providing public 
goods help define limits of business intervention in political arenas. Therefore, 
studying these outcomes improves our knowledge of how organizations with 
profit objectives and that engage in market action can be socially responsible.  
A fundamental premise of this thesis is that organizational outcomes rest 
on how stakeholders react to CSR activities. Although this premise is long stand-
ing in stakeholder theory, much work has still to be done to unravel the complex-
ities of stakeholder reactions. Past CSR research has mostly looked at firms, e.g. 
at the antecedents of CSR adoption or at the financial benefits for firms of being 
socially responsible. Less research has been conducted on stakeholders, e.g. what 
they expect from firms, how they view firms, and how they perceive and decode 
corporate behaviour in modern societies. 
After reviewing the extant literature on the organizational outcomes of CSR 
(Chapter 1), I explore three interconnected themes: 
a) How the motives that stakeholders attribute to firms influence the cred-
ibility of CSR activities and the perceived trustworthiness of the firm 
(Chapter 2). 
b) How trust mediates the link between CSR activities and organizational 
outcomes (Chapters 3 and 4). 
c) How firms use CSR to pursue strategic objectives and to establish value-
creating relationships with stakeholders (Chapters 5 and 6). 
The goal of Chapter 1 is to synthetize the burgeoning research on organiza-
tional outcomes of CSR. The review is based on a literature search of leading ac-
ademic journals in management, marketing, organizational behaviour, and busi-
ness ethics. The selection produced an initial list of 131 articles published from 
January 2000 to December 2015. To reflect the most recent research, I also 
searched in-press sections of all the journals in the list to identify forthcoming 
papers that satisfied the selection criteria (as of December 2015). Finally, I cross-
referenced the sample with previous reviews and the references of the latest arti-
cles to identify impactful articles that were published in journals that were not in 
the search list. Therefore, the final sample for the review consists of 160 contri-
butions in 26 journals (17 in the search list and nine that published the addition-
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al impactful articles). I coded all the articles using a formalized codebook to iden-
tify the theories used, the examined organizational outcomes, the type of CSR 
activity presumed to originate the outcomes, the stakeholder categories involved, 
and the role stakeholders played in producing the outcome. 
The categorization that I use in this review is based on the observation that 
stakeholders serve at least three roles with regard to firms: a) they set expecta-
tions about the firm’s actions and policies, defining what is desirable or undesir-
able; b) they experience the effects of the firm’s behaviour; and c) they evaluate 
the firm’s behaviour, that is, they make judgments about how well the firm meets 
expectations or affects societal interests. By specifying what role is taken by 
stakeholders with respect to a focal CSR policy or action, this categorization al-
lowed me to classify the theoretical rationales underlying the mechanisms that 
drive outcomes. 
This review extends the previous syntheses in many ways. First, it covers 
important recent contributions (as I show, most studies in this area have been 
published after 2011). Second, the scope of the literature search is broader than 
previous reviews that have considered particular organizational outcomes (such 
as those related to customers or to nonmarket strategies). Finally, this review 
surpasses old distinctions based on stakeholder categories (e.g., internal vs ex-
ternal) and provides a better integration of research. 
The survey reveals that the implications of CSR for the economic objectives 
of firms are indeed numerous and significant. Starting from the reviewed contri-
butions, I provide an integrative framework that describes the processes that 
connect CSR to organizational response for each stakeholder role; this frame-
work reveals important knowledge gaps in the literature and opens avenues for 
future research. 
In Chapter 2, I look at the mechanisms that allow firms to use trust to 
achieve credibility in their CSR activities. Stakeholders are generally sceptical of 
the intentions of firms and suspect that the true motives behind CSR are not 
those stated by managers, but aim at avoiding social penalties or projecting fa-
cades. I followed previous literature in distinguishing among egoistic-driven, 
values-driven, stakeholder-driven, and strategic-driven motives. Extant research 
is particularly confusing with regard to strategic-driven motives, because differ-
ent studies have found stakeholders to respond positively, negatively, and neu-
trally to them. Furthermore, studies have given only limited attention to how 
motive attributions influence stakeholder beliefs about the credibility of the in-
formation provided by a firm. 
I introduce a model that describes the development of stakeholder trust as 
a two-stage process. In the first stage, stakeholders evaluate source credibility, 
based on the attributed motive and other elements, such as information content, 
likeability of the source, or circumstantial evidence. In the second stage, stake-
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holders make trustworthiness ascriptions to the firm, to the extent that they con-
sider the CSR activities real; in this stage, motive attributions link CSR to the 
trustworthiness dimensions that can be ascribed to a firm. However, when 
trustworthiness ascriptions are lacking, trust may still materialize due to calcula-
tive considerations.  
The model treats stakeholder trust based on second-hand information (i.e., 
not directly observed by stakeholders) as a type of initial trust. I rooted the mod-
el in attribution theory, which tries to explain how individuals attribute causes to 
others’ actions. This theory implies that stakeholders interpret CSR activities 
simplistically, without making justice to the mixed motives that may move firms 
to engage in these activities. Based on this model, I provide eight theoretical 
propositions that link the four motives to source credibility and trustworthiness 
ascriptions. The main point is that strategic-driven motives block these ascrip-
tions but support calculative trust; only values-driven motives provide a proper 
basis for benevolence and integrity ascriptions. These propositions solve previ-
ous contradictory research on motive attribution and have implications for how 
firms should communicate their CSR activities. 
I also present a list of reasons why second-hand CSR information can be a 
relatively weak basis for trust development. For example, the institutional struc-
tures that should make sure that CSR information is accurate are still embryonic 
in most countries; many CSR activities are not costly enough to constitute strong 
signals; categorization processes could lead stakeholders to stereotyping of firms, 
deactivating positive information. 
Chapters 3 and 4 are empirical studies that provide evidence that consum-
ers respond differently to product offerings by Italian retailers, based on the de-
gree of social responsibility ascribed by consumers to them. The first study 
(Chapter 3) covers Fair Trade products and was published as a co-authored arti-
cle in the Journal of Business Ethics in 2009. This study tests a mediated rela-
tionship between CSR and organizational outcomes, showing that trust drives 
positive customer response to Fair Trade products. 
We choose Fair Trade products because they embody positive ethical and 
social values that harmonize with general principles of social responsibility, but 
above all because they heavily depend on consumer trust. Usually, consumers 
cannot verify that Fair Trade products are obtained according to the ‘fair’ terms 
alleged by the label (price paid to producers, workers’ rights, and so on). Fair 
Trade certification and labelling organizations can act as trust mediators, but re-
tailers also have a role to play. 
Our hypotheses were that customer perceptions that a retailer is socially 
responsible are related to trustworthiness of that retailer; such trustworthiness is 
then transferred on the Fair Trade products sold by that retailer, eliciting brand 
loyalty and willingness to pay the premium price. We also expected that the ef-
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fect compounded when the retailer was marketing Fair Trade products under its 
own private label.  
To test the hypotheses, we interviewed 400 retail chain customers in Milan 
and Florence (Italy). Importantly, we took into account the inherent multidi-
mensionality of CSR and measured only the ‘Consumer CSR’ dimension, i.e., the 
extent to which consumers perceived that the retailer wanted to satisfy their 
needs and protect their rights and interests. Our idea was that consumers re-
spond more to how a firm treats them than to how it treats stakeholders in gen-
eral. Confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) indicated that the measurement model 
fitted data well and achieved discriminant validity. Then we built a structural 
equation model (SEM) that incorporated our hypotheses. Testing provided full 
support for all of them. This study provides evidence that socially responsible 
firms can achieve competitive advantage in the marketplace through increased 
trustworthiness, in particular for those products in which trust is crucial in de-
termining customer decision.  
 The second study (Chapter 4) covers organic products and was also pub-
lished as a co-authored article, on Business Strategy and the Environment in 
2010. This study shows that customers are sensitive not only to ‘Consumer CSR’ 
(the degree of care and concern that the retailer has for them), but also to ‘Envi-
ronmental CSR’ (the willingness of the retailer to protect the natural environ-
ment). Like Fair Trade products, organic products need trust because consumers 
cannot directly verify whether requirements of organic farming have been re-
spected. However, organic products are different than Fair Trade products in 
that consumers expect two kind of benefits: a) private benefits, i.e. organic 
products are expected to be safer, richer in nutrients, and promote health; b) 
public benefits, i.e. organic farming avoids pesticide, veterinary drugs, additives 
and other synthetic inputs that are bad for the environment. In contrast, Fair 
Trade customers only aim at public benefits (improved well-being of growers or 
producers). 
The study consisted in 183 field interviews to customers of a COOP hyper-
market in Milan. Italy provided an appropriate setting for investigating demand 
for organic products, because it was the third-ranking European market in this 
product category (after Germany and United Kingdom) and had a higher per-
capita consumption of organic products than the European average. By focusing 
the study on a single retailer, we excluded unobserved heterogeneity in charac-
teristics of different retailers that could influence consumer trust. We also ex-
cluded variation in unobservable reactions of customers to different categories of 
organic products, by concentrating the questionnaire on a single product, which 
was a yogurt sold under the Biologici COOP label. Thus, the only source of varia-
tion in our data was the consumer perception of the degree of COOP’s social re-
sponsibility.  
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Again, we used CFA to verify that the fit of our scales was adequate and 
SEM to test our hypotheses. The resulting model provides strong support to 
them. These findings confirm that CSR allows firms to increase their trustwor-
thiness in the eyes of customers, adding value to trust-intensive products and 
leading to positive consumer attitudes. The study implies that mainstream retail-
ers should improve their social and environmental performance, and communi-
cate it to customers, if they want to expand their business in the growing niche of 
organic products. An important policy implication is that retailers can serve as 
an effective guarantee of the origin of organic products and complement public 
certification schemes, such as the EU organic label. 
In Chapter 5, I examine how firms use CSR to pursue their strategies. This 
chapter was published in 2010 in a collection edited by C. Louche, S. O. Idowu, 
and W. L. Filho, Innovative CSR: From Risk Management to Value Creation 
(Greenleaf Publishing). One could expect that socially responsible firms try to 
maximize organizational outcomes of CSR by differentiating themselves from in-
dustry rivals and choosing hard-to-imitate activities. Starting from evidence that 
points in the opposite direction, I delineate a distinction between what I call 
‘convergent CSR’ (in which firms adopt practices that have been developed col-
lectively) and ‘divergent CSR’ (in which firms build unique CSR practices). The 
widespread diffusion of codes of conduct, certified managerial standards, ethical 
labels, and various types of inter-firm collaboration testify to the prevalence of 
the convergent approach. 
Why do socially responsible firms engage in convergent CSR instead of 
pursuing unique ways to deal with stakeholders? Managers may prefer conver-
gent CSR because they want to respect ethical principles or are forced to be so-
cially responsible by external coercion, and do not see CSR as a source of com-
petitive advantage. But in other cases, which constitute the focus of the chapter, 
convergent CSR can be strategically motivated: managers choose to share the 
benefits from CSR with rivals in the industry. 
The central contribution of this chapter is in identifying a list of strategic 
reasons (i.e., motivated by expected organizational outcomes) for choosing the 
convergent approach. I present six non-exhaustive reasons, drawing from insti-
tutional theory and other streams of research that have explored strategic inter-
action among firms in industries. The reasons are: institutional isomorphism, 
environmental uncertainty, rivalry mitigation, low barriers to imitation, econo-
mies of scale, reputation interdependencies. For each of them, I describe their 
theoretical rationale, provide illustrative examples, and explain why they can be 
strong enough to push whole industries toward convergent CSR. These reasons 
are conceptually independent from each other but can overlap empirically; there-
fore, I proposed some criteria to discriminate among them in research. This 
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chapter extends knowledge of how organizational outcomes shape a firm’s deci-
sions about its CSR activities. 
In Chapter 6, I propose an integrative view of CSR, stakeholder trust, and 
implicit contracts that help explain how organizational outcomes are produced in 
complex relationships with stakeholders. Stakeholder theory has frequently ad-
vanced the concept that firms are nexuses of explicit and implicit claims. CSR 
and related forms of stakeholder management have been seen as ways of honour-
ing implicit contracts with stakeholders. Moreover, implicit contracts are be-
lieved to encourage relationship-specific investment and to motivate effort by 
stakeholders. 
In outlining the role of CSR in implicit contracts, I try to move beyond the 
traditional economic interpretation, which reduces the trustworthiness of the 
firm to the expectation that the firm will find it beneficial to honour the contract. 
In this interpretation, stakeholder trust is always calculative, i.e., stakeholders 
rationally assess the conditions that may drive the firm to fulfil promises. This 
interpretation is too narrow because decades of trust research point at the exist-
ence of other types of trust that are founded on personal ties and social rules, ra-
ther than calculation. 
I suggest that CSR facilitates firms in entering implicit contracts by signal-
ling a firm’s long-term orientation (which is related to calculative trust) and by 
supporting stakeholder ascriptions of firm benevolence and integrity (which is 
not). However, CSR is often not required to enter implicit contracts, because it 
can be superseded by alternative ways of demonstrating trustworthiness. For ex-
ample, sheer firm profitability may reveal that the firm is extracting rents from 
implicit contracts and will not renege on them. If stakeholders are also doing so, 
not many of them will withdraw from the relationship only because the CSR per-
formance of the firm is somewhat inadequate. 
Under the premise that CSR is costly, because it absorbs resources that 
could serve other purposes (including managerial attention), I argue that the de-
gree of adoption of CSR is directly related to industry- and firm-level variables 
that make implicit contracts important to a firm’s strategies, and inversely relat-
ed to the strength of overriding factors that make a firm trustworthy in implicit 
contracts. Based on this reasoning, I analyse five domains (including such varia-
bles as the characteristics of a firm’s products, a firm’s competitive strategies, its 
size, its age, its profitability, the salience of particular stakeholders, and a firm’s 
organizational identity) and provide empirical predictions about rates and forms 
of adoption of CSR.  
In the Conclusion I summarize the main contributions of the thesis to the 
research question, discussing theories and results from previous chapters. I also 
present implications and limitations of the work and suggest perspectives for fu-
ture research.  

  
Samenvatting 
Dit proefschrift onderzoekt Maatschappelijk Verantwoord Ondernemen (MVO) 
en vertrouwen in zes samenhangende hoofdstukken. De onderzoeksvraag die ik 
aan de orde stel is: Wanneer en hoe leidt MVO tot een verhoogd vertrouwen bij 
belanghebbenden en positieve organisatorische resultaten voor de bedrijven die 
het invoeren? Om deze vraag te beantwoorden, wil ik inzichtelijk maken hoe 
MVO leidt tot vertrouwen, wat een fundamenteel aspect van zakelijke transacties 
is. 
MVO wordt doorgaans geassocieerd met kenmerken van betrouwbaarheid, 
met name welwillendheid en integriteit. Vertrouwen neemt echter een unieke 
positie in bij de organisatorische resultaten van MVO (bijvoorbeeld toenemende 
reputatie, werknemersmotivatie of consumentenvraag), omdat het tevens een 
voorwaarde voor elk van deze punten is. MVO behelst de belofte van een onder-
neming om bepaalde waarden of belangen van belanghebbenden (stakeholders) 
te respecteren, maar vaak zijn belanghebbenden niet in staat om te beoordelen of 
de door een bedrijf vermelde MVO-kenmerken reëel zijn. Wanneer belangheb-
benden niet precies weten of afspraken worden nagekomen, is vertrouwen een 
belangrijke factor voor hun reactie op de invoering van MVO bij een onderne-
ming. Bovendien impliceert vertrouwen circulariteit. Aan de ene kant moeten 
MVO-belanghebbenden duidelijk maken dat het bedrijf betrouwbaar is. Aan de 
andere kant rust het signaleren hiervan op MVO-informatie die door het bedrijf 
zelf wordt aangeleverd. Dus hoe kunnen belanghebbenden erop vertrouwen dat 
een bedrijf maatschappelijk verantwoord is als ze er niet al vertrouwen in hebben 
dat dit zo is? 
Onderzoek heeft aangetoond dat MVO voor belanghebbenden daadwerke-
lijk het vertrouwen in een onderneming kan doen toenemen, wat aangeeft dat er 
mechanismen bestaan die het mogelijk maken vertrouwen bij belanghebbenden 
te ontwikkelen en de circulariteit te omzeilen. Toch zijn de aard en de modus 
operandi van deze mechanismen nog grotendeels onduidelijk, wat de motivatie 
verschafte voor het onderzoeken van vertrouwen in dit proefschrift. 
Eerdere literatuur heeft traditiegetrouw een verband gelegd tussen de or-
ganisatorische resultaten van MVO met hun rol in de ondersteuning van de 'be-
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langrijke opvatting' van MVO, wat suggereert dat de fundamentele motivatie 
voor een bedrijf om MVO in te voeren financieel is. Tegenstanders hebben be-
toogd dat deze opvatting in vele opzichten twijfelachtig is, wat ertoe zou kunnen 
leiden het belang van de organisatorische resultaten buiten beschouwing te laten. 
Het onderzoeken van de voorwaarden waaronder MVO organisatorische resulta-
ten voortbrengt is echter essentieel voor een goed begrip over hoe bedrijven in 
verband staan met sociale en milieukwesties, ongeacht hun opvatting hierover. 
Organisatorische resultaten zijn essentieel voor een 'normatieve' opvatting over 
MVO, omdat bedrijven zich richten op een constitutieve winst, concurreren op 
markten, en onderhevig zijn aan prikkels om efficiënt en innovatief te zijn. Orga-
nisatorische resultaten die niet kostendekkend zijn (er niet in slagen om een be-
langrijke basis voor activiteiten te bieden) kunnen bedrijven nog steeds helpen 
levensvatbaarheid op lange termijn te bereiken, en de morele calculus van de in-
spanningen te behalen die aan een op winst gerichte organisatie worden gesteld. 
Organisatorische resultaten zijn van cruciaal belang, zelfs in een 'politiek' per-
spectief, omdat de voordelen voor een onderneming van het vullen van institu-
tionele vacua of het verstrekken van algemene goederen helpen bij het definiëren 
van de grenzen van de bedrijfsinterventie op politiek gebied. Daarom vergroot 
het onderzoeken van deze uitkomsten onze kennis over hoe organisaties met 
winstdoelstellingen, die zich bezighouden met de markt, maatschappelijk ver-
antwoord kunnen zijn.  
Een essentieel uitgangspunt van dit proefschrift is dat de organisatorische 
resultaten berusten op hoe belanghebbenden reageren op MVO-activiteiten. 
Hoewel deze veronderstelling al langer bekend is in de theorie over belangheb-
benden moet er nog veel werk worden verzet om de complexiteit van de reacties 
van belanghebbenden te ontrafelen. Bij eerder MVO-onderzoek is vooral gekeken 
naar bedrijven, bijvoorbeeld naar de voorafgaande feiten bij MVO-invoering of 
naar de financiële voordelen voor bedrijven om maatschappelijk verantwoord te 
ondernemen. Er is minder onderzoek gedaan naar belanghebbenden, bijvoor-
beeld wat zij verwachten van bedrijven, hoe hun opvatting is over bedrijven, en 
hoe zij het gedrag van ondernemingen in de moderne samenleving beschouwen 
en interpreteren. 
Na een overzicht van bestaande literatuur over de organisatorische resulta-
ten van MVO (hoofdstuk 1), verken ik drie samenhangende thema's: 
a) Hoe de motieven die belanghebbenden toeschrijven aan bedrijven in-
vloed hebben op de geloofwaardigheid van MVO-activiteiten en de 
waarneembare betrouwbaarheid van de onderneming (hoofdstuk 2). 
b) Hoe vertrouwen intervenieert in de relatie tussen MVO-activiteiten en 
organisatorische resultaten (hoofdstuk 3 en 4). 
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c) Hoe bedrijven MVO gebruiken om strategische doelstellingen na te stre-
ven en waarde-creërende relaties met belanghebbenden te vormen 
(hoofdstukken 5 en 6). 
Het doel van hoofdstuk 1 is om het ontluikende onderzoek naar de organi-
satorische resultaten van MVO te synthetiseren. Het overzicht is gebaseerd op 
een literatuurstudie van toonaangevende wetenschappelijke tijdschriften over 
management, marketing, gedrag in organisaties en bedrijfsethiek. De selectie 
bracht een eerste lijst voort van 131 gepubliceerde artikelen van januari 2000 tot 
december 2015. Om het meest recente onderzoek weer te geven zocht ik ook in 
nog niet uitgebrachte onderdelen van alle tijdschriften in deze lijst om verwachte 
verhandelingen die voldeden aan de selectiecriteria vast te stellen (vanaf decem-
ber 2015). Tot slot heb ik kruisverwijzingen tussen eerdere beoordelingen en de 
referenties van de nieuwste artikelen toegepast om invloedrijke artikelen vast te 
stellen in tijdschriften die niet in de lijst met zoekresultaten stonden. Daarom 
bestaat de uiteindelijke steekproef van het overzicht uit 160 bijdragen in 26 tijd-
schriften (17 in de lijst met zoekresultaten en negen artikelen die ook veel invloed 
hebben). Ik heb alle artikelen gecodeerd volgens een geformaliseerd codeboek 
om de gebruikte theorieën, de onderzochte organisatorische resultaten, het soort 
MVO-activiteit dat de resultaten tot stand brengt, de betrokken belanghebben-
dencategorieën, en de rol die de belanghebbenden vervullen bij het produceren 
van het resultaat vast te stellen. 
De indeling die ik gebruik in dit overzicht is gebaseerd op de waarneming 
dat belanghebbenden ten minste drie rollen met betrekking tot bedrijven vervul-
len: a) zij hebben verwachtingen over het optreden en het beleid van de onder-
neming, definiëren wat gewenst of ongewenst is; b) zij ervaren de gevolgen van 
het gedrag van de onderneming; en c) zij evalueren het gedrag van de onderne-
ming, dat wil zeggen dat ze een oordeel vormen over hoe goed het bedrijf voldoet 
aan de verwachtingen of maatschappelijke belangen beïnvloedt. Door te specifi-
ceren wat de rol is van belanghebbenden met betrekking tot een centraal MVO-
beleid of -actie, kon ik door deze indeling de theoretische beweegredenen classi-
ficeren die ten grondslag liggen aan de mechanismen die uitkomsten bepalen. 
Dit overzicht werkt de eerdere syntheses op vele manieren uit. Ten eerste 
omvat het belangrijke recente bijdragen (zoals ik laat zien zijn de meeste studies 
op dit gebied na 2011 gepubliceerd). Ten tweede is de omvang van het literatuur-
onderzoek breder dan eerdere onderzoeken die specifieke organisatorische resul-
taten (zoals die gerelateerd aan consumenten of niet-marktgerichte strategieën) 
in aanmerking hebben genomen. Tot slot overschrijdt dit overzicht oude ver-
schillen op basis van categorieën van belanghebbenden (bijvoorbeeld intern ver-
sus extern) en biedt het een betere integratie van onderzoek. 
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Uit het onderzoek blijkt dat de gevolgen van MVO voor economische doel-
stellingen van de bedrijven inderdaad talrijk en significant zijn. Ik ben begonnen 
met de geëvalueerde bijdragen, en zorg daarmee voor een integraal kader dat de 
processen beschrijft die MVO verbinden met de organisatorische reactie voor el-
ke belanghebbenden-rol; dit kader laat belangrijke hiaten zien in de kennis in de 
literatuur en verschaft mogelijkheden voor toekomstig onderzoek. 
In hoofdstuk 2 kijk ik naar de mechanismen die het bedrijven mogelijk 
maken om vertrouwen te gebruiken om de geloofwaardigheid in hun MVO-
activiteiten tot stand te brengen. Belanghebbenden zijn over het algemeen scep-
tisch over de intenties van bedrijven en vermoeden dat de ware motieven achter 
MVO niet die zijn die managers aangeven, maar richten zich op het voorkomen 
van sociale sancties of schijnvoorstellingen. Ik heb eerdere literatuur gevolgd in 
het onderscheid tussen beweegredenen die worden gestuurd door egoïsme, 
waarden, belanghebbenden en strategie. Bestaand onderzoek is bijzonder ondui-
delijk wat strategisch-gestuurde beweegredenen betreft, omdat verschillende 
studies hebben geconstateerd dat belanghebbenden hierop positief, negatief en 
neutraal reageerden. Bovendien hebben studies slechts beperkt aandacht ge-
schonken aan hoe toegekende beweegredenen de overtuigingen van belangheb-
benden beïnvloeden met betrekking tot de geloofwaardigheid van de door een 
onderneming verstrekte informatie. 
Ik heb een model geïntroduceerd dat de ontwikkeling van het vertrouwen 
van belanghebbenden beschrijft als een proces in twee fasen. In de eerste fase 
evalueren belanghebbenden bron-geloofwaardigheid, gebaseerd op de toegeken-
de beweegreden en andere elementen zoals informatie-inhoud, appreciatie van 
de bron, of indirect bewijs. In de tweede fase geven belanghebbenden ascripties 
van betrouwbaarheid aan de onderneming naarmate zij de MVO-activiteiten re-
eel vinden; in dit stadium verbinden toegekende beweegreden MVO met de be-
trouwbaarheidsdimensies die aan een bedrijf kunnen worden toegeschreven. 
Wanneer ascripties van betrouwbaarheid echter ontbreken, kan het vertrouwen 
nog steeds worden beschreven door weloverwogen meningen.  
Het model behandelt vertrouwen van belanghebbenden gebaseerd op 
tweedehands informatie (dat wil zeggen, niet rechtstreeks door belanghebbenden 
waargenomen) als een soort initieel vertrouwen. Ik heb het model verankerd in 
de attributie-theorie die probeert uit te leggen hoe individuen oorzaken aan ac-
ties van anderen toeschrijven. Deze theorie impliceert dat belanghebbenden 
MVO-activiteiten simplistisch interpreteren, zonder recht te doen aan de ver-
schillende redenen die ondernemingen kunnen bewegen deel te nemen aan deze 
activiteiten. Op basis van dit model geef ik acht theoretische proposities die de 
vier beweegredenen verbinden aan geloofwaardigheid van de bron en ascripties 
van betrouwbaarheid. Het belangrijkste punt is dat de strategisch-gestuurde be-
weegredenen deze ascripties blokkeren, maar weloverwogen vertrouwen onder-
Samenvatting   |   221  
  
steunen; alleen waarden-gestuurde beweegredenen vormen een goede basis voor 
welwillendheid en ascripties van integriteit. Deze stellingen lossen vorig tegen-
strijdig onderzoek naar toegekende beweegredenen op, en hebben gevolgen voor 
de manier waarop bedrijven hun MVO-activiteiten moeten communiceren. 
Ik introduceer tevens een lijst met redenen waarom tweedehands MVO-
informatie een relatief zwakke basis vormt voor de ontwikkeling van het ver-
trouwen. Bijvoorbeeld de institutionele structuren die ervoor moeten zorgen dat 
de MVO-informatie juist is, zijn in de meeste landen nog niet ontwikkeld; veel 
MVO-activiteiten zijn niet duur genoeg om sterke signalen uit te zenden; de cate-
gorisatie van processen kunnen ertoe leiden dat belanghebbenden bedrijven ste-
reotyperen, waardoor positieve informatie wordt ontkracht. 
De hoofdstukken 3 en 4 zijn empirische studies die bewijzen dat consu-
menten verschillend reageren op productaanbod door Italiaanse retailers, geba-
seerd op de mate van maatschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid die door de con-
sumenten aan hen wordt toegeschreven. De eerste studie (hoofdstuk 3) heeft be-
trekking op Fair Trade-producten en is gepubliceerd met het artikel in Journal of 
Business Ethics in 2009. Deze studie toetst een gemedieerde relatie tussen MVO 
en de organisatorische resultaten, waaruit blijkt dat vertrouwen zorgt voor posi-
tieve reacties van klanten op Fair Trade-producten. 
We kiezen voor Fair Trade-producten omdat ze positieve ethische en socia-
le waarden belichamen die in harmonie zijn met de algemene beginselen van 
maatschappelijke verantwoordelijkheid, maar vooral omdat ze sterk afhankelijk 
zijn van het vertrouwen van de consument. Meestal kan de consument niet con-
troleren of de Fair Trade-producten worden verkregen op basis van de 'eerlijke' 
termen zoals die op het etiket worden vermeld (prijs betaald aan de producenten, 
de rechten van werknemers, etc.). Organisaties met Fair Trade-certificering en 
etikettering kunnen fungeren als mediators in vertrouwen, maar retailers hebben 
ook een rol te vervullen. 
Onze hypotheses waren dat de perceptie van de consument dat een retailer 
maatschappelijk verantwoord is, te maken heeft met de betrouwbaarheid van die 
retailer; die betrouwbaarheid wordt vervolgens overgebracht op de Fair Trade-
producten die worden verkocht door deze retailer, waardoor trouwheid aan het 
merk en de bereidheid om de hogere prijs te betalen worden verkregen. We ver-
wachten ook dat het effect nog wordt versterkt als de retailer Fair Trade-
producten onder de eigen naam op de markt brengt.  
Om de hypothesen te toetsen, interviewden we 400 klanten van winkelke-
tens in Milaan en Florence (Italië). Belangrijk is dat we rekening gehouden heb-
ben met de inherente multi-dimensionaliteit van MVO, en we hebben alleen de 
'Consument MVO' dimensie gemeten, dat wil zeggen de mate waarin de consu-
ment merkt dat de retailer aan hun behoeften wilde voldoen en hun rechten en 
belangen beschermde. Ons idee was dat consumenten beter reageren op hoe een 
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onderneming hen behandelt dan op hoe deze omgaat met belanghebbenden in 
het algemeen. Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) gaf aan dat het meetmodel 
goed bij de gegevens paste en discriminante validiteit behaalde. Daarna hebben 
we een structureel vergelijkingsmodel (SEM) gebouwd die onze hypothesen ver-
enigden. Toetsing zorgde voor een volledige ondersteuning hiervoor. Deze studie 
levert het bewijs dat maatschappelijk verantwoorde bedrijven concurrentievoor-
deel kunnen behalen via een grotere betrouwbaarheid in de markt, met name 
voor die producten waarin het vertrouwen van cruciaal belang is bij het bepalen 
van de beslissing van de consument.  
 De tweede studie (hoofdstuk 4) heeft betrekking op biologische producten 
en werd ook gepubliceerd in het artikel Business Strategy and the Environment 
in 2010. Deze studie toont aan dat klanten niet alleen gevoelig zijn voor 'Consu-
ment MVO' (de mate van zorg en aandacht die de retailer voor hen heeft), maar 
ook voor 'Ecologisch MVO' (de bereidheid van de retailer om de natuurlijke om-
geving te beschermen). Net als Fair Trade-producten behoeven biologische pro-
ducten ook vertrouwen omdat de consument niet direct kan controleren of aan 
de eisen van de biologische landbouw is voldaan. Biologische producten zijn ech-
ter anders dan Fair Trade-producten omdat consumenten twee verschillende 
voordelen verwachten: a) persoonlijke voordelen, dat wil zeggen biologische 
producten zijn naar verwachting veiliger, rijker aan voedingsstoffen, en zijn be-
vorderlijker voor de gezondheid; b) algemene voordelen, dat wil zeggen de biolo-
gische landbouw gebruikt geen pesticide, diergeneesmiddelen, additieven en an-
dere synthetische middelen die slecht zijn voor het milieu. Daarentegen willen 
Fair Trade-consumenten alleen algemene voordelen (verbeterde welzijn van de 
telers of producenten). 
Het onderzoek omhelsde 183 interviews, op locatie, met consumenten van 
een COOP-supermarkt in Milaan. Italië bood een geschikt kader voor het onder-
zoeken van de vraag naar biologische producten, omdat het op de derde plaats in 
de Europese markt in deze productcategorie staat (na Duitsland en het Verenigd 
Koninkrijk), en een hogere consumptie heeft per hoofd van de bevolking van bio-
logische producten dan het Europese gemiddelde. Door het onderzoek te richten 
op één retailer hebben we niet-waargenomen heterogeniteit in de kenmerken 
van de verschillende retailers die vertrouwen van de consument kunnen beïn-
vloeden uitgesloten. We hebben ook variatie in niet-waarneembare reacties van 
consumenten op verschillende categorieën van biologische producten uitgesloten 
door de vragenlijst te richten op één product, een yoghurt uit de Biologici COOP 
reeks. Zo was de enige bron van variatie in onze gegevens de consumentenper-
ceptie van de mate van sociale verantwoordelijkheid van de COOP.  
Wederom gebruikten we CFA om te verifiëren dat de pasvorm van onze 
schalen voldoende was, en SEM om onze hypothesen te toetsen. Het resulteren-
de model biedt hiervoor sterk bewijs. Deze bevindingen bevestigen dat MVO er-
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voor zorgt dat bedrijven hun betrouwbaarheid in de ogen van consumenten kun-
nen verhogen, waarde aan vertrouwen-intensieve producten toevoegt en leidt tot 
een positieve houding van de consument. Het onderzoek impliceert dat reguliere 
retailers hun sociale en ecologische prestaties moeten verbeteren, en dit aan con-
sumenten dienen te communiceren, als ze hun bedrijf willen uitbreiden in de 
groeiende niche van biologische producten. Een belangrijke beleidsimplicatie is 
dat retailers kunnen dienen als een effectieve garantie van de oorsprong van bio-
logische producten en een aanvulling kunnen vormen op de openbare certifice-
ringsregelingen, zoals het biologische label van de EU. 
In hoofdstuk 5 heb ik onderzocht hoe bedrijven MVO gebruiken om hun 
strategieën na te streven. Dit hoofdstuk werd gepubliceerd in 2010 in een collec-
tie bewerkt door C. Louche, SO Idowu, en WL Filho, Innovative CSR: From Risk 
Management to Value Creation (Greenleaf Publishing). Men zou kunnen ver-
wachten dat maatschappelijk verantwoorde bedrijven proberen om organisatori-
sche uitkomsten van MVO te maximaliseren door zich te onderscheiden van de 
concurrentie in de bedrijfssector en moeilijk te imiteren activiteiten kiezen. Uit-
gaande van het bewijs dat in de tegenovergestelde richting wijst, heb ik een on-
derscheid afgebakend tussen wat ik 'convergent MVO' (waarin bedrijven praktij-
ken invoeren die gezamenlijk zijn ontwikkeld) noem en 'afwijkende MVO' (waar-
in de ondernemingen unieke MVO-praktijken opbouwen). De algemeen aan-
vaarde verspreiding van gedragscodes, gecertificeerde bestuurlijke normen, 
ethisch verantwoorde etiketten, en verschillende vormen van samenwerking tus-
sen bedrijven getuigen van de prevalentie van de convergente aanpak. 
Waarom houden maatschappelijk verantwoorde bedrijven zich bezig met 
convergente MVO in plaats van dat ze unieke manieren nastreven om met be-
langhebbenden om te gaan? Managers kunnen de voorkeur geven aan conver-
gente MVO omdat ze ethische beginselen willen respecteren, of worden gedwon-
gen maatschappelijk verantwoord te zijn door externe actoren, en zien MVO niet 
als een bron van concurrentievoordeel. Maar in andere gevallen, die de focus van 
het hoofdstuk vormen, kan er een strategische reden voor convergente MVO zijn: 
managers kiezen ervoor de voordelen van MVO te delen met concurrenten in de 
bedrijfssector. 
De centrale bijdrage van dit hoofdstuk is het identificeren van een lijst met 
strategische redenen (dat wil zeggen, gebaseerd op de te verwachten organisato-
rische resultaten) voor het kiezen van de convergente aanpak. Ik introduceer zes 
niet-limitatieve redenen, op basis van de institutionele theorie en andere stro-
mingen van onderzoek die de strategische interactie bij de ondernemingen in de 
bedrijfssector verkend hebben. De redenen hiervoor zijn: institutioneel isomor-
fisme, onzekerheid op milieugebied, concurrentie-mitigatie, lage belemmeringen 
voor imitatie, schaalvoordelen en reputatie wisselwerkingen. Voor elke reden be-
schrijf ik hun theoretische rationale, bied ik illustratieve voorbeelden, en leg ik 
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uit waarom ze sterk genoeg zijn om hele bedrijfssectoren in de richting van con-
vergente MVO te bewegen. Deze redenen zijn conceptueel onafhankelijk van el-
kaar maar kunnen empirisch overlappen; daarom heb ik een aantal criteria voor-
gesteld om onderscheid tussen hen in het onderzoek te maken. Dit hoofdstuk 
werkt de kennis uit van hoe de organisatorische resultaten vorm geven aan be-
slissingen van een onderneming over haar MVO-activiteiten. 
In hoofdstuk 6 leg ik een integrale weergave voor van MVO, vertrouwen 
van belanghebbenden, en impliciete contracten die helpen verklaren hoe de re-
sultaten van de organisatie worden geproduceerd in complexe relaties met be-
langhebbenden. De theorie van belanghebbenden heeft vaak het concept naar 
voren gebracht dat bedrijven dwarsverbindingen zijn van expliciete en impliciete 
claims. MVO en aanverwante vormen van belanghebbendenmanagement wor-
den gezien als manieren om impliciete contracten met de belanghebbenden te 
erkennen. Bovendien wordt veronderstelt dat impliciete contracten relatie-
specifieke investeringen aanmoedigen en inspanning door belanghebbenden mo-
tiveren. 
Door de rol van MVO in impliciete contracten te schetsen probeer ik verder 
te gaan dan de traditionele economische interpretatie, die de betrouwbaarheid 
van de onderneming reduceert tot de verwachting dat het bedrijf het zinvol vindt 
om het contract na te komen. In deze interpretatie is vertrouwen van belangheb-
benden altijd weloverwogen, dat wil zeggen dat belanghebbenden rationeel de 
voorwaarden beoordelen die ervoor kunnen zorgen dat de onderneming beloftes 
kan volbrengen. Deze interpretatie is te beperkt, omdat tientallen jaren van on-
derzoek in vertrouwen wijzen op het bestaan van andere vormen van vertrouwen 
die zijn gebaseerd op persoonlijke banden en maatschappelijke regels, in plaats 
van die gebaseerd op weloverwogenheid. 
Ik stel voor dat MVO bedrijven faciliteert in het invoeren van impliciete 
contracten door het signaleren van de langetermijnoriëntatie van een onderne-
ming (die is gerelateerd aan weloverwogen vertrouwen) en door het ondersteu-
nen van ascripties van belanghebbenden van robuuste welwillendheid en integri-
teit (wat dat niet is). Maar MVO is vaak niet nodig om impliciete contracten in te 
voeren, omdat het kan worden vervangen door alternatieve manieren om be-
trouwbaarheid aan te tonen. Zo kan pure winstgevendheid aantonen dat het be-
drijf opbrengst extraheert uit impliciete contracten en dat het deze nakomt. Als 
belanghebbenden dit ook doen, zullen er niet veel zijn die zich uit de relatie te-
rugtrekken alleen omdat de MVO-prestaties van de onderneming enigszins on-
toereikend zijn. 
Onder de voorwaarde dat MVO duur is omdat het middelen absorbeert die 
voor andere doeleinden kunnen worden ingezet (met inbegrip van bestuurlijke 
aandacht), beargumenteer ik dat de mate van invoering van MVO direct gerela-
teerd is aan variabelen op bedrijfssector- en ondernemingsniveau die impliciete 
Samenvatting   |   225  
  
contracten van belang maken voor de strategieën van een bedrijf, en omgekeerd 
evenredig zijn met de sterkte van dwingende factoren die een onderneming be-
trouwbaar in impliciete contracten maakt. Op basis van deze redenering analy-
seer ik vijf domeinen (met inbegrip van variabelen zoals de kenmerken van de 
producten van een bedrijf, concurrentiestrategieën van een bedrijf, de grootte, de 
leeftijd, de winstgevendheid, de karakteristieke trekken van bepaalde belangheb-
benden en de organisatorische identiteit van een bedrijf) en bied ik empirische 
voorspellingen aan over de tarieven en de vormen van de invoering van MVO.  
In de conclusie vat ik de belangrijkste bijdragen van de scriptie samen tot 
de onderzoeksvraag door de theorieën en resultaten van voorgaande hoofdstuk-
ken te bespreken. Ik vermeld tevens de implicaties en beperkingen van het werk 
en ik draag perspectieven voor toekomstig onderzoek voor. 
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